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And should I then presume? 




Introduction to the Thesis 
This thesis is about nature, in a certain sense. However, it is not a work of natural philosophy. 
Instead, this thesis uses nature as a lens, or refractive mirror, through which to examine an 
altogether more inscrutable idea. The unconditioned. There are various ways in which one can Òget 
startedÓ with this idea, so to speak. In order to get started here, I must first put the unconditioned 
into a very specific context: the years 1781 Ð 1804, and two German philosophers, Immanuel Kant 
and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. 
Both KantÕs and SchellingÕs works are difficult, and diverse in their objects of study. There are four 
chapters in this thesis, and any one of them could have easily been extended to become a thesis in 
its own right. There is a wealth of varying opinion on both Kant and Schelling, not just in the years 
that I cover, but also across the whole of their intellectual (and often personal) lives. Despite the 
difference of scholarly opinion regarding each philosopherÕs work, I found in my research that the 
idea of the unconditioned kept re-emerging, sitting there stubbornly on the corner of the page, or in 
my peripheral vision. In searching for ways to comparatively examine KantÕs and SchellingÕs 
philosophy, it was the unconditioned which, in some yet to be articulated manner, sunk into the 
foundations of my thinking.  
Before getting started proper, therefore, it is incumbent upon me to bring the unconditioned into 
view. Firstly, the word: unconditioned, which in the original German is das Unbedingte. What first 
struck me about this idea is how it transforms in the change of hands from Kant to Schelling. Kant 
speaks almost exclusively in his critical philosophy of the unconditioned. Schelling, on the other 
hand, speaks of another similar yet not quite identical idea: the absolute. Both ideas troubled both 
men for many years. Both ideas seem to lie on the very edge of what is expressible, philosophically 
or otherwise. And yet, both the unconditioned and the absolute, in differing ways, represent two of 
the central pillars in KantÕs and SchellingÕs thinking between 1781 and 1804. 
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This thesis is about the unconditioned and the absolute, and how Kant and Schelling articulate them 
in their philosophy. It is about the extent to which these ideas can be articulated by philosophy at 
all. This thesis is about how KantÕs and SchellingÕs respective conceptions of nature can help to 
illuminate their attitudes toward the unconditioned on the one hand, and the absolute on the other. 
There are two philosophical constructions of nature with which I deal across the following four 
chapters. One is metaphysical, and the other is aesthetic. In both cases, I argue that the problem of 
articulating the unconditioned or absolute is of central importance. For both Kant and Schelling, an 
unconditioned ground is necessary to secure philosophyÕs place as a science. Kant seeks an 
unconditioned ground for knowledge, one that is constructed out of a critical analysis of the faculty 
of reason. For Schelling, an unconditioned ground for all things is the necessary starting point for 
philosophy. For Kant, philosophy seeks the unconditioned; for Schelling, it begins there. For Kant, 
the unconditioned is a rational principle; for Schelling, it is a mode of being.  
There are now two distinct ideas in play: the unconditioned or absolute on the one hand, and nature 
on the other. In order to establish how these ideas will function in this thesis, a couple of issues 
should be mentioned at this point. The first is the idea of God, which does not feature prominently 
in my discussion of Kant, but does appear in my discussion of Schelling, especially chapter four on 
SchellingÕs philosophy of art. The second is the precise use of nature with which I operate. Both of 
these issues are interrelated, and so I will dwell for a moment on each in turn. At various points in 
KantÕs work, he calls both God and nature the highest points of transcendental philosophy.
1
 God is 
of course bound up with nature for Kant, to the extent that teleological judgments predicated of 
nature lead one to what Kant calls the super-sensible. Without wishing to simplify, at this point it 
suffices to say that the distinction between nature and God for Kant rests upon the distinction 
between the sensible and the super-sensible. This distinction is supported in, for example, KantÕs 
                                                
1 The first declaration can be found, among other places, in the 1793 essay What Real Progress has 
Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff? (c. 20:292-3). The second can be 
found in KantÕs 1783 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (4:318). 
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1793 essay What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and 
Wolff, wherein Kant assigns the sensible to the metaphysics of nature, and the super-sensible to the 
metaphysics of morals (20:293). By itself, this distinction between the sensible and the super-
sensible is not hugely significant in terms of the God/nature issue, since both God and nature have 
their super-sensible objects (i.e. objects that cannot be experienced). 
Indeed, Kant makes it clear in the Progress essay that the metaphysics of nature and of freedom 
should not be considered as wholly separate sciences (ibid.). The more important distinction for 
Kant is that between theoretical and practical reason, and it is according to this distinction that the 
realms of nature and God are separable. Kant sharply distinguishes between metaphysics of nature 
and metaphysics of morals, the latter dealing with questions purporting to freedom, the moral law 
and ultimately, theology. While a trajectory can be laid out which leads from one domain to the 
other, and while this trajectory may indeed be necessary for KantÕs philosophy, nature and God are 
by no means the same domain for him. 
In the case of Schelling, the boundaries are not quite so clearly defined. As the reader will see in 
chapter four especially, it is often unclear exactly how God is at all distinguished from nature, the 
absolute, or the universe. Whereas Kant conducts his philosophy in a way that makes it fairly easy 
to limit oneÕs discussion to a specific issue, SchellingÕs writing by comparison allows for no such 
easy compartmentalisation, and this is why God necessarily appears in the latter half of this thesis. 
Having stated the above, it should be clear that I do not wish to enter a discussion on the extent to 
which Kant and Schelling mean the same thing when they refer to God; my point of comparison is 
rather between their conceptions of nature and the unconditioned or absolute. 
One of the most fundamental divisions Schelling sought to disassemble, mentioned above, was that 
between theoretical and practical philosophy. For Schelling, there is no experience of nature on the 
one hand, and nature in itself on the other. This is why nature cannot be spoken of in the same terms 
when talking about Kant as opposed to Schelling. When I talk about metaphysical and aesthetic 
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constructions of nature, I am talking about nature at its most fundamental level. I am talking about 
the possibility of nature itself, and with it, the possibility of thinking about nature. My specific 
focus is on KantÕs idea of nature in the Critique of Pure Reason, which I take to be synonymous 
with KantÕs deductions of the laws of experience. The question of nature in this respect is the 
question of knowledge of nature. When I consider nature aesthetically, I am referring to KantÕs 
theories of judgments of taste and teleological judgments. Once again, these have to do with the 
way Kant conceives of the faculties of human cognition. I do not, for example, conduct an analysis 
of KantÕs Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, though this book is surely still worthy of 
study. I am more focussed on how the metaphysical basis for knowledge on the one hand, and 
matters of taste on the other, inform and are challenged by SchellingÕs philosophy. When I talk 
about metaphysics of nature, I do not mean metaphysics of natural science. I am referring to that 
which makes metaphysics of nature possible in the first place, I am referring to the most basic 
construction of nature by philosophy, and where that nature is situated in the system of human 
thinking. For Kant, nature appears in a metaphysics of experience, for Schelling, it appears in a 
metaphysics of identity. These two metaphysical positions, in crude form, are the two halves of this 
thesis. 
So, the reader is now faced with two distinct ideas, the unconditioned or absolute on one hand, and 
nature on the other. Faced with the same two ideas, I came to realise that it was precisely the 
relationship between them which would form the common thread of comparison between Kant and 
Schelling. How is nature related to the unconditioned in Kant, and how is it related to the absolute 
in Schelling? In SchellingÕs case, the matter is not so straightforward, as, during the years of 
SchellingÕs career covered in this thesis, he modulates from unconditioned to absolute, and does not 
make clear what difference, if any he sees between them. From this initial common ground, and its 
subsequent differentiation in KantÕs and SchellingÕs metaphysical method, one general question and 
two specific ones emerge. The general question, which applies to Kant and Schelling both, can be 
posed as follows: 
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How can philosophy articulate the unconditioned or absolute, and what role does nature play in 
this? 
The specific questions apply to Kant and Schelling respectively. 
1. How can the unconditioned be articulated by critical metaphysics? 
2. How can the absolute be articulated through identity-philosophy? 
These questions, in order to be addressed, require an explanation of each term. What does nature 
mean for Kant, and for Schelling? What is the meaning of the unconditioned, or the absolute? What 
are contemporary readers to understand by these terms? These questions in turn lead to a further 
division in my thesis. Neither Kant nor Schelling are exclusively metaphysicians, their 
philosophical systems both contain works in aesthetics. Furthermore, both Kant and Schelling give 
poetry a privileged position in the arts. So, as well as this thesis comparing KantÕs and SchellingÕs 
philosophy, it is also a comparison between their metaphysics and aesthetics. Several questions 
guide this comparison. What may it be that art can tell us which philosophy cannot? What 
distinguishes the insights of the philosopher from those of the artist? Which point of view can best 
provide an articulation of the unconditioned, or of the absolute? These are all questions with which 
this thesis is concerned. 
In this thesis, I read Kant and Schelling in a particular way. Due to my concern with how they each 
articulate the unconditioned or absolute in their philosophy, I largely read Kant through the lens of 
SchellingÕs response to Kant. By this I mean that I have carefully chosen themes and specific 
arguments in KantÕs critical philosophy which resonate with those I discuss in Schelling. I do this 
for three reasons. Firstly, to extract particular problems from the wealth of KantÕs and SchellingÕs 
texts which I believe are of enduring importance. Secondly, to read Kant in a way that he is rarely 
read. And thirdly, to bring Schelling more into the arena of post-Kantian scholarship. I must make 
clear that in reading Kant and Schelling in this way, I do not wish to make Kant merely a precursor 
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to Schelling, nor Schelling merely a commentator on Kant. Both philosophers wrote on a huge array 
of topics during their respective careers. Nor do I wish to claim that natureÕs relation to the 
unconditioned or absolute is what Kant or Schelling were ÒreallyÓ talking about, even when they 
appeared to be discussing something else. Instead, I wish to employ the idea of nature and 




In addition to these theoretical and methodological considerations, there are also three pragmatic 
issues which I need to mention here. The first concerns the historical period that this thesis covers 
(1781-1804). This period is comprised out of two smaller periods, one from 1781 to 1790, and the 
other from 1795 to 1804. The first covers the primary texts by Kant that I discuss in chapters one 
and two, these being the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/7), and the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment (1790) respectively. Kant wrote three Critiques in this period, the second one being the 
Critique of Practical Reason (1988), but my discussion of Kant focuses on the connections between 
the first and the third. Though I also discuss other earlier texts by Kant, this is largely for purposes 
of context, and they are not analysed in the same depth as the first and third Critiques. The period 
1795-1804 covers the texts by Schelling that I discuss, which are greater in number. The significant 
ones are Of the I as a Principle of Philosophy (1795) Treatise Explicatory of the Idealism in the 
Science of Knowledge (1797), First outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature (1799), the 
Presentation of my System of Philosophy (1801) and Further Presentations from the System of 
Philosophy (1802), and the Philosophy of Art, which Schelling gave as a series of lectures in 1802 
and again in 1804. 
                                                
2 There is a growing area of scholarship examining these and similar issues, in particular the Kant-
Schelling connection. Though I do not deal with them at length here, there are two good examples of 
this in Paul FranksÕ All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in 




The second pragmatic issue concerns my labelling of the two philosophical topics that I examine in 
KantÕs and SchellingÕs work, namely, ÔmetaphysicsÕ and ÔaestheticsÕ. The title of this thesis refers 
to KantÕs ÔcriticalÕ philosophy, and SchellingÕs Ôidentity-philosophyÕ. The first term is perhaps more 
self-explanatory that the second. It is generally agreed that the first publication of KantÕs Critique of 
Pure Reason in 1781, marks the official beginning of his critical period. Therefore, I read the first 
Critique according to the ways in which is proposes KantÕs critical metaphysics, and the third 
Critique according to the ways in which it proposes KantÕs critical aesthetics. SchellingÕs identity-
philosophy, however, does not have such a clear start date. While SchellingÕs Presentation of my 
System of Philosophy of 1801 can be viewed as the first official declaration and definition of 
identity-philosophy, there are antecedents to it evident in earlier work. Also, Schelling remarks in 
the Presentation that he had always held the identity-philosophy to be his fundamental method, of 
which earlier works were merely components. I use the label of Ôidentity-philosophyÕ with this in 
mind. I take SchellingÕs identity-philosophy, at least in the period which I cover, to be his 
metaphysical method. Schelling does not refer to his writings on art as aesthetics, but rather as a 
philosophy of art. The Philosophy of Art lectures themselves are composed according to the same 
method of identity-philosophy. I therefore choose this term to refer to the period I cover as a whole. 
The third and final pragmatic issue concerns the structure of my thesis. The thesis has two parts. 
The first part is dedicated to Kant, the second part to Schelling. Chapters one and two discuss 
KantÕs metaphysics and aesthetics respectively, and chapters three and four discuss SchellingÕs 
metaphysics and philosophy of art respectively. While the thesis as a whole is intended to be read in 
order, I should note that some points which are raised in chapter one are answered in chapter three, 
specifically on the issue of the relation between the unconditioned and nature. The same is true of 
chapters two and four. I will make clear which points these are in the text itself, but it will be useful 
to keep this general structural point in mind. 
8 
 
Kant and Schelling are both challenging but fascinating philosophers. While they differ in many 
ways, one thing can be said equally of both; that one receives from their philosophy as much as one 
puts into it. In this thesis I have expended a great deal of myself not only to construct an argument 
worth making, but also to navigate the labyrinths contained in the texts themselves. My ideas 
emerged from a research process that was not defined before it began, but rather came to be defined 












Chapter One: Making Boundaries in Metaphysics  
1.1. The Conflicts of Metaphysics 
Abstract 
This exposition introduces KantÕs Critique of Pure Reason via the demand of reason for the 
unconditioned. In order to elucidate this concept of the unconditioned, I first provide some 
historical context behind KantÕs composition of the first Critique. I then outline the nature of the 
demand of reason as it articulated in the two Prefaces to the Critique in the A and B editions of the 
text. This leads me to a summary of transcendental idealism as KantÕs metaphysical method. 
Vitally, this involves the insoluble distinction between appearances and things in themselves. I 
make sense of this via KantÕs ÒCopernican hypothesisÓ and its significance for the critical 
philosophy more generally. It is at this point that I define my own reading of Kant, through a brief 
review of dominant traditions in Kant scholarship and assumptions associated with them. I make 
clear that my reading of Kant prominently involves the ÒidealistÓ preoccupation with self-world 
relations in the Critique. I too adopt this concern and use it to introduce KantÕs idea of the 
unconditioned proper. I conclude by relating this idea of the unconditioned to the question of 




1.1.1. Contextualising the Critique 
The publication of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 marks a radical shift in the history of 
Western metaphysics.
3
 Composed over ten years Ñ a period referred to as KantÕs Òsilent decadeÓ 
Ñ the CPR is KantÕs first official articulation of transcendental idealism.
4
 It is with this new 
method of philosophy that Kant attempts to put metaphysics on the path of a science.
5
 Kant 
characterises metaphysics as a Ôbattle-groundÕ, in which its procedure has so far remained Ôa merely 
random gropingÕ (Bxv). Transcendental idealism, then, is KantÕs attempt to resolve the conflict of 
metaphysics. So audacious was KantÕs task, that he published a second edition of the CPR in 1787, 
which contained substantial revisions and clarifications. This dual status of KantÕs text, while not 
discrediting KantÕs thought itself, does reveal a philosopher embroiled in struggles to achieve the 
clarity and completeness he believes metaphysics should possess. The story of how Kant came to 
realise this need to resolve the conflict of metaphysics is not a simple one. Opinion varies on the 
consistency of KantÕs views in his work prior to the CPR.
6
 While it is true that KantÕs pre-critical 
                                                
3 Hereafter CPR. 
4 Between his Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, and the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason in 
1781, Kant published only three texts, a review of the work of Moscati, an Italian surgeon and professor 
of anatomy (1771), Of the Different Races of Human Beings (1775), which was attached to an 
announcement for KantÕs lectures on physical geography, and two articles pertaining to KantÕs 
involvement with the Philanthropinum, a reformist school established in Dessau in 1774. These were 
published anonymously between 1776-7. In 1777 Kant composed the essay Concerning Poetic Fiction 
and Sensor Illusion, as a response to J.G. KreutzfeldÕs disputation at the latterÕs inaugural dissertation as 
professor of poetry at the University of Knigsberg. However, Kant never published this response 
during his lifetime, and the essay was not published in German until 1910. Sensory Illusion has been 
translated into English by Ralf Meerbote in Lewis BeckÕs book KantÕs Latin Writings (1992, 2nd ed.). 
Meerbote includes with his translation an introductory essay containing some interesting comments on 
KantÕs view of sensibility, which anticipate KantÕs analysis of sensible intuition in the CPR. 
5 CPR Bvii. 
6 For example, Gardner claims that KantÕs pre-critical writings Ôdo not express a unified philosophical 
outlookÉ[or a] cumulative progress towards oneÕ. These writings rather give the impression of 
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writings cover a diverse range of subjects, one thing that does seem to persist through KantÕs early 
work is a desire to reconcile metaphysics with natural science. In particular, Kant sought to provide 
a viable metaphysical foundation for the principles of Newtonian mechanics. With this exposition I 
therefore aim to summarise some of the reasons, meanings, and consequences of Kant conducting 
his metaphysics in a Newtonian universe. To do this, I briefly examine some of KantÕs pre-critical 
writings, which help contextualise KantÕs possible motivations in composing the CPR. 
KantÕs attempt to reconcile metaphysics with Newtonian mechanics is most explicitly articulated in 
the Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755), in which Kant sought to provide a 
purely mechanical explanation for the origin of the physical universe. In so doing, Kant confirmed 
his belief in the validity of NewtonÕs principles for describing the natural world. However, Kant 
went further than Newton in defending a mechanical account of the universe. While Newton 
claimed that the system of mechanics was the direct result of a divine hand, Kant advanced the 
Ònebular hypothesisÓ in which GodÕs existence is not directly necessary for explaining the 
formation and evolution of the universe.
7
 In place of divine creation, Kant developed a dynamic 
theory of matter in which matter posseses an inherent drive to form itself into harmonious 
arrangements. In the Universal History Kant believed that he could account for the entire universe 
according to NewtonÕs principles of attractive and repulsive force.
8
 This does not mean, however, 
that Newtonian science provides a complete description of reality for Kant. In addition, natural 
science requires some form of metaphysical support. KantÕs dynamic theory of matter is a not a 
physical theory; it is a metaphysical one. 
                                                                                                                                                            
Ôcontinual dissatisfaction and experimentationÕ (1999, p. 13). Beiser opposes these claims and instead 
argues that Ôthere is a single aim to all of KantÕs major early writingsÕ, which was to Ôprovide a 
foundation for the metaphysics of natureÕ (in Guyer, ed. 1992, p. 30). 
7 Universal History (trans. Hastie, 1969, p. 35). 
8 ibid., p. 23. 
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While KantÕs metaphysical position in the Universal History differs from that of the CPR, what 
remains in the latter is KantÕs contention that to merely observe empirical evidence is not sufficient 
for explaining oneÕs relation to the natural world. It matters also how one conducts such 
observations, the foundational principles that inform oneÕs investigations. If one observes the 
physical world according to the assumption that matter is inherently dynamic, one will reach 
different conclusions than if one conceives of matter as dead or inert. 
KantÕs view of how one should conduct metaphysics changed several times before he composed the 
CPR.
9
 Kant moved away from the belief that metaphysics should follow the methods of Newtonian 
science, leading to what Beiser has referred to as KantÕs Ôturbulent decadeÕ between 1760 and 1769 
(1992, p. 36). BeiserÕs account of this period tends to over-simplify matters, and ÔturbulentÕ is a 
somewhat hyperbolic description. However, it can be argued, as Beiser does, that Kant became 
sceptical about the possibility of a proper method for conducting metaphysics. KantÕs 1766 work 
Dreams of a Spirit-seer Elucidated by the Dreams of Metaphysics is a good example of this.
10
 
Dreams is a curious work, in large part because of its uncharacteristically ironic tone. In it, Kant 
engages with theologian and mystic Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772), comparing SwedenborgÕs 
stories of contact with the spirit world to the sophistries of dogmatic metaphysics.  
However, unlike BeiserÕs reading, which takes this work to represent KantÕs Ôgrowing disaffection 
with metaphysicsÕ (1992, p. 45), I take the less drastic view that Dreams is one example of KantÕs 
continued pursuit of a secure methodological ground for conducting metaphysics.
11
 In a letter to 
                                                
9 Cf. Beiser, 1992, pp. 30-46. 
10 Dreams of a spirit-seer elucidated by the dreams of metaphysics  
11 KantÕs letter to J.H Lambert in 1765 supports this claim: ÔFor a number of years I have carried on my 
philosophical reflections on every earthly subject, and after many capsizings, on which occasion I 
always looked for the source of my error or tried to get some insight into the nature of my blunder, I 
have finally reached the point where I feel secure of the method that has to be followed if one wants to 
escape the delusion of knowledge that has us constantly expecting to reach a conclusion, yet just as 
14 
 
Moses Mendelsohn from April 1766, Kant offers some explanation for the scepticism expressed in 
Dreams, a text which Mendelsohn did not look upon favourably. Kant explains that the tone of 
Dreams, to which Mendelsohn had taken some offence, was partly the result of KantÕs reluctance to 
write it (ibid., p. 54).
12
  
KantÕs correspondence during this time, particularly with philosopher and mathematician J.H. 
Lambert, reveals that Kant was embroiled in the task of working out proper demonstrations for what 
was to become the critical method of transcendental idealism. Kant and LambertÕs mutual 
admiration for each other is clear in these letters. Kant refers to Lambert in a letter from December 
1765 as the Ôgreatest genius in GermanyÕ (Zweig, 1967, p. 47). Kant sympathised with LambertÕs 
assertion that Ôwe do not get to any material knowledge from the form aloneÕ (ibid., p. 45), as well 
as the notion that Ôwhenever a science needs methodical reconstruction and cleansing, it is always 
metaphysicsÕ (ibid., p. 50). While KantÕs Òproper methodÓ of metaphysics would not materialise for 
another sixteen years, with the publication of the first edition of the Critique, Kant already held in 
1765 what he maintained in the CPR, that it would only be the Ôgreat, long-awaited revolution in the 
sciencesÕ that allowed Ôtrue philosophyÕ to Ôcome to lifeÕ (ibid., p. 49). 
Despite KantÕs pre-critical ruminations, highlighted in the correspondence above, KantÕs 
metaphysics prior to his discovery of the transcendental idealist method was largely rationalist in 
                                                                                                                                                            
constantly makes us retrace our steps, a delusion from which the devastating disunity among supposed 
philosophers also arises. For we lack a common standard with which to procure agreement from themÕ 
(Zweig, 1967, p. 48). While Kant proclaimed to have settled on a secure metaphysical method, the two 
works promised in his letter to Lambert were not as imminent as Kant indicated. KantÕs ÒMetaphysical 
foundations of natural philosophyÓ did not appear until twenty years later, as the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science (1786), and the ÒMetaphysical Foundations of Practical PhilosophyÓ, 
the contents of which Kant claims in the letter to have Ôalready worked outÕ (ibid., p. 48), never 
appeared. It is clear that Kant struggled with matters of method, but the presence of such struggles show 
that his interest in resolving the problems of metaphysics never waned. 
12 Mendelsohn had characterised the tone of Dreams as Ôbetween jest and earnestÕ in a previous letter to 
Kant, and it is this ambiguous attitude toward the subject matter which Kant sought to clarify. 
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nature, and led Kant to distinguish, not just the fields of application of metaphysics and natural 
science, but also the worlds which emerge from them. Hence, in the Inaugural Dissertation of 
1770, Kant defends a sharp distinction between the sensibility and intellect. Not only does this 
distinction pertain to our powers of cognition, but also to two distinct worlds, one which is accessed 
by the senses, and the other which is accessed by the intellect. This Òtwo-worldÓ hypothesis allowed 
Kant to claim that, while sensibility has access only to a certain kind of representation or 
ÔappearanceÕ, the intellect can in some sense grasp things as they really are, as well as things which 
cannot be experienced in a sensible manner. While Kant believed himself to have reconciled the 
systems Ð broadly construed Ð of Leibnizian rationalism and Newtonian science, what he had in 
effect done was separate out intellectual concepts from empirical experience, unable to account for 
how the two relate to each other. Kant still had not managed to unify physical and metaphysical 
explanations of the world, and it is this problem which leads to KantÕs characterisation of 
metaphysics, and indeed, human reason itself, in the CPR. It is to this characterisation that I now 
turn. 
1.1.2. Metaphysics as a Demand of Reason 
For Kant, the problem of reconciling physics and metaphysics Ñ to put it bluntly Ñ is not simply 
one of method. It arises out of a dilemma inherent in reason itself. In the Preface to the A edition of 
the CPR, Kant begins by outlining the dilemma of reason in the following way: 
Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge 
it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of 
reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its 
powers, it is also not able to answer. (Avii) 
The Ôbattle-groundÕ of metaphysics results from this dilemma, and so, in the Prolegomena to Any 
Future Metaphysics (1783), one finds the following questions: 
If [metaphysics] is a science, how does it come about that it cannot 
establish itself, like other sciences, in universal and lasting esteem? If it 
16 
 
is not, how does it happen that under the semblance of a science it 
ceaselessly gives itself airs and keeps the human understanding in 
suspense with hopes that never fade and are never fulfilled? (4: 256) 
If metaphysics is to be considered as a Ôcompletely isolated speculative science of reasonÕ (Bxiv), 
then one cannot expect to alter or improve upon the methods of metaphysics without first subjecting 
reason to its own internal examination. The two demands are therefore coextensive; reason must 
conduct a critique of its own powers, and in so doing construct a new and secure method for 
metaphysics.  
The demand which in turn issues from this new, critical metaphysics, is twofold. Its twofold nature 
informs the structure of this current chapter, and I remain preoccupied with it throughout the other 
chapters. KantÕs presupposition for making these various demands is that Ô[W]e have no knowledge 
antecedent to experience, and with experience all our knowledge beginsÕ (B1). On the one hand, 
then, Kant defines his metaphysics as one which is occupied with enumerating Ôthose concepts a 
priori to which the corresponding objects, commensurate with them, can be given in experienceÕ 
(Bxviii-xix). Here, reason is tasked with securing a priori the conditions of possibility for 
experience. On the other hand, Kant points out that such a task results in a ÔstartlingÕ consequence, 
namely, that reason must Ôtranscend the limits of possible experienceÕ in order to account for them. 
To properly ground the conditions of experience, KantÕs metaphysics simultaneously posits Ôthe 
unconditionedÕ which reason demands Ôas required to complete the series of conditionsÕ (Bxx). 
How is reason to negotiate the boundary between conditioned experience and the unconditioned, 
which ÔcompletesÕ, but does not enter into experience? The answer to this lies in KantÕs 




1.1.3. Transcendental Idealism and the Copernican Hypothesis 
KantÕs method of transcendental idealism is predicated upon what is known as the Copernican 
revolution in philosophy.
13
 The term ÔCopernican revolutionÕ in fact contains two distinct but 
related thoughts, both of which Kant introduces in the B Preface. LetÕs take ÔrevolutionÕ first. While 
the majority of the CPR is written in a fairly dry, ahistorical style, the B Preface is a good example 
of KantÕs references to historical factors which inform his transcendental idealism.
14
 Kant discusses 
mathematics and natural science in terms of a Ôsingle and sudden revolution [by which they] have 
become what they are, and indicates that metaphysics ought to Ôimitate their procedureÕ, if only by 
analogy (Bxvi). In terms of natural science, Kant refers to a procedure for metaphysics based on 
Ôthe student of natureÕ, which consists in Ôlooking for the elements of pure reason in what admits of 
confirmation or refutation by experimentÕ (Bxix). For the purposes of the CPR specifically, such a 
modelling of metaphysics upon the new, ÒrevolutionisedÓ sciences comes down to the necessary 
realisation that Ôreason has insight only into that which is produces after a plan of its ownÕ (Bxiii). 
This brings us to the other term in the phrase above: ÔCopernicanÕ. KantÕs Copernican hypothesis 
responds to the assumption that Ôall our knowledge must conform to objectsÕ. Instead, Kant claims 
that metaphysics fares better if it proceeds by supposing that Ôobjects must conform to out 
knowledgeÕ (Bxvi). KantÕs Copernican hypothesis is essentially this: Ôwe can know a priori of 
things only what we ourselves put into themÕ (Bvxiii).
15
 
KantÕs Copernican hypothesis has established the starting point for transcendental idealism, but has 
not yet defined it. If knowledge of objects is possible a priori, it remains to be shown what kind of 
                                                
13 I have used the term ÔhypothesisÕ in the subtitle to reflect KantÕs indication that his metaphysics 
Ômake[s] trialÕ with this method rather than plainly assert it. Cf. Bxvi. 
14 Ameriks has referred to this as the ÔHistorical-systematic connectionÕ. He identifies this connection 
as part of a larger Òhistorical turnÓ in philosophy, which recognises that philosophy must be rigorously 
constructed, but must also not be naive as to its historical context or influence. Cf. Ameriks, 2006, p. 
292. 
15 Cf. Deligiorgi, 2005, p. 101.  
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knowledge this is. The fundamental proposition of transcendental idealism in this regard is that 
Ôsuch [a priori] knowledge has to do only with appearances, and must leave the thing in itself as 
indeed real per se, but as not known by usÕ (Bxx). With this proposition, Kant has answered, in a 
preliminary way, the demand of reason, namely to supply an unconditioned corresponding to and 
completing the conditions of knowledge. The latter pertains to objects as they appear, namely, how 
objects Ôconform to our mode of representationÕ. The former pertains to things as they are in 
themselves. Resulting from this distinction is the equally fundamental one between thought and 
knowledge, which I touched on briefly above. It now becomes clear how this distinction takes effect 
in the CPR; that to know an object a priori means to Ôprove its possibilityÕ, i.e. the possibility of it 
being experienced. Knowledge is produced out of the elements of experience, which I discuss in 
detail in part two of this chapter. Thought, on the other hand, does not rely upon experience in the 
same way. A thought is possible only on the grounds that it does not contradict itself. Thinking a 
concept designates only a logical possibility of that concept, but to form knowledge out of that 
concept requires proof of its Ôobjective validityÕ, meaning, that the concept can be applied to 
appearances and thereby form an object of experience. 
Attitudes toward the Copernican hypothesis vary, both in terms of its correctness and its 
importance. These attitudes stem from larger, and often contesting, traditions in Kant scholarship. 
In order to understand some of these traditions, and to begin formulating my own position, I move 
now to a discussion of the most established traditions in approaching Kant. 
1.1.4. Analytic and Idealist Readings of Kant 
In his commentary on the CPR, Gardner distinguishes between what he calls ÔanalyticÕ and 
ÔidealistÕ interpretations of KantÕs philosophy (1999, pp. 30-33). The former, exemplified by the 
work of P.F. Strawson, concerns itself exclusively with the ways in which Kant defends the 
Ôtraditional epistemological goal of justifying our knowledge claimsÕ (ibid., p. 32).  The method of 
transcendental idealism, according to the analytic interpretation, has its main utility in refuting the 
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arguments of scepticism. Consequently, the Copernican hypothesis in commentaries such as 
StrawsonÕs is little more than a methodological idiosyncrasy, rather than a substantial proposition.
16
 
The idealist interpretation, exemplified in the work of Dieter Henrich, attempts to go beyond this 
initial goal, in order to investigate the more fundamental question over how it is the subject 
Ôconstitutes the worldÕ. In the analytic case, what are at issue are the structures of what we 
experience. In the idealist case, Ôexperience itself, the activity of experiencing, has an inherent 
structureÕ (ibid.), and furthermore, this structure is what gives rise to, shapes, constitutes, human 
knowledge. While GardnerÕs division may be oversimplifying matters somewhat, it nonetheless 
speaks to the diversity of opinion on the meaning and utility of KantÕs critical philosophy.  
The analytic position as it is expressed in StrawsonÕs The Bounds of Sense (1966), is certainly not 
without benefits. However, its view of the CPR is a fairly narrow one. As Strawson writes, Ôthe 
doctrines of transcendental idealism, and the associated picture of the receiving and ordering 
apparatus of the mind producing Nature as we know it out of the unknowable reality of things as 
they are in themselves, are undoubtedly the chief obstacles to a sympathetic understanding of the 
CritiqueÕ (p. 22). In StrawsonÕs view, the vital condition of KantÕs transcendental idealism is 
something Strawson calls the Ôprinciple of significanceÕ. This principle states that Ôthere can be no 
legitimate, or even meaningful, employment of ideas or concepts which does not relate them to 
empirical experienceÕ (ibid. p. 16). 
Henry Allison, whose work sits in something of an intermediary position between analytic and 
idealist readings, goes further than Strawson by arguing that the principle of significance is but one 
of multiple Ôepistemic conditionsÕ, which stem from the larger context of KantÕs anthropocentric 
model of knowledge. (Allison, 1983, p. 29). This anthropocentric model is a consequence of KantÕs 
Copernican hypothesis, of which the principle of significance is only a part. Kant himself says 
something similar to StrawsonÕs principle in the B Preface: Ôall possible speculative knowledge of 
                                                
16 Cf. Strawson, 1966, p. 23. 
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reason is limited to mere objects of experienceÕ (Bxxvi). However, Kant goes on to add that, in spite 
of this limitation of reason, we must still be able to think things beyond what we can experience, 
namely, things as they are in themselves. If KantÕs investigation were to cease at the level of 
conditions of experience, without investigating the character of what it is that appears to experience, 
then one is landed in Ôthe absurd conclusion that there can be an appearance without anything that 
appearsÕ (ibid.). On AllisonÕs gloss, it does indeed seem as though the principle of significance is 
not all that significant. He writes, Ôto say that objects Òconform to our knowledgeÓ is just to say that 
they conform to the conditions under which we can alone represent them as objectsÕ (1983, p. 28). 
Allison continues, Ôgiven this presupposition, there is no difficulty in accounting for either a priori 
or a posteriori knowledge of such objects, for it is an analytic truth that any object represented must 
conform to the conditions under which it can alone be represented as an objectÕ (ibid.). So, in brief, 
KantÕs transcendental idealism demands not just the principle of significance Ñ that metaphysics 
limits its knowledge claims to possible experience Ñ but further, that a real existing world be 
affirmed, out of which experience is partially constituted. It is with this further claim about what 
kind of world is affirmed by transcendental idealism that Gardner considers the idealist readings of 
Kant to be additionally concerned. It is because of this additional concern that I, at least 
provisionally, align myself closer to the idealist reading of Kant. This requires some qualification 
beyond that which GardnerÕs commentary offers.  
In addition to this deeper concern with Ñ put frankly Ñ Òthe worldÓ, that Gardner identifies with 
the idealist reading of Kant, there is another element that Henrich draws attention to. In The Unity 
of Reason, Henrich mentions the very diversity of opinion on Kant that Gardner summarises. In 
spite of the vast and continual labour expended upon understanding it, interpretations of KantÕs 
philosophy are hugely diverse, and appeal to various scholastic traditions (Henrich, 1994, p. 123-4). 
Any interpretation of Kant sensitive to this fact must recognise itself as such, as an interpretative 
exercise, which necessarily involves the forging of a relation between KantÕs texts, his purported 
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intentions in producing them, and our own contemporary concerns.
17
 With this in mind, Henrich 
outlines three procedures of philosophical commentary: paraphrastic-expository, genetic, and 
argumentative reconstruction (p. 124). Expository commentary presents the Ôtextual inventory of an 
entire workÕ for scrutiny. Genetic commentary adds to this the philosopherÕs perspective upon their 
own opus, attempting to expose Ôthe difficulties from which this work emergedÕ. Both of these 
forms of commentary are insufficient in HenrichÕs view, in that they are unable to Ôpenetrate the 
conceptual and argumentative fabric of the text itselfÕ (ibid.). The reconstructive procedure attempts 
to lay open the text, firstly by elucidating definitions and concepts internal to the text, and from 
these definitions it Ôisolates premises and arguments in texts of unarticulated complexityÕ. Henrich 
considers these reconstructions in philosophical commentary as Ôpreliminary work for 
interpretationÕ. In HenrichÕs estimation, the reconstructive procedure seeks to arrive at concrete 
assertions about the text in question, yet is also partakes in a hermeneutic exercise, such that it can 
find Ôsome textual basis even when it employs premises that are nowhere in the text under 
considerationÕ (ibid.). This is not to say that the interpretation imposes arguments on a text that does 
not support them, but rather that interpretation through reconstruction takes into account three vital 
factors. First, the text itself, removed from any potential context, theme or pre-existing agenda. 
Second, this text provides the basis for the formation of prevalent themes for the purposes of the 
interpretation being conducted. Thirdly, both of these elements are involved in a self-reflexive 
process of negotiation between the text, its historical position, and the position of the commentator. 
While HenrichÕs method is not without difficulties, there is good reason to at least be aware of the 
reconstructive method when discussing KantÕs philosophy. This is also not to say that my 
reconstruction of KantÕs aims and the arguments with which he attempts to prove them are what 
Kant himself intended in writing the CPR. Rather, the parts of the CPR with which I am concerned 
                                                
17 As Guyer points out in the introduction to his translation the CPR, paragraphs and even sentences of 
KantÕs text can be broken down into distinct argumentative units, and as such reconstructed in various 
ways to fit with various intentions (1998, p. vii). 
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form a constellation of philosophical problems which circulate around the main problem of this 
thesis: the way in which Kant and Schelling articulate the unconditioned in their philosophy. In 
tackling KantÕs CPR, I intend to forge a critical foundation upon which my thesis rests, such that 
each chapter reflects upon certain aspects of my central problem. Simply put that problem is as 
follows: How, if at all, can the unconditioned be articulated? 
1.1.5. The Unconditioned and the Question of Nature in the CPR 
It would appear at first glance that nature and the unconditioned are, quite literally, worlds apart. 
However, the task of forging a new metaphysics that Kant sets for himself in the CPR in fact 
requires that a delicate balance be struck between them.  As I have mentioned above, Kant made no 
secret of the fact that his philosophy was inspired by the methods of the natural sciences. In the 
CPR and the Prolegomena Kant remarks on the admirable qualities of the scientific methods and 
how these need to be emulated by philosophy in order for the latter to find the right path for its 
advances.
18
 There is therefore a danger that the possibility a priori of nature is in fact merely the 
possibility a priori of natural science. Strawson picks up on this worry, stating that in the CPR, 
Kant assumes that ÔNewtonian physics embodie[s] conditions of the possibility of empirical 
knowledge in generalÕ (1966, p. 23). There is a possibility here that Kant has limited what it is 
possible to know exclusively to that which is described by Newtonian mechanics. This chapter, 
while primarily expository, will also address this possibility. I begin by elucidating some of the 
fundamental elements in KantÕs structure of experience. From there I move on to examine how 
Kant articulates the unity of consciousness, particularly in relation to his denial of intellectual 
intuition. Finally I examine KantÕs theory of transcendental ideas, which, I claim, get us as close as 
is possible, within the CPR, to the unconditioned. 
  
                                                
18 Cf.. CPR, Bxvi; Prolegomena, 4:366. 
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1.2. The Elements of Experience 
Abstract  
Having introduced the themes in Kant with which this chapter deals, I now elucidate the core 
elements of experience in the CPR In relation to the central question of KantÕs transcendental 
idealism: how are synthetic a priori judgments possible? To understand the meaning of this 
question, I progress through KantÕs theory of intuition, concepts of the understanding, and the 
power of judgment, to establish how Kant views synthetic judgments in general. From here, I move 
to a discussion of the Analogies in order to illuminate what synthetic a priori judgments are and 
what knowledge can be yielded from them. This forms the first half of this chapter, and covers the 
main elements Kant deems necessary for knowledge. The second half conducts a discussion of three 
further elements in the CPR which are not items of knowledge; the unity of apperception, noumena, 
and intellectual intuition. While Kant articulates these concepts in various ways, they all share the 
common link of dealing with things beyond the realm of experience, and hence, beyond the realm 
of knowledge. I conclude by revisiting the question of nature in light of these discussions, and show 







1.2.1. Introduction  
Kant sums up the project of the CPR with the following question: Ôhow are a priori synthetic 
judgments possible?Õ (B19). To understand this question requires understanding KantÕs distinction 
between two modes of knowledge.
19
 Kant calls these pure and empirical. Empirical knowledge is 
knowledge a posteriori; knowledge formed out of experience. Kant defines empirical knowledge as 
being Ômade up of what we receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge 
(sensible impressions merely serving as the occasions) supplies from itselfÕ (B1). This gives rise to 
the question over what it is that our faculty of knowledge supplies to these sense impressions. Put 
simply, pure, or, a priori knowledge is that knowledge which is necessarily and universally 
independent of all experience. Pure knowledge is therefore not knowledge about properties or 




With this claim regarding pure a priori knowledge, Kant refutes both empiricism and rationalism. 
Regarding empiricism, Kant counters the claim that because knowledge begins from experience, 
knowledge therefore relies entirely upon experience. Regarding rationalism, Kant is claiming that 
the possibility of knowledge a priori does not mean that knowledge of objects is a merely mental 
phenomenon, or that this knowledge applies to a separate, non-empirical class of objects. The 
balance between these two extremes is found in the claim that all a priori knowledge pertains only 
to appearances (Erscheinungen) and not to things as they are in themselves.  
                                                
19 Erkenntnisse. 
20 This assertion can be shown through KantÕs line of reasoning in determining the concept of 
substance. He writes, Ôif we remove from our empirical concept of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, 
all properties which experience has taught us, we yet cannot take away that property through which the 
object is thought as substance or as inhering in a substance (although this concept of substance is more 
determinate that that of an object in general). Owing, therefore, to the necessity with which this concept 
of substance forces itself upon us, we have no option save to admit that it has its seat in our faculty of a 
priori knowledgeÕ (B6). 
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Before arriving to KantÕs conception of the synthetic a priori, I first elucidate KantÕs distinction 
between the two faculties responsible for knowledge in experience, the faculty of intuition and the 
faculty of the understanding. 
1.2.2. The a priori Forms of Intuition 
According to the above distinction between pure and empirical knowledge, it follows for Kant that 
to say merely that our senses receive data from the external world does not go far enough in 
explaining the nature, and vitally, the possibility of such receptive capacity. Sensible data must be 
formed before it can give rise to knowledge of an empirical item. Kant writes, Ôobjects are given to 
us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitionsÕ (A19). The first form of a priori 
knowledge offered in the CPR is therefore the a priori forms of intuition, space and time. 
Space and Time 
Kant classifies intuition (Anschauung) as the Ôimmediate relationÕ between a mode of knowledge 
and an object. Following the distinction between empirical and pure knowledge, there are also 
empirical and pure intuitions.
21
 With regard to appearances, there is both the matter and the form of 
an appearance. Again, following the same method of abstracting from a representation everything 
added to it from outside Ñ here this means, from concepts Ñ Kant deduces that the bare 
remainders are Ôextension and figureÕ. These components of an appearance are those without which 
one cannot make sense of an appearance at all. They belong to the form of appearances, and so, to 
the form of intuition. Of course, Kant cannot posit these forms of intuition arbitrarily; they must be 
established transcendentally. For Kant this means that space and time must be shown to be 
                                                
21  Kant makes this distinction in terms of pure and empirical representations (Vorstellungen). 
Representation is KantÕs most general term for the various components and activities involved in the 
formation of knowledge of objects. Kant himself assumes the term without qualification. An 
investigation into the use and suitability of ÔrepresentationÕ in Kant is a thesis in itself. I merely point 
out the term here in reference to the original German. Dickerson provides an informative overview of 
the issue of representation in Kant (2004, pp. 4-31). 
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necessary for every empirical experience, rather than simply happening to be present in experience. 
In order to show their necessity, Kant aims to prove that space and time are not material existences, 
but a priori forms of intuition. 
It is with this transcendental mode of proof that Kant seeks to guard against the nonsensical idea 
that one sees a different object each time they encounter it, or that one sees the same object, but 
according to different kinds of intuition. If there is no form of intuition a priori, it means that one 
cannot distinguish between oneself and the thing being intuited. It also eradicates any reason to 
believe that the object I am currently experiencing remains the same object when I next experience 
it, for if it has been constituted out of totally new intuitions, it thereby ceases to remain identical 
with itself. Each of these potential problems requires a particular form to secure intuitions as real 
relations to objects. 
In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant names the two a priori forms of intuition as space and time. 
Space is an Ôa priori representation, which necessarily underlies all outer appearancesÕ (B39). Time 
is the a priori form of Ôthe relation of representations in our inner stateÕ, (B50). Kant employs four 
main arguments to defend his conception of space, which he then applies analogously to time. For 
the sake of clarity, I will follow KantÕs arguments in reference to space.  
Firstly, space is not derived from empirical experience. It must be a priori, as Ôouter experience is 
itself only possible at all through [the] representation of spaceÕ (B38). One can know an object as in 
space, only insofar as space is presupposed as the mode of representation through which the object 
is experienced. As such, KantÕs second argument is that space is a necessary a priori representation, 
as it underlies all of our outer intuitions. As space underlies all outer intuitions, it is therefore not 
reducible to any particular instance of said intuition, and as such, Kant argues thirdly that space 
itself is a pure intuition (B39). As I have mentioned above, by ÔpureÕ Kant means both that it is a 
non-empirical intuition, and also that space itself is a singular indivisible representation, out of 
which particular realms and measures of space emerge. Diverse spaces can only occur within one 
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unified space, and this unified space must be presupposed as such before any particular spatial 
representation is possible. This leads to KantÕs fourth argument, that space is an Ôinfinite given 
magnitudeÕ (ibid.). Hence, all experience of external objects is a limitation of our pure a priori 
spatial intuition. A fifth and very important argument for space as an a priori intuition is KantÕs 
argument from geometry. According to this argument, geometrical representations can only be 
exhibited in intuition, i.e. immediately and as proof of their concept, if space and its dimensions are 
presupposed for intuition (B41). The conclusion from these arguments is that experience firstly 
requires that we represent to ourselves a form of externalisation, and that such externalisation 
happens at the level of intuition. Without the a priori intuition of space, no knowledge of objects in 
space is possible. 
As I mentioned, Kant defends his conception of time according to these same four arguments, with 
the key difference that where spatial intuition refers to external objects, time is Ônothing butÉthe 
intuition of ourselves and of our inner stateÕ (B50). As a result of this, time does not pertain to any 
empirical content, in the way that space does, but merely involves the relating of such content to the 
representations of our inner state. 
To sum up, space and time are a priori intuitions and not empirical concepts because the very 
possibility of the employment of empirical concepts relies upon space and time being already given. 
They are therefore neither objective (a property of objects) nor real (real existences), but are 
subjective and ideal.
22
 As forms of intuition they pertain only to appearances and not to things in 
                                                
22 This issue of the subjective and ideal status of space and time in Kant has been interrogated at length, 
exemplified in the years long debate between Adolf Trendelenburg and Kuno Fischer during the 1860s. This 
debate centered around TrendelenburgÕs claim that there exists a neglected alternative in KantÕs doctrine of 
space and time. Trendelenburg saw that Kant had managed to prove the subjectivity and ideality of space and 
time, but not the related inference that they could not be otherwise. Trendelenburg therefore put forward the 
suggestion that space and time are both subjective and objective. In KantÕs defence, Fischer staunchly 
disagreed. Neither space nor time permit me to tackle this debate at length here. Graham Bird has recently 
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themselves. Finally, space and time are the only forms of a priori intuition and hence the only 
forms that sensible data can take for human knowledge. To reiterate, this does not mean that 
knowledge itself is necessarily spatial and temporal. The kind of knowledge with which Kant is 
concerned is judgments of experience, and these can only occur within the forms of space and time. 
Or, to put it more clearly, Kant is concerned with what is necessary for explaining the possibility of 
judgments of experience. Intuition deals with that which is received through the senses, and so, by 
itself, intuition cannot form objects of knowledge. For this, a second element is required, and by 
extension a second faculty in which to house this element. The element is the concept and its faculty 
is the understanding. 
1.2.3. Concepts of the Understanding 
Knowledge is not possible through intuition alone. Rather, Kant insists, all items of knowledge are 
a combination of intuitions and concepts. Because of their distinct roles, Ôthe understanding can 
intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge ariseÕ (CPR, 
B75). Moreover, the framework governing the employment of concepts must not depend on 
particular experience. It must, like the forms of intuition, be a priori. So, as there are empirical and 
pure intuitions, there are empirical and pure concepts. To explain this separation, Kant contrasts 
formal, or general logic, with his own transcendental logic. I summarise KantÕs characterisation of 
formal logic in order to show why he asserts the need for transcendental logic. Formal logic 
contains Ôthe absolutely necessary rules of thought without with there can be no employment 
whatsoever of the understandingÕ (B76). It treats of Ôthe form of thought in generalÕ (B 79), hence 
Kant also refers to it as Ôgeneral logicÕ. These rules are posited Ôwithout any regard to difference in 
the objects to which the understanding may be directedÕ (B76).  This point is important and informs 
many of KantÕs qualifications over knowledge of appearance in contrast to knowledge of this in 
                                                                                                                                                            
covered the debate, defending FischerÕs position (2006). Edward Kanterian has responded to Bird, in defence 
of Trendelenburg (2013). 
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themselves. These include KantÕs distinction between phenomena and noumena, and his denial of 
intellectual intuition as a form of knowledge.  
Both of these topics are dealt with shortly. The important point here is that because formal logic 
Ôabstracts from all content of knowledgeÕ, meaning, the Ôrelation of knowledge to the objectÕ, it 
cannot furnish judgments about objects, but only about the forms of thought out of which objects 
are (presumably) constituted. As Kant puts it, Ôalthough our knowledge may be in complete 
accordance with logical demands, that is, may not contradict itself, it is still possible that it may be 
in contradiction with its objectÕ (B84). To put it simply, formal logic deals only with the relations 
between thoughts, and the only rule governing these relations is that they not result in a 
contradiction. However, the non-contradiction of the forms of thought does not guarantee that those 
thoughts will not contradict the objects to which they are related. Formal logic has Ôno touchstone 
for the discovery of such error as concerns not the form but the contentÕ. When formal logic is 
applied, not just to the rules of the understanding, but to objects themselves, it mistakenly asserts 
that the rules of the understanding can directly map onto objects. This use of logic Kant calls 
dialectic, and he takes this to mean the Ôlogic of illusionÕ (B86) 
The point of this summary of KantÕs view of formal logic is to contrast it with his transcendental 
logic, which he claims, can indeed grant knowledge of objects a priori, by demonstrating that the 
forms of thought in the understanding do not apply immediately to objects, but rather mediately, 
through intuition, to appearances. Therefore, the employment of the pure concepts of the 
understanding Ôdepends upon the condition that objects to which it can be applied be given to us in 
intuitionÕ (B87). 
The three paragraphs above pertain to the pure concepts of the understanding, and hence by 
extension to the Transcendental Deduction, by which Kant seeks to justify the categories as 
explaining synthetic a priori knowledge of objects of experience, and the Metaphysical Deduction, 
by which Kant seeks to enumerate an exhaustive list of these pure concepts. As with almost every 
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significant argument in the CPR, the Transcendental Deduction has been vigorously debated in 
scholarship. For example, Strawson, who is hostile to the whole project of a priori synthesis in 
Kant, is equally suspicious of transcendental logic as the vehicle for discovering the fundamental 
concepts of the understanding.
23
 Allison, by contrast, appears more invested in working out the 
intricacies of KantÕs argument on this issue.
24
 Similarly to the a priori forms of intuition, my task 
here is not to debate the relative merits or problems with Kant employing such a logic, but rather to 
attempt a description of it which accurately represents what Kant means. Having elucidated KantÕs 
distinction between formal and transcendental logic, I now summarise a few of the pertinent 
characteristics of the understanding generally, regarding its relation to, and synthesis of, the faculty 
of intuition. 
The Understanding as Faculty of Judgment 
Where the faculty of intuition is primarily receptive, the faculty of the understanding is spontaneous 
and active. Via the spontaneous act of the understanding, sensible intuitions are contextualised 
within a Ôhigher representationÕ, which comprises Ôthe immediate [sensible] representation and 
various othersÉand thereby much possible knowledge is collected into oneÕ (B94). On this basis, 
Kant calls the understanding the Ôfaculty of judgmentÕ. Here we see KantÕs most basic division 
necessary for the synthesis into judgments of knowledge. Knowledge by means of concepts Kant 
calls ÔthoughtÕ, but this knowledge concerns only relations between non-empirical forms i.e. rules 
of thought in general. However, concepts are also Ôpredicates of possible judgmentsÕ, and as such, 
the rules they dictate work only in reference to some external content, namely, intuitions (ibid.). 
The understanding is therefore the faculty of judgment because it is that part of cognition that 
prescribes rules for conceptualising sensible data into knowledge. No knowledge is possible from 
concepts alone. On this reading, concepts themselves can be viewed as rules for combining thoughts 
                                                
23 Cf. Strawson, 1966, pp. 74-85. 
24 Cf. Allison, 1983, pp. 116-129. 
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with intuitions. Kant writes, Ôif understanding in general is to be viewed as the faculty of rules, 
judgment will be the faculty of subsuming under rules; that is, of distinguishing whether something 
does or does not stand under a given ruleÕ (A133/B1720). Judgment is the process by which the 
combination of concepts and intuitions is monitored.  
However, Kant is not just concerned with concepts and intuitions that happen to combine in 
experience; he is concerned to show how they necessarily combine, in other words, how to have 
knowledge of objects a priori. Given the hypothesis of transcendental idealism, that knowledge 
begins with experience, it is clear that for Kant, a priori knowledge is not knowledge of objects 
independent of experience, i.e. things in themselves, but rather a form of knowledge which 
Ôdetermines something in regard to [objects] prior to their being givenÕ (Bxvi). This is the synthetic 
a priori. In the following section, I draw on what has been discussed so far to elucidate what kind of 
knowledge Kant has in mind when he refers to synthetic a priori judgments. For this task I look to 
the Analogies of Experience, which offer some examples of synthetic a priori knowledge. 
1.2.4. The Synthetic a priori and Analogies of Experience 
With the above elements summarised, I return to KantÕs question with which I started: Ôhow are a 
priori synthetic judgments possible?Õ (B19). In order to find KantÕs answer, I look both to the 
analogies in the CPR, and KantÕs discussion of the possibility of pure natural science in the 
Prolegomena. In combination, these discussions offer some insight into what it is that Kant takes a 
priori synthesis to be, and what knowledge is to be obtained out of it.  
It is easy to understand why KantÕs notion of synthesis might be cast off as superfluous to the 
arguments of transcendental idealism. After all, Kant calls synthesis in general the Ômere result of 
the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul without which we should 
have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever consciousÕ (B103). However, it 
is KantÕs task in the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure concepts of the Understanding, to rescue the 
notion of synthesis from this obscurity and demonstrate its role in the formation of knowledge. If 
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one assumes the importance of this part of KantÕs transcendental idealism, it is helpful to first get a 
grasp on what Kant means by synthesis, specifically, the different between knowledge a priori and 
synthetic knowledge a priori. At a basic level, synthesis for Kant simply means the act of  Ôputting 
different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] 
knowledgeÕ (B103). In terms of the transition from intuition to concepts, Kant defines synthesis in 
the following way: 
Space and time contain a manifold of pure a priori intuition, but at the 
same time are conditions of the receptivity of our mind Ñ conditions 
under which alone it can receive representations of objects, and which 
therefore must also always affect the concept of these objects. But if this 
manifold is to be known, the spontaneity of our thought requires that it be 
gone through in a certain way, taken up, and connected. This act I name 
synthesis. (B102) 
Concepts are not merely applied to representations Ñ which in KantÕs terms could be anything; 
empirical, non-empirical, thought, intuition etc. Concepts must be applied to the Ôpure synthesis of 
representationsÕ. The pure a priori synthesis which yields pure concepts of the understanding, does 
so on the basic of an already present manifold of a priori intuition, i.e. the forms of space and time. 
The pure concepts of the understanding which are yielded out of this synthesis are supposed by 
Kant to provide the Ôcomplete plan of a whole scienceÕ which is divided according to Ôdeterminate 
principlesÕ (B109). To give one example pertinent for my discussion, the pure concepts of the 
understanding provide the method by which totality (I will explore the implications of this term 
below) can be approached as Ôplurality considered as unityÕ (B111). To summarise, the pure 
concepts of the understanding provide the method by which the plurality of the sensible manifold 
can be held as a unity, i.e. a conceptual unity. This will become clear in my discussion of the 
analogies below. 
For the moment, I compare this with KantÕs discussion of the possibility of pure natural science in 
the Prolegomena. In ¤17, Kant asks how it is possible Ôto know a priori the necessary conformity to 
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law of experience itself in respect of all its objectsÕ (4:296). Two distinctions have already been 
mentioned which inform KantÕs answer: the distinction between appearances and things in 
themselves, and the distinction between intuition and understanding. The output of these 
distinctions for KantÕs conception of knowledge a priori is that we have conceptual access only to 
appearances, and this conceptual access is mediated by intuition. Hence, Kant answers his question 
by stating that Ôwe shall not be able to study the nature of things a priori in any other way than by 
investigating the conditions and universal (although subjective) laws under which alone such a 
cognition is possible as experience (merely according to form), and by determining the possibly of 
things as objects of experience)Õ (ibid.). I take Kant here to be referring to the same process of pure 
a priori synthesis that he discusses in the above quoted passages of the CPR. I therefore turn to the 
Analogies with the following notion in mind: that a priori synthesis establishes the possibility of 
experience means the same as to say that a priori synthesis establishes the possibility of nature. I 
claim, in short, that nature in Kant means experience of nature. 
I have now moved a little way beyond KantÕs central question; Ôhow are a priori synthetic 
judgments possible?Õ (B19), and moved to a further question: what is synthetic a priori knowledge? 
One place in which an answer to this can be found is in the Analogies of Experience. Kant 
introduces the analogies with a principle: ÔExperience is possible only through the representation of 
a necessary connection of perceptionsÕ (B218). This necessary connection is time. This presents a 
challenge for Kant, because now time must somehow be extended beyond its role as the condition 
of inner sense, and applied to objects. Gardner formulates the problem in the following way: Ôwe 
need to be able to form the idea of an objective time-order, in which objects exists with determinate 
temporal locations, as distinct from the merely subjective time-order in which our representations 
succeed one anotherÕ (1999, p. 172). However, Gardner misses the additional point of the 
Analogies, that they are regulative rather than constitutive. In other words, what is important is not 
the positing of an objective time-order, but a mode of thinking that proceeds as if such a time-order 
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existed. Because time is only the Ôformal condition inner sense (CPR, A99), such an objective time-
order cannot be proven.
25
 
Kant does not so much wish to posit an objective time, as demonstrate how perceptions are 
connected, i.e. synthesised, according to a necessary order. This synthetic unity is Ôthe essential in 
any knowledge of objects of the sensesÕ (B219), insofar as this knowledge is itself grounded in its 
own unity, the unity of apperception. That latter unity is the subject of its own discussion in the 
following section. The analogies themselves relate to the three ways in which time-relations are 
understood, duration, succession, and co-existence. Without further preamble, I list the analogies 
individually below. 
1. ÔIn all change of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in nature is neither 
increased nor diminishedÕ (B224). 
2. ÔAll alterations take places in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effectÕ 
(B232). 
3. ÔAll substances, in so far as they can be perceived to coexist in space, are in thoroughgoing 
reciprocityÕ (B256). 
Now, while these analogies may not seem overly impactful in terms of what they reveal about the 
nature of experience, they do, when read through the Prolegomena, reveal KantÕs basic attitude 
toward the way in which nature itself is to be conceived.
26
  I therefore juxtapose a passage from the 
                                                
25 The full passage, taken from the Transcendental Deduction in A, is revealing here: ÔWhatever is the 
origin of our representations, whether they are due to the influence of outer things, or are produced 
through inner causes, whether they arise a priori, or being appearances have an empirical origin, they 
must all, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense. All our knowledge is thus finally subject 
to time, the formal condition of inner senseÕ (A99) 
26 As with the issues of space and time, and the Transcendental Deduction, I do not here enter into a 
debate about the true meaning or relative validity of KantÕs Analogies. I present them in juxtaposition 
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CPR with another from the Prolegomena, which should, with minimal explication, display my 
interpretation of KantÕs idea of nature. In a passage directly after the three analogies, Kant writes 
the following: 
There are certain laws which make a nature possible, and these laws are a 
priori. Empirical laws can exist and be discovered only through 
experience, and indeed in consequence of those original laws through 
which experience itself first becomes possible. Our analogies therefore 
really portray the unity of nature in the connection of all appearances 
under certain exponents which express nothing save the relation of 
timeÉto the unity of apperceptionÉTaken together, the analogies thus 
declare that all appearances lie, and must lie, in one nature, because 
without this a priori unity no unity of experience, and therefore no 
determination of objects in it, would be possible. (A216/B263) 
In the Prolegomena Kant writes: 
How is nature in the formal sense possible, as the sum total of rules under 
which all appearances must stand if they are to be thought as connected 
in an experience? The answer cannot be other than this: it is possible only 
be means of the constitution of our understanding, according to which all 
those representations of sensibility are necessarily referred to 
consciousness, and through which the peculiar kind of our thinking, 
namely through rule, is first possibleÉThere are many laws of nature 
which we can only know by means of experience, but the conformity to 
law in the connection of the appearance, i.e. nature in general, we can get 
to know through no experience, because experience itself needs such 
laws, which lie a priori at the ground of its possibility. (4:318) 
                                                                                                                                                            
with remarks in the Prolegomena, which I interpret as forming an impression that nature at this stage of 
KantÕs thought is to be considered a universal law, which is the same as the possibility of experience. 
Allison provides a balanced an insightful analysis of first two analogies (1983, pp. 199-234). Morrison 
has more recently written on the third (1998). 
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It is with the Analogies of Experience, in my view, that Kant has offered examples Ñ for him, the 
only possible examples Ñ of synthetic a priori knowledge. The change of appearances in time is 
grounded in a more fundamental substance that does not change. Such changes in appearances are 
governed by the necessary relation of cause and effect. As formed within a determining temporal 
order, distinct appearances exist simultaneously. Taken together, these analogies, more than 
pertaining to a single nature, prescribe nature as singular, i.e. as a unity, for the sake of the unity of 
experience. So, to return briefly to a statement with which I opened, that KantÕs metaphysics 
operates in a Newtonian universe, I now offer some support in the form of NewtonÕs three rules of 
reasoning contained in book three of the second volume of his Principia mathematica, named ÔThe 
System of the WorldÕ: 
1. We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to 
explain their appearances 
2. Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes  
3. The qualities of bodies, which admit neither intensification nor remission of degrees, and 
which are found to belong to all bodies within reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the 
universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever. (1973, p. 398)  
As Newton claims, Ôsince the qualities of bodies are only known to us by experiments, we are to 
hold for universal all such as universally agree with experimentsÕ (ibid.). As Kant continues, Ôthe 
highest legislation of nature just lies in ourselves (Prolegomena, 4:319). For as much as the 
Analogies correspond to NewtonÕs laws, Kant still requires the Metaphysical Foundations for a 
complete description of that to which experience relates. Kant splits the Foundations into four 
chapters, which correspond to the fourfold division Kant makes in the table of categories (quantity, 
quality, relation and modality. In the third chapter ÔMetaphysics foundations of dynamicsÕ, Kant 
derives the three laws of mechanics, which correspond to the three categories subsumed under 
relation, namely substance, causality and community. These three laws of mechanics are the 
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permanence of the total quantity of matter (4: 542), the law of inertia (4: 543), and the equality of 
action and reaction (4: 544). All of these laws are synthetic a priori propositions, i.e. they are 
claims about the nature of our experience, prior to our having any experience. A synthetic a priori 
proposition, in essence, is a metaphysical law. These mechanical laws map fairly directly onto 
NewtonÕs laws of mechanics. However, for Kant, the laws of Newtonian science are of two 
different kinds. The Axioms or Laws of Motion which Newton derives in the Principia, Kant 
regards as synthetic a priori propositions, as summarised above. But other deductions of NewtonÕs, 
such as the inverse-square law of gravitation, Kant does not regard as a priori but a posteriori. In 
short, not all of NewtonÕs laws are synthetic a priori truths. Those of NewtonÕs laws which are not 




I have, perhaps provocatively, attempted to show that in KantÕs Analogies, that which can in 
principle be known of nature is, firstly, to a significant degree, that which Newtonian science 
describes, and secondly, located in a priori principles of experience. The question of the possibility 
of nature, which Kant defines in the Prolegomena as the Ôhighest point that transcendental 
philosophy can ever touchÕ (4:318), is a question of legislation by consciousness, not a question 
over how nature comes to be susceptible to such legislation. I turn now, therefore, to KantÕs view of 
consciousness, more specifically, the unity of apperception. 
  
                                                
27 Much more can of course be said on this topic, which in itself is a worthwhile area of study. I have 
touched briefly upon some salient points here that support my more general point that experience is of 
that which is described by the laws of Newtonian natural science. Michael Friedman has written a 
highly informative book on the subject. Cf. Friedman, 1992, pp. 136-164. 
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1.2.5. Apperception and the Indeterminate ÔI thinkÕ 
In a footnote to the Paralogisms, Kant offers a complex account of the status of self-consciousness 
Ñ which he refers to as the ÔI thinkÕ Ñ in relation to the synthesis of sensibility and understanding. 
Kant writes, 
The ÔI thinkÕ expresses an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e. 
perception (and thus shows that sensation, which as such belongs to 
sensibility, lies at the basis of this existential proposition). But the ÔI 
thinkÕ precedes the experience which is required to determine the object 
of perception through the category in respect of time; and the existence 
here [referred to] is not a category. (B423) 
To put it another way, while the ÔI thinkÕ must necessarily accompany, and be known to 
accompany, all empirical representations, it is not itself such a representation.
28
 Nor is it a category 
of the understanding, for if it were, it would not be able to accompany all applications of the 
categories. If the ÔI thinkÕ is neither an empirical representation nor a category, it cannot appear to 
our self-consciousness in its simple existence. Kant calls this self-conscious ÔIÕ, which is not 
accessible to thought or intuition, apperception. In his essay on the history of the theory of self-
consciousness, Manfred Frank writes Ôthe existence of the pure cogito is neither intuition nor 
category. It is epistemically classified as an Òinner perceptionÓ, which must be strictly distinguished 
from the perception of psychic objectivities, as these appear to Òinner senseÓÕ (2004, p. 59). 
However, it is very unclear exactly what this distinct Ôinner perceptionÕ is supposed to be.  
Kant clarifies matters somewhat later in the footnote: 
[I]t must be observed, that when I have called the proposition, ÔI thinkÕ, 
an empirical proposition, I do not mean to say thereby, that the ÔIÕ in this 
proposition is an empirical representation. On the contrary, it is purely 
intellectual because belonging to thought in general. Without some 
                                                
28 Kant calls it a ÔperceptionÕ, and it is unclear how this could be anything other than a representation. 
Kant remains ambiguous on the issue. 
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empirical representation to supply the material for thought, the actus, ÔI 
thinkÕ, would not, indeed, take place; but the empirical is only the 




Given the fact that the ÔI thinkÕ is an element of thought only, the same conditions apply to it as do 
the categories. Just as Kant says elsewhere in the CPR that the categories cannot be defined in 
themselves, but merely the rules for their employment established, so too the ÔI thinkÕ cannot be 
defined, or indeed accessed cognitively at all, because it is the pre-cognitive actus that is necessary 
for cognition to take place at all. Kant does not make clear how it is possible to know anything at all 
about the ÔI thinkÕ if his description is correct. He merely states that the ÔI thinkÕ, can only appear to 
us, in the same way objects may only appear to us, via our faculty of inner sense. Kant seems to be 
oscillating between two incompatible views here, one that posits the empirical nature of the I, the 
other which posits its purely intellectual nature. It was requisite for KantÕs system that the term 
knowledge (Erkenntnis) be applicable only to objects. Since the ÔIÕ is not an object but rather the 
subject that synthesises objects, knowledge of the ÔIÕ is essentially a non-starter. As Frank puts it, 
Ôpure self-consciousness cannot become an object of knowledge because it is not sensibleÕ (2004, p. 
57).  
Here Kant must endure a burden of proof. If self-consciousness, or the ÔIÕ, cannot be known, it must 
be secured in some other fashion. This is where Kant calls upon the notion of an Ôintellectual 
representationÕ to make sense of the unity of self-consciousness. But precisely because Kant has 
denied us intellectual intuition, the matter of an intellectual representation of the I becomes 
complicated and possibly incoherent.  
It must be possible for the ÔI thinkÕ to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something 
would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that 
                                                
29 Once again there is a problem here. Kant says that the ÔI thinkÕ is Ôpurely intellectualÕ, yet it must 
necessarily rely on sensation. 
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the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me. The proposition ÔI 
thinkÕ expresses the determination of my existence, however it does not tell me anything about the 
content of my existence. It is therefore the ground of empirical propositions, while itself containing 
nothing empirical. This would seem to suggest that the ÔI thinkÕ is purely intellectual. But Kant has 
said as the beginning of the footnote that the ÔI thinkÕ is not purely intellectual, for then Kant would 
have to allow for a form of intellectual intuition which grounds the ÔI thinkÕ. The sensible manifold 
Ñ that which is synthesised into objects via the cognitive activity of the I Ð is not given in the 
proposition ÔI thinkÕ. It is in this sense, then, that the unity of apperception is transcendental. It 
applies only to the possibility of objects in general, as unified by a thinking subject, without 
prescribing any of their content either to external nature or internal nature. It cannot itself become 
an object of knowledge, nor can its activity, the primary actus, be applied to anything beyond 
possible experience. I can only access this manifold via reflection upon my inner sense, which itself 
is governed by the form of a priori inner intuition, namely time. As with external appearances, I 
cannot directly perceive what is referred to by the ÔI thinkÕ, because the presupposition of the I think 
is part of what makes perception possible. This is a charitable reading of Kant, given the 
inconsistencies pointed out above.  Kant does hint at a justification for this charitable reading in 
another footnote: 
[S]ince I do not have another self-intuition which gives the determining 
in me (I am conscious only of the spontaneity of it) prior to the act of 
determination, as time does in the case of the determinable, I cannot 
determine my existence as that of a self-active being; all that I can do is 
to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that is, of the 
determination; and my existence is still only determinable sensibly, that 
is, as the existence of an appearance. But it is owing to this spontaneity 
that I entitle myself an intelligence. (B158) 
In this note, Kant succinctly summarises some important distinctions. The most important is that the 
self is not transparent to its own activity. It is only conscious of the spontaneity that precedes and 
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makes possible its activity. Just as I perceive objects outside of myself only as they appear to me 
rather than how they are in themselves, I must also perceive myself as I appear to myself. Kant 
explains that, just as for knowledge of an object distinct from me I require, besides the thought of 
an object in general (in the concept), an intuition by which I determine that general concept, so too 
for knowledge of myself I require, Ôbesides the consciousness, that is, besides the thought of myself, 
an intuition of the manifold in me, by which I determine this thoughtÕ (ibid.). In short, to know 
myself requires the same formal boundaries as to know other objects. But to be aware that it is me 
that is knowing these things requires a third thing, which cannot be intuited in the same manner. 
Frank provides some useful comments on this: 
In KantÕs view it is clear that pure apperception includes the immediate 
consciousness of its own existence, and that this consciousness, although 
pre-intuitional, nonetheless includes the perception of an existent. This is 
because existence cannot be attained by thought alone; it must be given if 
there is to be consciousness of it. (2004, p. 59) 
If we grant that there can be perception without intuition, then such perception would be purely 
conceptual, in the way Frank seems to suggest above. Even so, no knowledge would be possible 
from this conceptual perception, and no knowledge is granted by concepts alone for Kant. Still, it 
must be the case that this spontaneous activity of the ÔI thinkÕ is really present, even if it is not 
directly perceivable, for otherwise the thinking subject would be dependent on the givenness of 
contingent phenomena for its thought, and we would be back in the empiricist camp that Kant aims 
to escape. This of course presents a dilemma, for the very thing Kant had termed the Ôhighest-point 
in philosophyÕ (B134), that is, unity of self-consciousness, can itself never be conclusively proved. 
As Frank notes, Ôthe naked being of the self, as a condition of possibility of its self-appearance, 
remains a mere presuppositionÕ (2004, p. 57). Without the aid of intellectual intuition, the self can 
never be entirely revealed to itself. As Kant asserts in the Paralogisms; 
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[The unity of consciousness] is only in thought, by which alone no object 
is given, and to which, therefore, the category of substance, which always 
presupposes a given intuition, cannot be applied. Consequently, this 
subject cannot be known. The subject of the categories cannot by 
thinking the categories acquire a concept of itself as an object of the 
categoriesÕ (B422) 
Here, Kant takes a risk, one that Frank also picks up on. If self-consciousness, taken as the unity of 
apperception, is to be guaranteed as the principle that grounds all our cognitive activity, and if, 
consequently, it is to be the qualification for all claims to the objectivity of knowledge, then there 
must be an element within intuition itself, which posits the ÔIÕ as already active in the process of 
cognition. If this element of intuition is to be pure Ñ as Kant requires Ñ then there is a danger that 
Kant implicitly brings into play that which his explicitly rejects: intellectual intuition. KantÕs early 
objectors, including Schelling, zoned in on this problem. It was proclaimed as the central task of 
post-Kantian philosophy to prove the existence of that which Kant merely presupposed. These post-
Kantian objectors, as Frank summarises, Ôstrove to demonstrate that KantÕs philosophy failed to 
provide an adequate description of [the I].Õ (2004, p. 56). According to them, Kant had absorbed 
himself so much in the deduction of the categories that the self-evidence of its highest principle Ñ 
the unity of self-consciousness Ñ had not been properly shown. I mention these post-Kantian 
objectors here because, as I will show in chapter three, Schelling believed one of KantÕs basic errors 
to be confusing intellectual intuition with the unknowable realm of noumena. We are immediately 
confronted with two further elements in the CPR, which advance us further on our approach to the 
unconditioned. Reflective of KantÕs own text, I am preparing to leave the realm of the known. I first 
discuss noumena and their Ñ yet to be determined Ñ difference from things in themselves. I will 





1.2.6. Noumena as the Positive Thought of Things in Themselves 
So far, in both this current chapter and the CPR, the notion of a thing in itself has largely been 
employed polemically in order to illuminate the errors of KantÕs predecessors.
30
  Kant has yet to 
give the thing in itself any positive treatment. Things in themselves have so far been merely those 
things, or, that aspect of things, which are not known to us. Kant concludes the Transcendental 
Analytic with a chapter entitled ÔThe ground of the distinction of all objects in general into 
phenomena and noumenaÕ, and it is here that the thing in itself receives this positive treatment. Kant 
writes about objects Ôconsidered in their own natureÕ, things that Ôare not objects of our senses but 
are thought as objects merely through the understandingÕ (B306). The crucial question then 
becomes Ôwhether our pure concepts of understanding have meaning in respect of these [noumena], 
and so can be a way of knowing themÕ (ibid.). Here, an important distinction arises, which draws 
attention to KantÕs occasionally problematic use of the word thought. He claims that to even 
conceptualise a possible object as noumenon is already to grant that object potential status as object 
of our cognition. The understanding employs concepts in order to combine them with intuitions, 
and as I have detailed above, the concepts produced therein have the sole use of constituting 
possible experiences, since intuition for Kant, whether a priori or empirical, is sensible. If we were 
to have a concept of the noumenon, we would in effect be schematising a possible object of 
experience, which by definition is not and cannot be experienced.
31
 Therefore our understanding 
does not have a concept of the noumenon, but merely a thought of it. The word thought here simply 
means logical possibility, a thought that is not self-contradictory. In KantÕs view, I cannot think of 
an object that it simultaneously existent and inexistent. But I can think of an object that exists 
                                                
30 Cf. Allison, 1983, p. 237. 
31 One could here say understand the noumenon in a similar way to a concept of reason (discussed in 
1.3. In this case the concept acts not as the ground of possible experience but as a regulative principle 
toward which experience strives. However, it is unclear how the concept of the noumenon as that which 
is unknown in the object, can regulate our experience of the object. 
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independently of my cognising it. By extension, I can think of that object as it is in itself, namely, as 
noumenon. 
So far, there doesnÕt seem to be a problem. It is of course possible that there be objects existing in a 
manner independently of the activities of our mind. We need to think of objects as having 
independent existence, or else we are Ôlanded in the absurd conclusion that there can be an 
appearance without anything that appears (Bxxvii). Objects can therefore be taken Ôin a twofold 
sense, namely as appearance and as thing in itselfÕ. The second half of this two-fold sense, Kant 
also splits in two. The noumenon can be thought both negatively and positively. In a negative sense, 
the noumenon is simply that object that is not an object of our sensible intuition. In this case it lies 
entirely outside of the boundaries of empirical knowledge. As such, nothing determinate can be said 
about it. In addition, the noumenon can be thought positively as an object of non-empirical 
intuition, i.e. a form of intuition other than our own. It becomes clear why Kant never entirely 
conflates the terms noumenon and thing-in-itself. The negative sense of noumenon refers only to 
our lack of cognitive access to something Ñ which then may as well be the thing in itself, for how 
could we know it to be anything else? The positive sense of noumenon implies another form of 
intuition, which could just as easily be conditioned by a priori forms in a similar way to our own. 
For Kant, we cannot claim that sensibility is the sole possible kind of intuition. We can only say 
that it is the sole form of intuition in which humans partake. To say that some other potential form 
of intuition Ñ about which we know nothing Ñ has access to things-in-themselves would be 
presumptuous. It would merely have access to things in another way than our sensible intuition 
does, and hence would yield different kinds of knowledge. 
There is another reason why Kant posits these two senses of noumena, and it has to do with the 
status of intellectual intuition. Kant opens the ÔPhenomena and NoumenaÕ chapter by characterising 
the territory of the understanding as Ôan island, enclosed by nature itself within unalterable limitsÕ 
(B294). But to assume that this island constitutes all that there is falls back into dogmatic modes of 
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thinking. It is not enough to merely claim ignorance of the possible existence of a realm beyond our 
understanding. It is in fact a requirement of reason that we posit such a realm, despite not being able 
to say anything determinate about it. The positive and negative senses of noumena equate roughly 
with two the senses in which Kant talks about intellectual intuition. In a negative sense, intellectual 
intuition is the conceivable but inaccessible mode of intuition that would allow for unmediated 
access to objects, as they exist in themselves. In a positive sense, it is the undeniable and necessary 
mode of intuition such as would inhere in a deity Ñ or indeed, in nature itself Ñ which, as Kant 
writes in the introduction, completes the series of conditions upon which our empirical experience 
depends. This dual and seemingly irresolvable status of intellectual intuition and our relation to it, is 
largely what keeps KantÕs theory of consciousness in balance, as it must if Kant wants to pave a 
third way toward addressing knowledge between rationalism and empiricism. Having introduced it 
from a distance, I now deal with KantÕs denial of intellectual intuition 
1.2.7. KantÕs Denial of Intellectual Intuition 
To get a handle on what Kant means by intellectual intuition, one can look for a preliminary answer 
in his Inaugural Dissertation of 1770: 
Sensibility is the receptivity of a subject by which it is possible for its 
representative state to be affected in a certain way by the presence of 
some object. Intelligence, rationality, is the faculty of a subject by which 
it is able to represent to itself what by its quality cannot enter the senses. 
The object of sensibility is sensuous; what contains nothing but what is 
knowable by the intellect is intelligible. In the older schools the former 
was called phenomenon, the latter noumenon. To the extent to which 
knowledge is subject to the laws of sensuousness it is sensuous; to the 
extent to which it is subject to the laws of intelligence it is intellectual or 
rational. (2: 393) 
Here, the two realms of phenomena (the sensible realm) and noumena (the intelligible realm) are 
clearly distinguished and separated. As a result, at least the possibility for intellectual intuition in 
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human cognition is allowed for, and hence Kant leaves open the possibility of a mode of knowledge 
that is achieved purely through intellectual activity. Shortly after the Dissertation, however, Kant 
began to doubt his own view. In a letter to Marcus Herz in 1772, Kant wrote: 
In my dissertation I was content to explain the nature of intellectual 
representations in a merely negative way, namely, to state that they were 
not modifications of the soul brought about by the object. However, I 
silently passed over the further question of how a representation that 
refers to an object without being in any way affected by it can be 
possibleÉ. [B]y what means are these [intellectual representations] given 
to us, if not by the way in which they affect us? And if such intellectual 
representations depend on our inner activity, whence comes the 
agreement that they are supposed to have with objects Ñ objects that are 
nevertheless not possibly produced thereby?É[A]s to how my 
understanding may form for itself concepts of things completely a priori, 
with which concepts the things must necessarily agree, and as to how my 
understanding may formulate real principles concerning the possibility of 
such concepts, with which principles experience must be in exact 
agreement and which nevertheless are independent of experience Ñ this 
question, of how the faculty of understanding achieves this conformity 
with the things themselves, is still left in a state of obscurity. (in Zweig, 
1967, p. 72) 
This passage not only gives insight into the problem Kant found with allowing for intellectual 
intuition in human knowledge, but it also provides key motivations for KantÕs critique of the 
faculties of cognition in the CPR. In the letter, Kant asks, by what means are these intellectual 
representations given, if not by the way in which they affect us? The solution to this problem for 
Kant will require a specific and clearly demarcated system of intuitions and their forms, in order to 
reconcile the two seemingly separate worlds of sensibility and intelligibility within one, 
transcendentally established, cognising subject. Hence, by the time of the CPR, intellectual intuition 
is stalwartly denied, and the possibility of knowledge is limited only to that which can be employed 
in empirical experience. In what follows, I examine KantÕs remarks on intellectual intuition in the 
47 
 
CPR, and why it is that he thinks it should be denied us. With these things in mind, I consider the 
ambiguous status of the unity of consciousness, which Kant also refers to as transcendental 
apperception. I will conclude by revisiting intellectual intuition in light of these examinations. 
To put it in simple terms, Ôintellectual intuitionÕ for Kant refers to the perfect unity between thought 
and being.  As Gram puts it, intellectual intuition is Ôa kind of knowing in which cognitive acts and 
their objects are identicalÕ (1981, p. 288). This means that an act of intellectual intuition, rather than 
partaking in the synthetic process of combining sensible data with concepts, is instead a singular act 
whereby the thing grasped intuitively and the thing conceived conceptually are one and the same.
32
 
If I were to intuit intellectually, I would in effect produce the object I come to know in the mere 
thinking of it, no sensible information being necessary. To be capable of such an intuition would 
necessitate being outside of time and space, and outside of the a priori forms of intuition I discussed 
in the previous section. I would no longer need to relate the objects I conceive to any kind of 
external data, nor would I need to contextualise them within the frame of my inner sense. 
Knowledge would thereby be instantaneous with my thinking. Not bound by the conditions of 
empirical knowledge, intellectual intuition would grant a kind of knowledge altogether disastrous 
for KantÕs epistemology.  
The precise place of intellectual intuition within KantÕs philosophical landscape is bound up with 
several other central elements. The first of these is sensible intuition Ñ the sole form of intuition 
which can supply us with knowledge of objects. The second is what we can call inner intuition, 
namely the form of intuition which allows us to relate external sensory impressions to ourselves as 
                                                
32 This concept on intellectual intuition has a long historical ancestry, dating back to the Medievals and 
beyond. Augustine, Aquinas, Galelei, Spinoza, and Leibniz, to name a few, all formed some notion of 
intellectual intuition, even if under different auspices. The significant factor in exploring KantÕs concept 
of intellectual intuition is his denial of it, especially when it comes to critics of Kant such as Schelling, 
who frequently advocates for the centrality of intellectual intuition as the starting point for philosophy. 
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a subject of those impressions. In the following note from the B Preface, Kant explains how 
intellectual intuition relates to the consciousness of oneÕs own self: 
If, with the intellectual consciousness of my existence, in the 
representation ÔI amÕ, which accompanies all my judgments and acts of 
understanding, I could at the same time connect a determination of my 
existence through intellectual intuition, the consciousness of a relation to 
something outside me would not be required. But though that intellectual 
consciousness does indeed come first, the inner intuition, in which my 
existence can alone be determined, is sensible and is bound up with the 
condition of time. (Bxl) 
The understanding is an intellectual faculty, but it is effective only to the extent that it can be 
applied to possible sensible intuitions. As such, Ôthe understanding in us men is not itself a faculty 
of intuitions, and cannot, even if intuitions be given in sensibility, take them up into itself in such a 
manner as to combine them as the manifold of its own intuitionÕ (ibid.). Kant paints a nuanced 
picture of the relationship between activity and passivity here. The understanding is active to the 
extent that it determines objects of sensibility. It is passive to the extent that it can only do this once 
it has been supplied with sensible intuitions, which it does not itself prescribe. Sensible intuition is 
active to the extent that it actively intuits sense data according with the a priori forms of intuition 
(space and time). It is passive to the extent that the intuitions themselves are supplied by an 
immediate relation between object and intuiting subject, a relation that is not initiated by any 
activity of the subject. In other words, I cannot intuit empirical objects out of the pure desire to do 
so, without them first being given to me. Without the aid of sensible intuitions, the understanding 
would have no possible objects to determine. Without the determining functions of the 
understanding, sensible intuitions would remain static in their a priori forms, which in themselves 
determine no particular object. Intellectual intuition, if it were possible for human cognition, would 
tip this balance entirely on to the side of activity; it would not require any sense data from the 
outside in order to complete its cognitions. Nor would it inhere within any particular forms, as the a 
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priori forms of space and time are present only to the extent that they bridge the gap between 
sensibility and understanding. For Kant, we cannot even make sense of what such an intellectual 
intuition would be like, because we necessarily conceive of objects as occurring always already 
within the confines of the forms of space and time. We think of intellectual intuition in a merely 
negative sense therefore, in much the same way that we think of the thing in itself, and its 
corresponding symbolic representative, the noumenon. 
It is important to note that KantÕs denial of intellectual intuition is not a flat out denial. Kant does 
not deny the possibility of intellectual intuition, precisely because the make up of our cognitive 
faculties does not allow us to legislate on such a matter. As Kant says, Ôwe cannot judge in regard to 
the intuitions of other thinking beingsÕ (B43). Kant can deny intellectual intuition only to the extent 
that his conception of intuition in general is workable within his transcendental idealist conception 
of knowledge, which, in addition to the various conditions enumerated above, now also includes the 
fact that this knowledge is always only human knowledge. This involves not just a theory of our 
experience of external objects, but also our experience of ourselves, which, it turns out, must be 
subjected to the same restrictions. According to Kant, a proper examination of the possibility of 
human knowledge will reveal that a form of intuition which is intellectual, and not sensible, is 
impossible for us. Only gods may partake in intellectual intuition. 
Conclusion: Nature as the Sum Total of Appearances 
In the preceding I have sought to elucidate KantÕs various methods for dividing what can in 
principle be known from what in principle cannot be known. I have shown through my discussion 
of the Analogies of Experience that the synthetic a priori demonstrates what is in principle 
knowable results from three laws. I have proposed that these laws are themselves confirmations of 
the principles of Newtonian mechanics. Following this discussion I have discussed three concepts 
which in some way move beyond the realm of what is knowable, and in each case, I have shown 
how Kant reconciles these with the hypothesis of transcendental idealism. What remains, however, 
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is the status of nature taken, not as which is explained by the possibility of experience, but as the 
sum total of all objects of experience. In other words, how is Kant to account for nature as a whole? 
In addition, how is the demand for the unconditioned to met with in such an account? To answer 
these questions, I move from The Transcendental Analytic to The Transcendental Dialectic, and 




1.3. Meeting ReasonÕs Demand: the Regulative Role of Ideas 
Abstract 
In this final part of chapter one, I examine KantÕs doctrine of ideas in order to assess the way in 
which he conceives the relation between nature and the unconditioned.  To what extent can they be 
considered synonymous? This question over the relative sameness or difference of the 
unconditioned and nature anticipates my discussion of SchellingÕs nature-philosophy in chapter 
three, in which he argues for a certain conception of the unconditioned in nature. My task at this 
point is therefore to provide an elucidation of what Kant means by ÔideaÕ, and how these ideas relate 
to the other cognitive faculties. I claim that the picture of nature one receives in the CPR is 
precisely nature as an idea, regulated in turn by the unconditioned. While nature is regulated by the 
idea of the unconditioned, they are not synonymous in KantÕs view. From what has been said 
above, particular with regarding to a priori synthetic knowledge, I conclude that, in the context of 
the CPR, nature is merely those laws which prescribe the possibility of experience (the synthesis of 
concepts and intuitions). This leaves open the question over whether there is any other kind of 






Tackling KantÕs doctrine of the ideas of reason requires some preparation. KantÕs discussion of the 
ideas in the CPR is extremely dense, containing various interwoven defences of different 
principles.
33
 Kant also employs a large variety of terms which are often used interchangeably.
34
 I 
employ two methods for approaching Kant on the ideas. The first method is to state that I am 
concerned primarily with one form of ideas that Kant proposes, namely, the cosmological. I take 
this form of idea to be primarily concerned with providing a unity of thinking regarding subject 
object relations (self-world, human-nature, etc.). In focussing primarily on the cosmological ideas, I 
arrive at the question to which I have been advancing during this chapter; what is the relationship 
between nature and the unconditioned? The second method is to appeal, as I have done several 
times throughout this chapter, to some useful clarifications provided by the Prolegomena, which 
help to illuminate the connection between nature and the unconditioned, as well as the relation 
between reason and the other cognitive faculties. 
In the third part of the Prolegomena, which asks Ôhow is metaphysics in general possible?Õ, Kant 
mentions the Ôpeculiar destination of reasonÕ (4:350) that is posited through the ideas. This 
destination is peculiar because, in order to satisfy its own demand for the unconditioned, reason 
posits the ideas merely as Ôa principle of the systematic unity of the use of the understandingÕ. It is 
by positing such a principle that reason can give Ôcomplete justification for its own procedureÕ 
(ibid.). In what follows, I offer some elucidation of the ideas with this peculiar destination in mind, 
and how this account in the Prolegomena accords with KantÕs description of the ideas in the CPR. I 
assess what picture of nature Kant leaves us with in the ideas, and the relation of this nature to the 
unconditioned. Before I arrive to this discussion, I elucidate KantÕs definition of the idea in general. 
                                                
33 Cf. Ameriks (1992), pp. 253-4. 
34 In particular, for my purposes, the lack of explicit distinction between what is meant by ÔnatureÕ, Ôthe 
worldÕ and Ôthe universeÕ is a pertinent example of this. 
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1.3.2. Ideas as Concepts of Reason 
KantÕs most basic term for ideas is concepts of reason.
35
 These concepts allow us to conceive of 
things, as opposed to concepts of the understanding, which allow us to connect thoughts to 
perceptions in experience. Concepts of reason can never enter into experience themselves, and 
occur nowhere in empirical knowledge. It is already clear that a distinction needs to be made. 
Concepts up until this point have been understood as things deployed by the understanding in order 
to formulate a possible experience into an actual one. Kant explains that, unlike concepts of the 
understanding, concepts of reason are those to which Ôno actual experience has even been 
completely adequateÕ, yet to which Ôevery actual experience belongsÕ (CPR, B367). In short, 
concepts of reason enable us to ÔconceiveÕ; concepts of the understanding to ÔunderstandÕ, by which 
Kant means, connect to perceptions. Concepts of reason are those that allow us to think entities, 
which may very well exist, but are not empirically accessible. Kant calls these concepts 
transcendental ideas. In what follows, I will focus on the dual function of Kantian ideas, namely 
that they cannot enter into experience, but that they nonetheless ground all possible experiences. An 
analogous relation obtains between reason and understanding Ñ both taken in the pure sense Ñ as 
the relation that obtains between the understanding and intuition in a priori synthetic knowledge. In 
the latter, intuition is taken as a whole; an Ôimage of sensibilityÕ (B377). In the former, 
understanding is taken as a whole, in regard to the Ôtotality of conditionsÕ which are possible 
through the a priori synthesis. 
It may appear from the above that concepts of reason are merely an extension of concepts of the 
understanding, and as such Ð given that concepts of reason are further removed from experience 
than concepts of the understanding Ð one could read the former as little more than forms of thought, 
                                                
35 CPR B367. 
54 
 
which are devoid of content.
36
 This is certainly not what Kant intends concepts of reason to be, 
given the hypothesis of transcendental idealism that Ôall possible speculative knowledge of reason is 
limited to mere objects of experienceÕ (Bxxvi). However, one must also remember KantÕs 
corresponding assertion that Ôthough we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must 
yet be in a position to think them as things in themselvesÕ (ibid.). In order to grasp how Kant 
reconciles these two claims with the ideas, it is useful to follow Kant in his distinction between 
ideas in general and transcendental ideas in particular.  
1.3.3. Ideas in General: KantÕs Platonism? 
Kant begins ÔThe ideas in generalÕ with a cautionary note, about the words that are used to express 
concepts. ÔTo coin new wordsÕ, he writes, Ôis to advance a claim to legislation in language that 
rarely succeedsÕ (B369). KantÕs preference is to search in Ôdead and learnedÕ languages that may 
provide an already existing expression which encompasses his concept (ibid.). It is through this 
search that Kant comes to PlatoÕs use of the term ÔideaÕ, and takes from Plato the definition of 
ÔideaÕ as Ôsomething which not only can never be borrowed from the senses but far surpasses even 
the concepts of understandingÉinasmuch as in experience nothing is ever to be met with that is 
coincident with itÕ (B370). From here onwards, Kant becomes increasingly ambiguous about what 
he sees as correct in Plato, and what he wishes to do away with. Some clues can be found in KantÕs 
earlier treatment of Plato in the Introduction of the CPR. Kant rhapsodises over PlatoÕs journey to 
the realm of ideas: 
The light dove, cleaving the air in her free flight, and feeling its 
resistance, might imagine that its flight would be still easier in empty 
                                                
36 Cf. A568/B596; ÔIf [concepts of the understanding] are applied to appearances, they can be exhibited 
in concreto, because in the appearances they obtain the appropriate material for concepts of experience 
Ñ a concept of experience being nothing but a concept of understanding in concreto. But ideas are even 
further removed from objective reality that are categories, for no appearance can be found in which they 
can be represented in concretoÕ. 
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space. It was thus that Plato left the world of the senses, as setting too 
narrow limits to the understanding, and ventured out beyond it on the 
wings of the ideas, in the empty space of the pure understanding. He 
did not observe that with all his efforts he made no advance Ñ 
meeting no resistance that might, as it were, serve as a support upon 
which he could take a stand. (B9). 
 
This gives a distinct impression of KantÕs problem with Plato; that if Plato only had in his 
possession the transcendental idealist principle of all knowledge being limited to experience, he 
would have fared much better. However, the matter is not so simple upon arriving to KantÕs theory 
of ideas, because, as concepts of reason as opposed to the understanding, ideas do not connect at all 
to intuition, and so cannot be manifested in any experience. There is, nonetheless, a specific 
relationship between the understanding and reason regarding the ideas, which can help illuminate 
just what it is that Kant sees in Platonic ideas worth imitating, and where Plato may have been 
mistaken. Before introducing his transcendental ideas, Kant concludes the Ideas in General with the 
following description of a Ôserial arrangementÕ (Stufenleiter) leading to the idea: 
The genus is representation in general (repraesentatio). Subordinate to it 
stands representation with consciousness (perceptio). A perception which 
relates solely to the subject as the modification of its state is sensation 
(sensatio), an objective perception is knowledge (cognitio). This is either 
intuition or concept (intuitus vel conceptus). The former relates 
immediately to the object and is single, the latter refers to it mediately by 
means of a feature which several things may have in common. The 
concept is either an empirical or a pure concept. The pure concept, in so 
far as it has its origin in the understanding alone (not in the pure image of 
sensibility), is called a notion. A concept formed from notions and 
transcending the possibility of experience is an idea or concept of reason. 
(B376f.) 
Here one can point out the difference between pure concepts of the understanding and concepts of 
reason by saying that the former are those from which empirical concepts are derived. So, while 
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pure concepts up to now have been those which deal only with providing the basis for the act of 
synthesising empirical concepts with intuitions, Kant now shows that pure concepts have a further 
use, which mediates between the understanding as employed with respect to intuition, and reason, 
which takes the understanding purely as a totality.
37
 This Ôserial arrangementÕ can provide some 
clarity over how Kant adopts PlatoÕs conception of idea. As Kant says, Plato took ideas to be 
Ôarchetypes of the things themselvesÕ (B370). However, according to KantÕs transcendental 
idealism, things themselves cannot be brought into experience, nor can any concept be applied to 
them. Kant is left with archetypes that cannot be instantiated. However, if one takes ideas to be, not 
archetypes of things themselves, but archetypes of those things of which we have concepts, then a 
possible solution appears. This requires some elucidation. Kant points out that Plato also realised 
that Ôour faculty of knowledge feels a much higher need that merely to spell out appearances 
according to a synthetic unityÕ. Beyond this, Ôour reason naturally exalts itself to modes of 
knowledge which so far transcend the bounds of experience that no given empirical object can ever 
coincideÕ (B371). On this issue Kant and Plato are in agreement. However, in a footnote shortly 
after, Kant distinguishes himself from Plato due to the ÔextravagancesÕ by which the latter 
ÔhypostatisedÕ the ideas (B372). What Plato took to be archetypes of things, and attempted to 
present as such, Kant takes as principles of reason, and so not in things, but Ôonly in our mindsÕ 
(ibid.). 
As I have already said, I am concerned specifically with the idea of nature, and its relation to the 
unconditioned. There are two sentences towards the end of Ideas in General, which are relevant in 
this regard. I quote them here in preparation for the following section, in which I elucidate KantÕs 
transcendental ideas with respect to the question of nature. Though the two sentences sit close 
together in the text of the CPR, I separate them out here in the hopes of making their individual 
sentiments clear: 
                                                
37 Cf. B378, B383. 
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a plant, an animal, the orderly arrangement of the cosmos Ñ presumably 
therefore the entire natural world Ñ clearly show that they are possible 
only according to ideas. 
But only the totality of things, in their interconnection as constituting the 
universe, is completely adequate to the idea. (B375) 
It is interesting to note that in the first sentence, Kant seems to intimate that the Ôentire natural 
worldÕ is something larger, or perhaps, more general, that Ôthe cosmosÕ. Might it be that nature, the 
very thing with which we are supposed to be firmly and immediately acquainted, is in fact an idea 
of something even more vast that the universe itself? Despite this provocation, I do not wish to 
attempt a proof of such a claim here. I leave the question open.
38
 As Kant himself warns, Ôhow great 
a gulf mayÉhave to be left between the idea and its realisation, are questions which no one can, or 
ought to, answerÕ (B374). With these things in mind, I move now to a discussion of transcendental 
ideas generally, and then to the cosmological in particular.  
1.3.4. The Form of Transcendental Ideas 
As I have already made clear, one of KantÕs problems with Platonic ideas is that they presume to 
describe actual entities, which for Kant is problematic because for him, objects of our knowledge 
must be possible objects of experience. Due to the fact that reason often attempts to Ôtranscend the 
bounds of experienceÕ, into a realm with which Ôno empirical object can ever coincideÕ (B371), the 
doctrine of transcendental ideas can generally be considered as KantÕs attempt to limit the 
employment of ideas such that reason avoids positing entities inaccessible to experience. Kant 
achieves this by claiming that ideas only ever have a regulative, and never a constitutive 
                                                
38  Kant does momentarily address the difference between ÔnatureÕ and ÔworldÕ in the CPR 
(A420/B448). However, the resulting Ôcosmical conceptsÕ (Weltbegriffe) and Ôtranscendent concepts of 
natureÕ (Naturbegriffe) do not make clear what distinction there might be between ÒnatureÓ and Òthe 
worldÓ. This is because these concepts are merely the concepts by which we conceive a totality of 
appearances, for the purposes of reason; they are not meant to determine to what theses appearances 





 However, despite the ideas being limited in this way, Kant also claims that they 
Ômust none the less be recognised as having [their] own realityÕ (ibid.). What exactly is the nature of 
this reality? As I have discussed above, Kant has already made clear that ideas cannot appear in 
experience; they can neither be objects, nor be applied to objects. The transcendental idea is instead 
directed towards Ôabsolute totality in the synthesis of conditions, and never terminates save in what 
is absolutely, that is, in all relations, unconditionedÕ (B383).
40
 Since the understanding is applied to 
intuitions, it cannot lend this totality to itself, for then it would be possible for the understanding to 
actually achieve a complete synthesis, i.e. it would be possible to experience all that is. It is 
incumbent upon reason, then, to lend the understanding this totality as a regulative principle, which 
guides the understanding in its employment with intuitions. In a rather dense passage, Kant explains 
how ideas meet the demand of reason for the unconditioned: 
The transcendental concept [idea] of reason isÉnone other than the 
concept of the totality of the conditions for any given conditioned. Now 
since it is the unconditioned alone which makes possible the totality of 
conditions, and, conversely, the totality of conditions is always itself 
unconditioned, a pure concept of reason can in general be explained by 
the concept of the unconditioned, conceived as containing a ground of 
the synthesis of the conditioned. (B379) 
This is still to speak about transcendental ideas in general. The way in which Kant demonstrates 
how this demand for a totality of conditions (an unconditioned) is met with in the ideas depends on 
the form of idea. Kant separates the transcendental ideas into three groups, which reflect the three 
                                                
39 A644/B672 
40 Kant says something similar in the Reflexionen, for example in reflection 4033 from 1769, Kant 
writes, Ôthe necessity of things that we can cognize is always conditional, for in itself we can always 
negate anything since where we affirm nothing we also do not contradict anything by means of its 
denial. The concept of the necessary is nevertheless in the first instance a concept given through reason, 
since through it alone is anything determined. Absolute necessity is a boundary concept, since without it 
there would be no completudo in the series of the contingent. However, this boundary concept is itself 
problematic and cannot be cognized by reason a prioriÕ (17: 391). Cf. CPR B650. 
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enquires of pure reason that Kant first introduces in the Preface, namely, immortality, freedom, and 
God (Bxxx). Once again, Kant uses a wealth of terms regarding each form of ideas, their derivation, 
and they relations to each other. Before dealing with the cosmological ideas proper, I here present a 
brief summary of the forms of the transcendental ideas in general, in the hope of clarifying what it 
is that the cosmological ideas specifically are concerned with.  
Kant construes the three enquiries of pure reason in terms of relations between representations. I 
separate these out numerically below, joining each relation to its a) corresponding inquiry of reason, 
b) transcendental idea, c) transcendental doctrine, and finally d) KantÕs method for investigating 
each idea. All of these elements and the terms by which Kant articulates them are found between 
B391-B392. 
1. The relation of representations to a subject. This relation concerns a) immortality, whose 
idea is b) the soul, whose doctrine is c) transcendental psychology. KantÕs method for this is d) 
the Paralogisms. 
2. The relation of representations to an object. This relation concerns a) freedom, whose idea is 
b) the world (i.e. nature), whose doctrine is, transcendental cosmology. KantÕs method for this 
is d) the Antinomies. 
3. The relation of representations to all things in general. This relation concerns a) God, whose 
idea is b) the being of all beings, whose doctrine is c) transcendental theology. KantÕs method 
for this is d) the Ideal. 
In every case, Kant takes pure reason as seeking Ôthe absolute totality of the synthesis  on the side of 
the conditionsÕ (B393), i.e. an unconditioned. This unconditioned must be sought on the side which 
conditions appearances, rather than appearances so conditioned, since in the latter case, we are 
dealing with that which has already been synthesised within space and time. In this case, space and 
time are themselves the conditions of appearance, but Kant does not wish to grant an unconditioned 
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intuition. For Kant there can only be unconditioned ideas, because the unconditioned itself cannot 
enter into experience. It would seem from this that nature has very little to do with either the 
cosmological ideas or the unconditioned which they seek. But it is important to remember KantÕs 
earlier remark from B385, in which he refers to the Ôabsolute whole of all appearancesÕ as an idea. 
Kant has already claimed that nature is precisely this whole of appearances, or rather, the Ôsum total 
of objects of experienceÕ (Bxix). It is hard to take the second characterisation as anything other than 
a whole of appearances, since appearances only occur in experience. So, at this point, it is safe at 
least to assume that when Kant talks about the cosmological ideas, he at least has their relation to 
nature in mind. In order to tackle once again the question of nature through the cosmological ideas, 
I move from the Transcendental Ideas to the Antinomy of Pure Reason.  
1.3.5. The Idea of an Unconditioned Nature 
Kant points something out regarding the cosmological ideas which is significant for my present 
discussion. In The antinomy of Pure Reason, he claims that these ideas are particular in that they 
alone demand Ôa sufficient answer bearing on the constitution of the objectÕ (B506). As the 
cosmological ideas concern relations of representations to objects, they presuppose an object which 
Ômust be given empiricallyÕ, and this empirically given object must be tested according to its 
Ôconformity to the ideaÕ (ibid.). This would seem to lend some context Ñ at least regarding KantÕs 
cosmology Ñ as to how it is that ideas must have their own reality. In the Antinomies, Kant 
explicitly describes the nature of this reality. He writes that both pure and transcendental concepts 
(i.e. categories and ideas) issue from the understanding. Reason itself Ôdoes not really generate any 
conceptÕ. Instead, it endeavours to Ôfree a concept of the understanding from the unavoidable 
limitations of possible experienceÕ (B436). To summarise these limitations briefly: concepts cannot 
be applied to objects save through their combination with sensible intuition, and this intuition is 
necessarily formed in space and time. The idea, on this reading, is a concept freed from space and 
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time; freed from intuition.
41
 However, if a concept is freed from intuition, it cannot be applied to 
anything, since Kant denies application of concepts to anything except sensible intuition. The 
alternative would be intellectual intuition, which, as explained in 1.2.7, Kant does not allow in 
cognition. 
How is an idea to have reality if the only reality for which Kant allows is that which is formed in 
space and time? This is a question that has not been extensively explored in the literature on Kant. 
In the case of the cosmological ideas, this question is answered by something Kant calls regressive 
synthesis (B438). Regressive synthesis is itself a response to the principle upon which Kant bases 
his deduction of the ideas, namely that Ôif the conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions, and 
consequently the absolutely unconditionedÉis also givenÕ (B436). Up to this point in my 
discussion, the unconditioned has been opposed simply to the conditioned, but there appears here a 
third term, the condition, which is necessary for explaining how it is that regressive synthesis can 
occur. It is here that KantÕs conception of space and time appear to shift somewhat from how they 
are discussed in the Transcendental Aesthetic. In the Antinomies, Kant calls space and time the 
Ôtwo original quanta of all our intuitionÕ. In both cases Kant seeks to show how a regressive 
synthesis is possible. In the case of time, things are fairly straightforward. As one ÒquantumÓ of 
intuition, Kant calls time Ôthe formal condition of all seriesÕ (B439). Its antecedents are either 
conditions (the past), or consequents (the future). From this it becomes clear that a regressive 
synthesis can only occur with respect to past time. Space, however, is not a series but Ôan 
aggregateÕ. A regressive synthesis of space cannot proceed in the same manner as time, but must 
instead regress from matter, which Kant takes as conditioned, to one of two possible conditions, 
either ÔnothingÕ, or Ôwhat is no longer matter Ñ namely, the simpleÕ (B440). These forms of 
regressive synthesis, in KantÕs view, are employed by reason in order to establish the Ôbeginning of 
                                                
41 This ÒfreeingÓ of an idea from space and time involves a process, which seems to lead to a kind of 




the worldÕ, and the Ôlimit of the worldÕ, namely, whether the world begins in time or not, and 
whether the world is infinitely extensive or not (B446). Of course, it will be the task of the 
antinomies themselves to expose the impossibility of determining either of these things 
conclusively. I will return to this point in 1.3.6.  
The two forms of regressive synthesis, first through time, and second through space, comprise a 
mathematical synthesis (B446). Corresponding to this mathematical synthesis is a second form Kant 
calls dynamic synthesis. Both of these are forms of regressive synthesis, i.e. that which seeks to 
ascend from the understanding to reason, and so from the conditions to the unconditioned. Where 
the mathematical synthesis deals with, firstly, the order of appearances in time, and secondly, the 
division of appearances into the simple in space, the dynamic synthesis deals with something extra. 
The two cosmological ideas corresponding to the dynamic synthesis are those of the ÔoriginationÕ of 
appearances and the Ôdependence of existenceÕ upon the Ôalterable in the field of appearanceÕ 
(B443). When Kant talks about origination and dependence, he is referring to the seeming 
opposition between freedom and necessity. With these two ideas, Kant is referring to two 
overlapping concepts, Ôthe worldÕ, and ÔnatureÕ. The freedom, or Ôself-activityÕ of nature sits in an 
ambiguous position between individual natural causes and the necessity of the whole of nature, i.e. 
the dependence of the existence of the alterable with respect to appearance, which Kant calls 
Ônatural necessityÕ (B446).  
To clarify, the first two forms of cosmological ideas, which refer to time and space respectively, 
concern the Ômathematical sum total of all appearances and the totality of their synthesisÕ (ibid.). 
These two forms of idea manifest in the Antinomies as follows: with respect to time, the first 
cosmological idea can claim both that the world begins in time and that it does not. This is the first 
antinomy. With respect to space, the second cosmological idea can claim both that space is 
infinitely divisible and that it is not divisible. This is contrasted with the dynamic synthesis, wherein 
the same world (the mathematical world) is entitled ÔnatureÕ, and viewed as Ôa dynamical wholeÕ. 
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These two cosmological ideas, namely that nature is both free, but also necessary, i.e. productive of 
appearances and not things in themselves, these ideas manifest in the Antinomies as follows: with 
respect to causality, the third cosmological idea can claim both that there exists a cause of 
appearance aside from the laws of nature, and that there is no such additional cause. In other words, 
while a cause outside of nature is conceivable (the idea of God), it is not necessary, indeed, not even 
possible to incorporate into KantÕs account of natureÕs appearance, because the idea of God cannot 
be brought into experience. With respect to necessity, the fourth cosmological idea can claim both 
that there is a necessary being on which the sum total of appearances depends, and that there is no 
such necessary being. 
In all four cases summarised above, the conflict between the thesis and antithesis of each antimony 
cannot be solved, because no corresponding object can be supplied which confirms either side. In 
other words, taking the first antinomy as an example, the natural world cannot be experienced as 
having had a beginning in time or not. Experience is experience of appearances, and as such can 
only advance from condition to conditioned, i.e. from a priori synthesis to an object. This progress 
from pure to empirical knowledge, or in other words, from the knowledge of the conditions of 
experience to knowledge of what it is that is conditioned by those conditions, can continue without 
end. I will say a brief word about the mathematical regressive synthesis before dwelling for a 
moment on the dynamic and what it means for the possibility of an unconditioned idea of nature. 
As mentioned above, the mathematical regressive synthesis which leads to the first two antinomies 
can be resolved by rejecting both thesis and antithesis. So, in the realm of appearances, one 
experiences objects firstly as being extended in space and ordered in time. However, neither 
extension in space nor ordering in time need be enclosed by a limit, nor do they need to be allowed 
to continue into infinity. This is because space and time are forms of intuition, and as such, apply 
only to that which is present to the senses. As Kant explains, Ôall beginning is in time and all limits 
of the extended are in space. But space and time belong only to the world of sense. Accordingly, 
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while appearances in the world are conditionally limited, the world itself is neither conditional nor 
unconditionally limitedÕ (B550). In essence, a limit cannot be placed in the world because it is a 
condition of knowing the world that it is limited by intuition. The condition (sensible intuition) is 
contained within the series of appearances. In the case of the dynamic regressive synthesis, it is not 
a sensible condition that Kant appeals to but an intelligible one. This is because the concept of cause 
(which pertains to the third antinomy) and the concept of appearances being dependent something 
external to them for their reality (the fourth antinomy), are not part of intuition but of the 
understanding. As pertaining to the intelligible rather than the sensible, the latter two ideas can in 
principle be taken as true with respect to both their thesis and antithesis. I will explore this with 
reference to the third antinomy only, because it is this one that concerns the question of nature most 
directly. 
Kant posits two ways of conceiving causality, either according to nature, or arising from freedom. 
In the first case, causality is that which Kant describes in the second analogy. Here, a state of 
appearances is considered as such on the condition that it must have been caused by a prior state. 
Natural causality in this sense is simply the ordering of appearances in time; nothing comes into 
being without first being caused. Causality by freedom on the other hand, Kant construes as Ôthe 
power of beginning a state spontaneouslyÕ, which as such is not dependent on the causal chain that 
is posited in natural causality. To bring my discussion to its point, I quote here a passage in which 
Kant explains how natural and free causation are reconciled via the idea of reason: 
That everything which happens has a cause is a universal law of the very 
possibility of all experience. Hence the causality of the cause, which 
itself happens or comes to be, must itself in turn have a cause; and thus 
the entire field of experience, however far it may extend, is transformed 
into the sum-total of the merely natural. But since in this way no absolute 
totality of conditions determine causal relation can be obtained, reason 
creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity which can begin to act of itself, 
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without requiring to be determined to action by an antecedent cause in 
accordance with the law of causality. (B561) 
Only that which appears can be considered an object of nature. That which appears can do so only 
by intuitions being synthesised with concepts. Knowledge of nature, via this synthesis, can be in 
principle gained according to three a priori synthetic propositions: the quantum of substance in 
nature remains constant; effects can only be consequents of causes; and all objects of experience are 
co-existent. These are, in essence, the universal laws of nature in the CPR. Beyond them, and in 
order that nature be conceived as something other than a mechanism which carries out these laws in 
experience, freedom is posited as an idea, which, because it has no corresponding object, must be 
merely regulative, rather than constitutive, of any experience of nature. In KantÕs view, conducting 
a survey of nature, one must act Ôas if the series of appearances were in itself endless, without any 
first or supreme numberÕ (B700), even though, by virtue of the laws of nature Ñ the laws of the 
experience of nature Ñ such an endless series can be neither confirmed nor denied. It is with this 
characterisation that I claim KantÕs idea of the unity of nature is necessarily a unity of thinking 
about nature. Indeed, Kant expresses this explicitly in the Prolegomena, when he writes, Ôthe 
possibility of experience in general is thus at the same time the universal law of nature, and the 
principles of the former are themselves the laws of the latterÕ (4:319). This may not pose a problem 
for Kant in the context of his project in the CPR, since he introduces this project in the B Preface by 
claiming that nature must be constrained to Ôgive answer to questions of reasons own determiningÕ 
B xiii). In the concluding section (1.3.6), however, I lay out some of the drawbacks of this position, 
which both establish a point of contrast with Schelling (to be addressed in chapter three), and a 





1.3.6. The Unity of Nature is the Unity of Thinking 
Kant often approaches the question of nature with the analogy of legal proceedings. Kant regularly 
employs legal metaphors, in which nature is required to be Òbrought to standÓ to the trials of 
reason.
42
 In these trials, Kant is concerned with locating objects that can meet reasonÕs demands for 
unity, totality, and ultimately, the unconditioned. Given that no such object can exist, these 
demands are assigned to the ideas, which regulate the employment of the understanding in 
experience as if such unconditioned unity and totality were a part of nature, rather than merely Ôin 
our brainÕ (B512). The fact that Ôan unconditioned and first existenceÕ is Ônowhere discernibleÕ 
(B502) in experience, leads Kant to the conclusion that such an existence must remain a regulative 
idea. I claim that this is because Kant relies upon a separation between subject and object. In terms 
of an item of knowledge, this is the distinction between the knower and what is known. It is true, 
according to KantÕs definition of what constitutes an object, that there can be no unconditioned 
object, and hence no unconditioned in nature Ñ that is, nature considered as synonymous with 
experience of nature. 
Natural science, if grounded by the principles of transcendental idealism, must abide by the same 
laws as those governing everyday experience of nature. As Kant says in the Prolegomena, Ônatural 
science will never discover to us the inside of the things, i.e. that which is not appearance but can 
serve as the highest ground of explanation of the appearancesÕ (4:353). This is because nature itself, 
in KantÕs terms, is a series of objects, held in a necessary connection. If the unconditioned cannot be 
an object, it cannot be in nature. This is so, I claim, because Kant relies upon everything being 
either subject or object. This dualism is presented as an impasse. The ideas get around this impasse 
in one way, by claiming that experience can be guided by an unconditioned regulative principle 
which is, as such, neither subject (as condition of experience) nor object (as that which is 
conditioned).  In this case, while a unity in reason may be achieved by keeping the ideas from being 
                                                
42 Cf. section three of The Antinomy of Pure Reason, particularly A463/B491, and B502-4. 
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mistakenly applied to objects, a very narrow conception of nature results. It is a nature which is 
defined by the laws which construct experiences of it. Nature is the medium by which we deduce 
the modes of our own thinking. Nature is, in one sense, only in our minds, and that which we 
experience is a series of appearances that may or may not be a totality. What is more, human beings 
are bound to this uncertain state of affairs, somewhat paradoxically, because, as Kant writes in the 
Prolegomena, Ômetaphysics, perhaps more than any other science, is laid in us in its fundamental 
lines by nature itselfÕ (4:353). In the third chapter another option will become available, through 
SchellingÕs nature-philosophy, which attempts to move beyond the opposition of subject and object. 
With this option, the unconditioned is in nature, precisely because it is neither subject, nor object, 
but a productive process. I leave this here, simply as a signpost for what is to come, and offer now 




Conclusion to Chapter One 
This chapter has sought to clearly elucidate some of the core concepts of KantÕs critical 
metaphysics. I have attempted to view this metaphysics through the question of nature, and defend 
the view that the CPR contains a substantial and specific idea of nature, wherein the possibility of 
nature itself is considered to be in some sense the same as the possibility of experience. I have 
maintained the view that KantÕs idea of nature, and the unity of nature, is in fact the unity of 
thinking about nature. My focus on the unconditioned has sought to show that while KantÕs idea of 
nature is heavily influenced by the natural sciences, the problem of its metaphysical grounding, and 
by extension of nature taken as an idea, persists. This problem is exemplified by KantÕs descriptions 
of nature as the sum total of appearances, and the impossibility of apprehending such a totality in 
concreto. This reveals the more general problem over the objective reality of ideas, given that ideas 
cannot be exhibited in experience. In chapter two, I explore a different solution that Kant proposes 
in the third Critique, the Critique of the Power of Judgment. There, nature is considered in an 
altogether difference sense than as a whole of appearances. It is considered as the source of 
aesthetic judgments. I consider the Critique of the Power of Judgment and the concepts explained 
therein as a necessary counterpart to those explored in this chapter. Where the metaphysical 
construction of nature in Kant meets its limit, the aesthetic construction of nature enters, and so I 
move now to chapter two, which is occupied precisely with this aesthetic construction of nature. 
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Chapter Two: KantÕs Critical Aesthetics in the Critique of The 
Power of Judgment 
Chapter Outline 
In this chapter, I explore KantÕs expansion upon his idea of nature as articulated in the Critique of 
Pure Reason. Section 2.1 explores this idea in terms of KantÕs theory of reflective judgment, 
specifically the two main forms of aesthetic judgment, judgments of beauty and judgments of the 
sublime. Regarding the latter, I draw out one of KantÕs claims pertinent to my discussion, that 
nature is not receptive to ideas. Ideas merely regulate oneÕs experience of nature, but do not 
constitute that experience, or the matter of that experience. In the Critique of Judgment, this 
regulative function of reason via the ideas is replaced with the reflective function of judgment that 
forms aesthetic experience. Despite similar limitations imposed upon experience of nature by 
reflective aesthetic judgments, there are moments in the Critique of Judgment where KantÕs attitude 
toward the idea of nature is expanded, particularly regarding the supersensible. One place this is 
particularly evident is in KantÕs theory of genius. In 2.2, I examine this theory and its connection to 
aesthetic ideas, which Kant defines as the counterpart to ideas of reason (covered in 1.3). I then 
move on to discuss the fine arts and poetry in particular, with which I attempt to test the limits of 
KantÕs more expansive idea of nature, namely, a nature that seems predisposed to our aesthetic 
appreciation of it. Despite the fine arts, and poetry especially, acting as powerful symbolic 
representations of this ÒhiddenÓ power of nature, I conclude that KantÕs need to restrict this power 
to a reflective function of judgment, points toward something from which the critical philosophy 





2.1. The Aesthetic Judgment 
Abstract  
In this section, I examine KantÕs description of pure judgments of taste, firstly of the beautiful, and 
secondly of the sublime. I elucidate the difference between objective determining judgments and 
subjective reflective judgments. Both judgments of beauty and the sublime are purely reflective, 
and as such have important connections to KantÕs idea of nature, which, as I have shown in chapter 
one, is conditioned by certain a priori modes of thinking. Despite this conditioned nature drawing 
critical ire from some of KantÕs successors, Schelling being one of them, I will point to moments in 
the third Critique that present interesting challenges to those intending to surpass KantÕs critical 
boundaries, particularly regarding the supersensible ground of nature. The lack of receptivity that 
nature has to ideas is something that radically separates KantÕs theory of nature from SchellingÕs. 
This will become an important point of comparison in chapters three and four. I will conclude by 
defending the view that Kant does have a coherent theory of the sublime, which still has its uses, 






In the Critique of pure reason, KantÕs theory of judgment is limited to acts of the understanding. In 
the Analytic of Concepts, he even goes so far as to call the understanding itself the Ôfaculty of 
judgmentÕ (B94). KantÕs central task in the CPR, in this respect, is to establish firm grounds upon 
which our capacity for judgment can be shown to be objective, and hence productive of objective 
knowledge.  
In order to show how objective knowledge is possible, Kant proposes a way in which to conceive of 
our cognitive activity in relation to the external world, such that the world itself Ñ while subsisting 
independently of us Ñ comes to be objective partly as a result of our cognitive engagement with 
it.
43
 The product of this process of cognitive engagement with the material world Kant calls the 
phenomenal, or the realm of appearances. Its counterpart, the noumenal, is everything that cannot 
not be subsumed within or under the human cognitive apparatus, which includes, but is not 
necessarily limited to, things as they are in themselves.
44
 In the Transcendental Aesthetic of the 
CPR, Kant deduced the a priori forms of space and time as the sole forms of intuition in which 
sensible experiences take place. In this sense, the term ÒaestheticÓ was used simply to denote the 
science of the senses, rather than BaumgartenÕs usage as a rationalist science of taste.
45
 In the CPR, 
the faculty of judgment is reserved for assessing and implementing standards of correctness when 
combining sensible intuitions with the concepts of the understanding. In this manner, objective or 
                                                
43 Cf. Gardner, 1999, pp. 37-50. KantÕs view of cognition as activity, rather than the mere passivity of 
the senses, or affectation of the intellect, also informs the way in which KantÕs critique of reflective 
judgment is understood. I demonstrate this below according to KantÕs distinction between subjective 
and objective judgment. 
44 Cf. CPR B298. 
45 Cf. ibid., B35a. 
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determinative judgments took their role in cognition as monitoring the effective production of 
objective knowledge.
46
 In the CPR judgments are always judgments of cognition. 
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment,
47
 Kant concerns himself not with cognitive judgments, 
but with aesthetic judgments. As already mentioned, in the CPR, ÔaestheticÕ simply designated the 
science of sensibility. An element of experience is aesthetic to the extent that it concerns the 
affections of our senses, prior to these affections being conceptualised. Kant retains this definition 
of aesthetic in the CJ, but with some important additions. One such addition is the meaning of 
subjective judgments. In typical parlance, one tends to think of subjective and objective as strict 
oppositions, such that the subjective relates merely to the realm of personal feeling or preference, 
rather than the realm of objective factual truths. Accordingly, to say, for example, that taste is 
subjective is to say that it is reducible only to a particular personÕs likes and dislikes. Nothing ÒtrueÓ 
or epistemically significant can be said of a subjective judgment. This is not how Kant uses the term 
subjective however. While it is true that an aesthetic judgment is subjective, because it concerns 
itself only with cognition of the subject and not the objective world as such, this does not mean that 
all judgments of taste reduce to personal preference for Kant. While there are these kinds of 
judgment which relate to our feelings of sensory gratification, there are also, in addition, pure 
judgments of taste, and it is this form of pure judgment with which Kant is primarily concerned. 
Before examining the intricacies of KantÕs argument, it is worth describing his general account of 
the subjective judgment in more detail. 
2.1.2. The Subjective Form of Judgment 
Several of the core features of KantÕs description of judgment in the CJ are carried over, at least 
analogously, from the CPR. For example, the difference between determining and reflective 
judgments in the CJ is analogous to the apodeictic and hypothetical uses of reason in the CPR, 
                                                
46 Cf. ibid., B600. 
47 Hereafter CJ. 
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(B674-5). In both cases a unity with regard to knowledge of nature is at issue, and in both cases, this 
unity concerns the relationships between the universal and the particular. The regulative use of 
reason in the CPR with regard to ideas Ð which Kant here views as problematic concepts (B675) Ð 
has a similar function to the reflective form of judgment in the CJ. So, one can draw an Ð albeit 




Kant defines the power of judgment as Ôthe faculty for thinking of the particular as contained under 
the universalÕ (CJ, 5:179). By ÔuniversalÕ Kant means a principle or law, such as a concept; by 
particular he means an individual phenomenal item. The power of judgment can work in one of two 
ways. When the law is already given, such as in the case of the categories of the understanding, the 
faculty of judgment merely Ôsubsumes the particular under itÕ (ibid.). Kant calls this the 
ÔdeterminingÕ power of judgment, insofar as it constitutes particular phenomenal items as objects of 
experience. For example, when I apply the concept of a tree to a phenomenal item, I have subsumed 
this particular, phenomenal tree under the universal concept of ÒtreeÓ. I thereby constitute an object 
of experience. On the other hand, there are cases where Ôonly the particular is given, for which the 
universal is to be foundÕ, and in this case the power judgment is Ômerely reflectingÕ (ibid.). One 
begins with a particular, for which a universal is sought. In this case I could start with the 
phenomenal tree, and from this extract some other universal notion such as that of a living thing 
                                                
48 One key factor here is the issue of autonomy. In the case of reflective judgment, Kant writes in the 
CJ that, unlike determining judgments, which have no autonomy because of their merely subsumptive 
function, reflective judgments are more autonomous because they subsume a particular under a principle 
which the faculty of reflective judgment provides for itself (5:386). It is by this self-prescribed principle 
or law that the power of reflecting judgment can approximate to concepts of reason (ibid.). For more on 




reaching toward the sun for nourishment. This is subjective or reflective judgment.
49
 There are 
important reasons why reflective judgments are precisely reflective, and as such subjective rather 
than objective. In the case of objective judgments, I determine the tree as such by applying a 
concept to it. In the case of reflective judgments, I do not determine any aspect of the objective tree 
so much as I use said object as an item for reflection upon my own cognitive faculties. There is an 
important reason for this which has to do with KantÕs expanded idea of nature in the CJ. Kant 
claims that, in the case of determining judgments, nature is experienced according to laws 
prescribed by the understanding. In the most general sense, nature is determined by the 
understanding according to Ôthe universal conceptÕ of nature (5: 180), by which I take Kant to mean 
simply that nature is as it is to the extent that it accords to laws.
50
 There are now two levels of law-
governed nature, the universal level of nature as a singular concept, and the Ôparticular empirical 
lawsÕ (ibid.) that result from the legislation of the understanding. It is with these particular empirical 
laws that reflective judgment deals.
51
 
                                                
49 One can find a useful technical definition of reflection in the Amphiboly of the Concepts of 
Reflection in the CPR. He writes, Ôreflection (reflexio) does not concern itself with objects themselves 
with a view to deriving concepts from them directly, but is that state of mind in which we first set 
ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which [alone] we are able to arrive at concepts.  It 
is the consciousness of the relation of given representations to our different sources of knowledgeÕ 
(B316). 
50 Kant uses Ôuniversal conceptÕ here, and not ÔideaÕ as in the CPR. I take him to mean essentially the 
same by both these terms. 
51 In addition to elucidating the structure and function of reflective judgment, Kant must also show it to 
be a necessary a priori faculty of cognition. However, the strength of the ground upon which he claims 
this can be debated, though space does not permit me to go into detail here. See, for example, the 
following passage from the CJ: ÔThe understanding is[É]in possession of a priori universal laws of 
nature, without which nature could not be an object of experience at all; but still it requires in addition a 
certain order of nature in its particular rules, which can only be known to it empirically and which from 
its point of view are contingentÕ (5:184). Shortly after, Kant relates this to the supersensible: ÔThrough 
the possibility of its a priori laws for nature the understanding gives a proof that nature is cognized by 
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The reflecting power of judgment does not legislate in the way determining judgments do, and so 
the principle by which reflective judgment operates cannot be supplied from without. Instead, Ôthe 
reflecting power of judgmentÉcan only give itself such a transcendental principle as a law, and 
cannotÉprescribe it to natureÕ (5: 180). Kant follows this with a line that is of particular importance 
for my purposes, as it has to do with his conception of nature. He writes, Ôreflection on the laws of 
nature is directed by nature, and nature is not directed by the conditions in terms of which we 
attempt to develop a concepts of it that is in this regard entirely contingentÕ (ibid.). This is one of 
the first hints of KantÕs attitude toward nature in the CJ, and it is followed by probably the most 
well known of KantÕs assertions with regard to cognition of nature a priori. The understanding 
prescribes a priori laws to nature, but these laws do not govern everything in nature, for there are 
also Ôparticular empirical lawsÕ, which Kant claims Ômust be considered in terms of the sort of unity 
they would have if an understanding (even if not ours) had likewise given them for the sake of our 
faculty of cognitionÕ (ibid.). It is this consideration of the merely empirical in nature that Kant 
defines as purposiveness.  
Purposiveness in an objective sense has to do with the correspondence between a concept, 
construed as the Ôground of reality of an objectÕ, which Kant also calls an ÔendÕ, and that to which 
the concept is applied. In other words, the form of an object is purposive to the extent that it accords 
with the concept that grounds its real possibility. In addition to this determinate purposiveness, Kant 
describes the purposiveness of nature in general according to its empirical laws. This breed of 
purposiveness belongs exclusively to the reflective power of judgment, as it does not actually 
prescribe anything to objects in nature, but rather considers there empirical reality as if it were 
designed for the purposes of our judgment. It is KantÕs conception of the purposiveness of nature 
                                                                                                                                                            
us only as appearances, and hence at the same time an indication of its supersensible substratum; but it 





which grounds his analysis of judgments of beauty and the sublime, and by way of analogy, his 
discussion of fine art and genius, which I will show as this chapter progresses.  
2.1.3. The Judgment of Taste  
A judgment of taste (Geschmackurteil) is a form of reflective judgment. In these judgments, it is the 
imagination, and not the understanding, which supplies the rule by which the judgment is made. As 
opposed to determining judgments of knowledge, which are related to the faculty of cognition, 
reflective aesthetic judgments are related to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. In the First 
Introduction to the CJ, Kant provides some supporting arguments for this subjective form of 
judgment by appealing to the threefold division of the human mind developed by Moses 
Mendelssohn in his Morgenstunden of 1785.
52
 Kant labels these three divisions the faculty of 
cognition, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and the faculty of desire (20:206). In the case of 
the second, Kant argues that Ôthe representations belonging to cognitionÕ are used Ômerely as 
grounds for preserving [the subjectÕs] existence in [them]Õ (ibid.). This final use of representation as 
ground does not provide or determine any cognition, even though, as Kant admits, it may 
presuppose one. Such a remark is sufficient for dismissing with the idea that aesthetic judgments 
have absolutely nothing to do with cognition. We can see from KantÕs phraseology that it is merely 
the result of aesthetic judgment that is not cognitive, which is not to say the basis or ground might 
                                                
52 Kant composed two introductions to the CJ, a first draft (the here cited First Introduction), and a 
second, much shorter version. The first draft was not published until 1793, three years after the 
publication of the CJ. During the nineteenth century, this separately published introduction was taken to 
be a piece of work independent from the CJ. In the Cambridge edition of the CJ to which I refer, this 
First Introduction is presented before the introduction to the CJ included in the original 1790 edition. I 






 Of course, such an appeal to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure in the subject 
is not sufficient for fully constituting a system of judgment.
54
 For such a system to be formulated, 
the feeling of pleasure and displeasure must be connected with a priori principles, in the same way 
that cognition is connected to the principles of the understanding, and desire connected to pure 
reason (20:207). By supplying its own principle, reflective judgment is able to hold the empirical 
manifold as a unity, even if it cannot determine it as such. It is on the basis of this reflective unity 
that Kant hopes to secure a systematic connection between the human mind and the natural world. 
2.1.4. Judgments of Reflection and the Technique of Nature 
Why should systematicity, not just of the human mind, but also of nature itself, be so important for 
Kant? Systematicity, even if it is taken only as a regulative principle, is what solidifies the place of 
judgment within the faculties, and helps to secure a viable idea of nature Ñ at least for KantÕs 
purposes. Via his particular construal of purposiveness, Kant can hold that even reflective 
judgments are not the result of mere accident but are secured according to a self-prescribed, a priori 
rule. The rule of reflective judgment presupposes a concordance between the activity of judgment 
and the arrangement of material nature. By the time Kant reaches his analysis of judgments of the 
beautiful, he has already established what he believes to be firm foundations upon which the 
subjective form of judgment is based. Judgment in the subjective case is reflective, for two 
important reasons. The first, already explored above, has to do merely with the limitation of 
subjective judgment to reflection upon the interaction of the faculties of the human mind. The 
                                                
53 Such an assertion becomes increasingly important as the CJ progresses, for it justifies the place of 
the faculty of judgment which would otherwise be in an unsecured position as an indeterminate 
mediator between imagination and understanding. 
54 Kant instead refers to this relation of cognition of an object to pleasure and displeasure as an 
ÔaggregateÕ because, while empirically knowable, such a representation in not grounded on any a priori 
principle, such as those governing the relation of intuitions and concepts. (20:207). 
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second and perhaps more interesting reason can be found in the First Introduction. Kant writes the 
following: 
The reflecting power of judgmentÉproceeds with given appearances, in 
order to bring them under empirical concepts of determinate natural 
things, not schematically, but technically, not as it were merely 
mechanically, like an instrument, but artistically, in accordance with the 
general but at the same time indeterminate principle of a purposive 
arrange of nature in a system, as it were for the benefit of our power of 
judgment, in the suitability of its particular laws (about which 
understanding has nothing to say) for the possibility of experience as a 
system, without which presupposition we could not hope to find our way 
in a labyrinth of the multiplicity of possible particular empirical laws. 
Thus the power of judgment itself makes the technique of nature into the 
principle of its reflection a priori. (20:214) 
It is this reflective power of judgment which allows us to conceive of nature not merely as a 
mechanism, but also Ôat the same time an artÕ (20:218). The suggestion is that, while it is tempting 
to reduce the subsuming power of determining judgment to a merely mechanical operation, the 
reflective power of judgment, given that it need not constitute the object in the same way, can 
contain the idea of nature as art, or as following a rule akin to art. What does this mean? One 
simple reading is that, as art, nature is a system which, according to the prescription of its own rule, 
can account for all possible myriad representations and experiences contained within and directed 
towards it. Via reflective judgment, we see nature as an artefact; we see it as if it were made. 
Furthermore, we see nature as if it were made for the purposes of our judgment. Such a 
characterisation of reflective judgment as technical and artistic in form provides ground for KantÕs 
theory of judgments of the beautiful and the sublime.
55
 These judgments of taste in relation to 
                                                
55 The technique of nature with regard to reflective judgments is merely formal, in that it provides 
Ôpurposive shapesÕ (Gestalten) for the power of judgment to reflect upon the agreement of the 
imagination with the understanding (CJ, 20:232) This is opposed to the real technique of nature that 
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nature provide the ground for beautiful works of art, both of which, I will claim, are mutually 
dependent, but in a way that makes nature, and not art-works, the primordial ground for judgments 
of beauty. 
2.1.5. The Pure Judgment of Taste: Beauty 
In the preceding, I outlined reflective judgments, and judgments of taste in general. In order to 
analyse judgments of beauty specifically, Kant splits the form of the judgment into four ÒmomentsÓ. 
Each of these moments mirrors the logical preconditions of experience Kant deduces in the CPR.
56
 
This makes the moments of an aesthetic judgment also purely logical.
57
 This does not mean that the 
judgment of taste itself is a logical judgment, and indeed it cannot be. But for the purposes of 
KantÕs transcendental deduction of judgment, its component parts are divided logically.
58
 As 
already mentioned, judgments of taste are reflective, and so concern themselves only with the 
relation between the faculties while determining nothing about the object. As a result of the 
Ôdetermining groundÕ of a judgment of taste being wholly subjective, the first logical moment, 
pertaining to the quality of the judgment, is disinterestedness. This simply means that when I judge 
an object to be beautiful, I do not determine this beauty as an objective property of the thing being 
                                                                                                                                                            
signifies objects of nature as ends, and therefore requires teleological judgment. I do not deal with 
teleological judgment in any depth here. For more on this see Ginsborg (2008). 
56 These are Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality. Kant uses this same fourfold structure in the 
Critique of Practical Reason to analyse moral judgments (CPrR, 66). 
57 What is immediately important, is that aesthetic judgments are purposive, or Ôpurpose-relatedÕ as 
Wicks calls them (2006, p. 16). I mention this now to highlight the way in which judgments of beauty 
are peculiarly subjective. The peculiar nature of this subjectivity will crystallise as I move through the 
four moments of a judgment of beauty. It will be useful to remember the remarks above about nature 
following a rule of technique akin to art when considering these four moments. 
58  In the following I cover only the first three moments of disinterestedness, universality and 
purposiveness. I leave out an extended discussion of necessity because by my reading it is implied by 




judged, up to and including its actual empirical existence.
59
 Kant writes, Ôto say that an object is 
beautiful and to prove I have taste what matters is what I make of this representation in myself, not 
how I depend on the existence of the objectÕ (CJ, 5:205). It is important for Kant that one not 
depend on the existence of the object, because to do so would presumably mean dependence upon 
some lower faculty like sensibility. Only complete disinterestedness in the sensible instantiation of 
an object can make the judgment of beauty a pure one, meaning that it is not bound up with 
anything empirical. Kant calls a judgment of taste bound up with the empirical a judgment of the 
agreeable, Ôwhich pleases the senses in sensationÕ (ibid.). 
As Wicks points out in his commentary on the CJ, the first moment of a judgment of beauty already 
brings about an important condition, namely that they are ideal. As ideal, Ôjudgments of taste attend 
to the object's beauty exclusivelyÕ, rather than another feature of the object such as its sensory 
charm or attractive meaning (2006, p.17). They are ideal because there is not one particular property 
of an object that we can demarcate as its beauty. Rather, the object, approached in a certain way, 
strikes us a beautiful, not in terms of its properties but in terms of its whole. A judgment of beauty, 
then, is a pure, ideal judgment of taste.
60
 Pure judgments of taste are disinterested because they do 
not rely upon sensibility, as opposed to judgments of the agreeable or the good, which always 
contain some aspect of Ôsensory charmÕ. For Kant, the agreeable, the beautiful and the good 
Ôdesignate three different relations to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, in relation to which we 
                                                
59 I.e. as an instantiation of X concept. This would be a strong reading of KantÕs claim. A softer reading 
would simply assert that, while the existence of objective empirical properties must in some way be 
present in order that I am able to judge anything at all, these properties do not factor into the product of 
my judgment itself. For a discussion of the first view, cf. Guyer (1997, pp. 169-183). For a discussion of 
the second, cf. Ameriks, (2003, pp.  323-343). 
60 The ideality of a judgment of beauty becomes increasingly important when Kant moves on to talk 
about beautiful judgments of art-works, because even more than in a judgment about an item of nature, 
whose teleological purposiveness we can only reflect upon subjectively, a beautiful art-work is able to 
bring about a pure judgment on the basis of an intentionally crafted and determined item. 
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distinguish objects or kinds of representations from each otherÕ (CJ, 5:210). Pure judgments of 
beauty contain nothing empirical, or rather, are not determined by anything empirical, and as such, 
any gratification or approval obtains from these judgments has to do exclusively with the interplay 
of our cognitive faculties.  
The eradication of anything empirical from the judgment of beauty leads Kant to the second 
moment, pertaining to its quantity. A judgment of beauty is universal. At first glance, this would 
seem to imply that a judgment of taste requires universal assent, but Kant does not mean this. 
Rather, he writes, Ôone cannot judge that about which he is aware that the satisfaction in it is 
without any interest in his own case in any way except that it must contain a ground of satisfaction 
for everyoneÕ (5:211). This sentence requires some elucidation. When I judge that I am satisfied by 
a given representation, and this judgment is a pure one, I simultaneously assert that every one can 
make the same judgment. This does not entail that everyone must agree with my judgment, only 
that they must be able to make the same kind of judgment in the same manner. Universality is 
subjective here, and relies on the fact that, if pure judgments of taste follow the same logical 
movements as cognitive ones, it must be true that everyone's capacity for aesthetic judgment 
operates in the same way. Kant calls this Ôcommon validityÕ (5:215). Kant really does not need to 
say anything more complex than this. The principles of reflective judgment, are inter-subjectively 
Ñ and therefore universally Ñ valid simply because the human faculty of judgment does and must 
work in the same manner in each particular subject. This common validity, in order for judgments 
of taste to rest on a priori rather than empirical principles, must ground and therefore logically 
precede the feeling of pleasure aroused in the subject. This lends credence to the notion that 
judgments of beauty have nothing to do with features of the object. It is the harmony between the 
faculties of cognition, combined with the ability Ôto communicate oneÕs state of mindÕ, if only with 
regard to this harmony, upon which feelings of pleasure are grounded. As such, Kant closes the 
second moment by summarising, ÔThat is beautiful which pleases universally without a conceptÕ 





 I am not focussed on this debate, rather I here lay the ground for KantÕs theory of artistic 
beauty, in which it is clear that the conceptual element of the judgment has a larger and, I claim, 
ambiguous role. 
The third Ñ and perhaps most complex Ñ moment of a judgment of beauty concerns its 
purposiveness.
62
 As I mentioned above, purposiveness simply refers to the causal relation between a 
concept and its object, namely the object being an end of the concept that caused it. An end is the 
concept taken as the ground of reality for an object. As shown above, this form of purposiveness 
works in only one direction, grounding the reality of empirical items, which are subsumed under 
universal concepts. Empirical items cannot ground concepts, and it is for this reason, at least 
according to the introduction of the CJ, that Kant introduces reflective judgment proper. While it is 
often reported that Kant came to the notion of reflective judgments relatively late, in contrast with 
his other critical principles, the possibility of reflective judgment is offered in the CPR.
63
 In the 
Analytic of Concepts, Kant says the following: 
By Ôanalytic of conceptsÕ, I do not understand their analysis, or the 
procedure usual in philosophical investigations, that of dissecting the 
content of such concepts as may present themselves, and so of rendering 
them more distinct; but the hitherto rarely attempted dissection of the 
faculty of the understanding itself, in order to investigate the possibility 
of concepts a priori by looking for them in the understanding alone, as 
their birthplace, and by analysing the pure use of this faculty. (B91) 
It is worth quoting Kant in full here, because his aim in the deduction of the table of categories in 
the CPR is quite specific. Kant is concerned with the make-up of the faculty of the understanding 
                                                
61 The debate between conceptualist and non-conceptualist readings of Kant is still going on. For non-
conceptualist readings cf. GuyerÕs Kant and the Claims of Taste (1997) and GinsborgÕs The Role of 
Taste in KantÕs Theory of Cognition (1990), for a conceptualist response cf. part three of AmeriksÕ 
Interpreting KantÕs Critiques (2003, pp. 283-343). 
62 For a concise overview of purposiveness in judgment cf. Deligiorgi, (2014, p. 28-9). 
63 Cf. Pillow, 2003, p. 17. 
83 
 
that governs, a priori, the process of cognition. Concepts are deduced, not from objects that make up 
their particular ends, but from the faculty of the understanding itself, and in this way, they are 
purposive. In the CJ, Kant takes this notion one step further, by pointing out that if the preceding 
argument is true, (that concepts are purposive for the sake of their employment by the 
understanding), it must be possible for there to be purposiveness without an end, for it is enough 
that a representation, be it of an object, a state of mind or an action, can be explained as such only 
Ôinsofar as we assume as its ground a causality in accordance with endsÕ (5:220). If this is true, then 
we can Ôobserve a purposiveness concerning form, even without basing it on an endÕ (ibid.), i.e. 
regardless of what purpose may or may not objectively obtain in the object itself. We do this, of 
course, not by way of a determinative judgment of cognition, but via reflection. This is what leads 
Kant to claim that a judgment of taste pertains to nothing but the form of the purposiveness of an 
object as its ground. What does this mean? Wenzel provides a useful summary. As we have already 
seen, a judgment of beauty does not merely concern the relationship between a subject and an 
object, as would a judgment of cognition. Rather, beauty has its roots in Ôan act of contemplation 
that takes into account that relationship' (2003, p. 2). Wenzel describes two main features of this act 
of contemplation: 
1. The feeling of the beautiful which leads to aesthetic judgment can be 
applied only to oneself. 
2. It is however of objective logical necessity, as this capacity also 
belongs to every subject. (2003, p. 3) 
 
These points reiterate what I have said above, but here applied to the third moment, they indicate 
that a judgment of beauty only concerns the form of purposiveness. The fact that the purposiveness 
thus represented can be only subjective, is a result of the combination of the above two facts. If the 
judgment relied upon something empirical, it would no longer be purely a priori, and hence not 
universal. As Kant writes in the CJ, 
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To establish a priori the connection of the feeling of pleasure or 
displeasure as an effect with some representation (sensation or concept) 
as its cause is absolutely impossible, for that would be a causal relation 
which (among objects of experience) can only ever be cognized a 
posteriori and by means of experience itself. (5:222) 
The form of purposiveness can hence be understood as Ôthe merely formal purposiveness in the play 
of the cognitive powers of the subjectÕ (ibid.). The play between these powers does have a kind of 
causality Ð it must for a feeling of pleasure to be aroused by it Ð but one that is not limited to any 
particular cognition. An aesthetic judgment that appealed to a particular cognition, and so only to its 
agreeableness or disagreeableness, is an empirical judgment, and hence not related to beauty.
64
 Only 
a pure disinterested aesthetic judgment can be called a judgment of the beautiful. Such a judgment 
is not easy to come by however. We are often mistaken about just what kind of judgments we are 
employing. This is not hard to imagine. It is difficult to conceive how exactly we might eradicate all 
interest in the object upon which we exercise our judgment. The division of logical judgments into 
empirical and pure appears relatively unproblematic. But when it comes to reflective aesthetic 
judgments, which pertain merely to the feelings of pleasure or displeasure in the subject, it becomes 
less clear how to ensure that the judgment of beauty remains pure. Indeed, Kant points this out 
when he writes: 
Charms are not only often included with beauty (which should properly 
concern merely form) as a contribution to the aesthetic universal 
satisfaction, but are even passed off as beauties in themselves, hence the 
matter of satisfaction is passed off for the form: a misunderstanding 
which, like many others that yet always have something true as their 
ground, can be eliminated by careful determination of these concepts. 
(5:223) 
                                                
64 Such a judgment would rely upon empirical data, not just incidentally but necessarily, and so cannot 
be a pure judgment. 
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We might want to question how a determination of concepts is supposed to clarify anything here, 
given that the judgment of beauty is precisely that which arouses feelings in the subject without 
strict reliance upon any concept. The exact method by which these Ôcharms and emotionsÕ are 
eradicated, or how they are stopped from tainting the judgment of beauty in the first place, is not 
fully explained by Kant. He makes pains to emphasise that while the mere sensation of something, 
for example, a colour or the tone of an instrument, can only ever be agreeable, i.e. empirical, it is 
the form of the experience yielded by this sensation which is pure, and hence appropriate for a 
judgment of beauty. This is because the form Ôis the only thing that can be universally 
communicated about these representations with certainty: because the quality of sensations 
themselves cannot be assumed to be in accord in all subjectsÕ (5:224).
65
 It might at first seem 
impossible to separate the merely sensuous ÔstuffÕ of a colour or a tone from its pure form. Indeed, 
it is debatable the extent to which mere sensations even have a form, aside from their being ordered 
in space and time. Kant attempts such a separation of form and content with the following: 
If one assumes, with Euler, that the colours are vibrations (pulsus) of the 
air immediately following one another, just as tones are vibrations of the 
air disturbed by sound, and, what is most important, that the mind does 
not merely perceive, by sense, their effect on the animation of the organ, 
but also, through reflection, perceives the regular play of the impressions 
(hence the form in the combination of different representations) (about 
which I have very little doubt), then colours and tones would not be mere 
sensations, but would already be a formal determination of the unity of 
the manifold in them, and in that case could also be counted as beauties 
in themselves. (ibid.) 
                                                
65 This is one of the first instances of what I call a negative conception of beauty. This is a form beauty 
that exists simply by virtue of eradicating those elements that cannot be ascribed to all subjects with 
certainty (leaving the merely formal). This negative concept of beauty will become increasingly 
important, particularly when Kant introduces judgments of the sublime as their ÒpositiveÓ counterpart. 
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Here Kant makes an important distinction between that which affects our senses (vibrations in the 
air), and how we come to recognise this succession of sensuous impressions in the interaction 
between our faculties. In so doing however, it appears as though Kant confuses the causal 
conditions of sensation with the sensations themselves. What is clear from the above passage, is that 
reflective judgment is the capacity to abstract from immediate sensations in order to identity their 
Ôregular play of impressionsÕ. It is hard to see how this would amount to anything more than merely 
reflecting particular sensible impressions upon their more general ordering in space and time, 
especially because these are the only purely formal kinds of intuition which Kant grants. According 
to this reading, the form of a sensation is simply the nature of its being spatially and temporally 
ordered. Remember, what makes this form viable for a judgment of beauty, in terms of the third 
moment, is its seeming purposiveness for precisely the make up of our faculties and the free play 
that occurs between them. This is problematic however. If we look at the above quotation closely, it 
seems that the only way we can reflect upon the Ôplay of the impressionsÕ is to first be confronted 
with a sensation, which must already be formed in space and time, and then Ñ through some 
process of abstraction Ñ reflect upon how the form of that sensation accords play of the faculties. If 
this is the case, then Kant relies upon the Lockean distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities, which would be untenable with KantÕs more general theory of sensation. Beauty would in 
turn be dependent upon something merely empirical, i.e. whatever primary qualities are necessary 
to bring about the sensation, if only for the purposes of abstraction to the form of this sensation. 
In fact, pure and empirical aesthetic judgments Ñ the first pertaining to beauty, the second to 
agreeableness or charm Ñ come so close together that Kant admits they are not only confused, but 
that charm can in fact act as a supplement to beauty for the purposes of Ôrecommend[ing] taste and 
its cultivationÕ (ibid.), as long as this charm is not mistaken as Ôthe grounds for the judging of 
beautyÕ (5:225). Taste needs to be cultivated. That a pure judgment of taste is ideal does not just 
mean it is devoid of all empirical content, but also, that it is ideal in the sense of ends; an ideal 
situation. This leads to further problems. If it were possible to be mistaken whether a judgment of 
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beauty is or is not a pure one Ñ as Kant seems to imply Ñ then it would seem that there are correct 
and incorrect methods for conducting such a judgment. If this is true, then the supposedly free 
harmonious play of the faculties is in fact not free, or at least not to the extent Kant implies.
66
 It is 
conditioned by certain rules of validity and invalidity. To see if Kant can survive this potential 
objection, it is worth citing at length a particularly complex passage from ¤16 of the CJ. Here, Kant 
discusses the distinction between free and adherent beauty. The first Ôpresupposes no concept of 
what the object ought to be; the second does presuppose such a concept and the perfection of the 
object in accordance with itÕ (5:229). Our ignorance of any objective end to that which we judge as 
beautiful liberates the imagination to take the place of determination according to a concept. Kant 
writes: 
No concept of any end for which the manifold should serve the given 
object and this which the latter would represent is presupposed, by which 
the imagination, which is as it were at play in the observation of the 
shape, would merely be restricted. (ibid.) 
As KantÕs discussion of purposiveness progresses, his characterisation of beauty becomes 
increasingly negative. A free beauty represents Ôno object under a determinate conceptÕ (ibid.). This 
leads to some strange distinctions. Flowers, borders on wallpaper, and Ômusic without a textÕ are 
free beauties. Human beings, horses and buildings are not, for when confronted with them, we 
Ôpresuppose a concept of the end that determines what the thing should be, hence a concept of its 
perfectionÕ (ibid.). How exactly we are to judge the level of perfection attained by a human or a 
building in fulfilling its concept is unclear. In the case of human beings, it is difficult to conceive of 
how one individual might be considered perfect, as opposed to another. Does Kant mean by 
                                                
66 It is worth asking here to what extent a faculty of human cognition can be entirely free, given that it 
is always at least partially dependent on both the other faculties, and the limitations said faculties place 
on the nature of our empirical experience. It could also be asked, however, to what extent partial or 




perfection simply the attainment of all requisite conditions for exercising the mental faculties? Or 
does he mean perfection in a moral sense? Either would be hard to reconcile with his larger critical 
philosophy, the former because a person we consider highly imperfect or even hateful could be still 
be considered perfectly rational, the latter because moral actions are defined by Kant as ones of 
striving, and hence of being always limited and imperfect.
67
 What is clear from the above passage is 
that a judgment of beauty is pure when we are lacking any determinate concept of what the object 
being judged is or ought to be. This lack of determinate or determining concept may be appropriate 
for KantÕs purposes, but as I will show later in my discussion of Kant on works of art, the case of 
artistic beauty raises some problems regarding the precise extent to which we can disassociate from 
any accompanying concept when aesthetically judging art-works. For the sake of natural beauty 
however, any hypothetical issue of perfection need never enter the picture, since the concept of the 
thing being judged concerns another element of cognition entirely, namely the objective judgment 
that yields knowledge. Kant summarises with the following: 
The satisfaction in the manifold in a thing in relation to the internal 
purpose that determines its possibility is a satisfaction grounded on a 
concept; the satisfaction in beauty, however, is one that presupposes no 
concept, but is immediately combined with the representation through 
which the object is given (not through which it is thought). Now if the 
judgment of taste in regard to the latter is made dependent on the purpose 
in the former, as a judgment of reason, and is thereby restricted, then it is 
no longer a free and pure judgment of taste. (5:230) 
He continues: 
To be sure, taste gains by this combination of aesthetic satisfaction with 
the intellectual in that it becomes fixed and, though not universal, can 
have rules prescribed to it in regard to certain purposively determined 
objects. But in this case these are not rules of taste, but merely rules for 
the unification of taste with reason i.e. of the beautiful with the good, 
                                                
67 I will discuss this in more detail later regarding KantÕs remarks on beauty as a symbol of morality. 
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through which the former becomes usable as an instrument of intention 
with regard to the latter, so that the determination of the mind that 
sustains itself and is of subjective universal validity can underlie that 
which can only be sustained through strenuous resolve but is objectively 
universally valid. (5:231) 
I have shown the way in which Kant demarcates pure judgments of beauty through the eradication 
of empirical grounds of determination. But Kant is also aware that such a negative conception of 
pure judgments does not suffice for a theory of taste. There is danger that beauty itself becomes 
either that which is judged only by force or absence of other determinations, or is intersubjectively 
valid only to the extent that every object can potentially be judged as beautiful.
68
 My motivation for 
pointing out these dangers here is to show the ways in which Kant attempts to Òfill outÓ the gaps 
created by free judgments of beauty.
69
 I claim that one way in which Kant does this is through a 
critique of judgments of the sublime, to which I now turn. 
2.1.6. The Sublime as Counterpart to Beauty 
Many commentators, both inside and outside of the Kantian tradition, have noted the difficulty that 
comes with the construction a coherent theory of the sublime.
70
 Even from those sympathetic to the 
Kantian tradition, the majority of emphasis has been expended on the importance of the sublime for 
KantÕs ethical theory. In a recent article on KantÕs theory of the sublime, Deligiorgi contends with 
both of these views, arguing, as I will, that there are other important factors about the sublime in 
Kant apart from its moral significance (2014, pp. 26-7). One does, however, require a certain 
                                                
68 One could apply a similar characterisation to conceptual art, only, instead of aesthetic judgments 
being concerned with whether or not something is beautiful, they are concerned with whether or not 
something is art. The possible applications of KantÕs aesthetics regarding conceptual art is a topic too 
large to cover here, but has been explored at length in de DuveÕs Kant after Duchamp (1996). See also 
CrowtherÕs discussion of the avant-garde in relation to KantÕs conception of fine art (2010, pp. 165-9). 
69 Namely, the gaps between the three faculties of cognition, desire, and taste. 
70 Cf. Forsey, 2007, pp. 381-9. 
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interpretive labour to isolate KantÕs theory of the sublime from its moral uses. The results of this 
labour, while doing service to KantÕs overall aesthetic philosophy, do reveal some concerns relating 
to the place of nature of his critical system more generally. Before addressing the question of nature 
in light of these concerns, I provide a brief overview of judgments of the sublime in the CJ. 
In terms of their logical form, judgments of the beautiful and the sublime share mostly common 
ground. Both judgments are disinterested in that they Ôplease for themselvesÕ (5:244). Both 
judgments are therefore reflective, and so concern the make up of our cognitive faculties more than 
they do the natural world itself. Judgments of the sublime are also of universal validity for the same 
reasons as judgments of beauty. The difference comes in the forms associated with the judgment, 
namely, ÔlimitationÕ of form in the case of beauty, and ÔformlessÉlimitlessnessÕ (ibid.) in the case 
of the sublime. This formal difference also results in different associated cognitive affects. I 
elaborate below. 
Where judgments of beauty represent a harmony in the faculties of understanding and imagination, 
the sublime represents a kind of disharmony, such that the faculties are frustrated in some way. 
Whereas judgments of the beautiful concern limitation, and hence cohesion, the sublime is to be 
found Ôin a formless object, insofar as limitlessness is represented in itÕ (ibid.). For Kant, each breed 
of judgment, in essence, correlates to each of the higher faculties. Beauty is connected with the 
understanding, insofar as it presents an indeterminate concept thereof. The sublime presents the 
same kind of indeterminate concept, but this time it is a concept of reason that is presented. To put 
it bluntly, judgments of the sublime are aesthetic presentations of the attempt to present the idea of 
totality to sensible intuition. 
From what has been summarised so far, it is clear that Deligiorgi is right to dispute the claims of 
those who deny that a theory of the sublime is possible because of its presentation of Ôontologically 
transcendentÕ objects (2014, p. 26). Even a superficial acquaintance with KantÕs theory of ideas of 
reason in the CPR is enough to show that the theory of the sublime Ñ despite its epistemological 
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complexity Ñ has a specific and important use in the CJ. Judgments of the sublime are the attempt 
to present ideas to the imagination. For DeligiorgiÕs purposes, the importance of the sublime 
connects to KantÕs emphasis on the autonomy of rational agents (ibid., p. 32). For my purposes, it is 
the relation between ideas and nature that is of importance about the sublime, as will be shown in 
my account of the dynamically sublime.
71
 The imaginative presentation of ideas is no small task, 
and one that Kant admits may even feel Ôcontrapurposive for our power of judgmentÕ (5:245). Ideas 
are Ôunsuitable for our faculty of presentationÕ, namely the imagination, and as such, risk Ôdoing 
violenceÕ to the imagination itself (ibid.). This is the essence of the judgment of the sublime. 
To deal with the sublime properly, Kant splits it into two types, the mathematical and the dynamic. 
The first type pertains to magnitude, the second to power, or force.
72
 The common factor in both 
cases of the sublime is a Ômovement of the mindÕ mediated by the imagination (5:247). In the case 
of the mathematical, this Ômovement of the mindÕ is related with the faculty of cognition Ñ i.e. the 
understanding. In the case of the dynamic, the imagination directs this ÔmovementÕ to reason, which 
                                                
71 Consider the following from KantÕs general remark attached to ¤29 of the CJ: Ôtaken literally, and 
considered literally, ideas cannot be presented. But if we extend our empirical faculty of representation 
(mathematically or dynamically) for the intuition of nature, then reason inevitably comes in as a faculty 
of the independence of the absolute totality, and produces the effort of the mind, though it is vain, to 
make the representation of the senses adequate to that. This effort, and the feeling of the unattainability 
of the idea by means of the imagination, is itself a presentation of the subjective purposiveness of our 
mind in the use of the imagination for its supersensible vocation, and compels us to think nature itself in 
its totality, as the presentation of something supersensible, subjectively, without being able to produce 
this presentation objectively (5:268). 
72 Significantly, it is only the second that is explicitly linked with nature. The reasons for this will 
become clear. Kant entitles section A ÔOn the mathematically sublime, and section B ÔOn the 
dynamically sublime in natureÕ. This echoes KantÕs distinction between the mathematical and dynamic 
forms of regressive synthesis in the CPR; the first of which Kant says deals with generative concepts of 
the world, or cosmical concepts (Weltbegriffe), the second of which generates concepts of nature 
(Naturbegriffe). I have discussed this in chapter one, cf. 1.3.3-1.3.4) 
92 
 
in the CJ Kant refers to as the Ôfaculty of desireÕ Ñ reason (ibid.).
73
 The mathematical sublime 
deals with magnitudes that are Ôabsolutely greatÕ; those magnitudes that are Ôgreat beyond all 
comparisonÕ (5:248). To clarify this, Kant discusses the concept of magnitude as a comparative 
concept. In a determinative judgment, the magnitude of one thing must be compared with another, 
such that their magnitudes are established relative to one another, or else a single item must be 
compared with a magnitude of measure, i.e. X is a certain number of feet/inches/metres. In both 
cases the object in question possesses magnitude relative to some other measure. Judgments 
pertaining to these kinds of magnitude are of course not sublime. Magnitudes, however, which the 
faculty of judgment cannot compare with any measurable scale, are reflective aesthetic judgments 
rather than quantitatively determining ones. They are relative only to the limits of that which we are 
able to sensibly apprehend. That which we judge to be absolutely great therefore pertains to a 
Ômagnitude that is equal only to itselfÕ. It is that Ôin comparison with which everything else is smallÕ 
(5:250).  
From the above it is clear that judgments of the sublime determine nothing about the object in 
question Ñ although they surely rely upon it in a specific way. Any object to which the judgment 
pertains serves only as Ôthe presentation of a sublimity that can be found in the mindÕ. Hence, Ôwhat 
is properly sublime cannot be contained in any sensible form, but concerns only ideas of reasonÕ 
(5:245). Because an idea of reason cannot be sensibly presented, what is presented in its place is an 
ÔinadequacyÕ of the mind.  One can see why this is the case. Magnitudes are relative to the context 
under which they are viewed. For example, in the relation between a tree and a bird that is sitting on 
one of its branches, the tree is taken as very large. In another relation, say, the tree to the forest in 
which it stands, the tree is exceedingly small. The measure with which Kant is concerned in relation 
                                                
73 This is not to say that the dynamical sublime has nothing to do with cognition, or that the 
mathematical has nothing to do with reason. If this were so, it would result in a distinction between 
mathematical and dynamical objects. Instead, Kant wishes to posit these two forms of the sublime as a 
Ôtwofold mannerÕ in which to represent the same object (5:247). 
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to the sublime is Ôthe measure of the sensesÕ (5:250).
74
 It is here that one sees the transition from 
one form of the sublime to the other. Since I cannot apprehend the entire forest in which a tree 
stands, I judge the forest to be mathematically sublime, i.e. in excess of that which I can sensibly 
access. In so doing, Kant claims, I demonstrate the presence of a faculty in my mind, which makes 
possible an ability to think in a way that Ôsurpasses every measure of the sensesÕ (ibid.). The faculty 
Kant is referring to here is reason. 
As with beauty, judgments of the sublime vary in degree; not all are pure judgments. For a 
judgment of the sublime to be pure, it cannot involve anything teleological, i.e. anything pertaining 
to a particular end in the object. Because of this criterion, Kant insists that the sublime cannot be 
shown in products of art Ñ where both the form and magnitude are determined by a human 
intention Ñ nor in natural ÔthingsÕ Ñ things of which we already have a determined concept Ñ but 
rather in Ôraw natureÕ, which Kant construes as nature Ômerely insofar as it contains magnitudeÕ 
(5:253).
75
 Pure judgments of the sublime therefore concern the appearances of nature, the intuition 
of which Ôbrings with them the idea of its infinityÕ, and this infinity is an aesthetic one because it 
concerns the Ôinadequacy of even the greatest effort of our imagination in the estimation of the 
magnitude of an objectÕ (5:255). Kant summarises what he means by this inadequacy of the 
imagination in terms of the cognitive construction of nature. He writes, 
 [T]he proper unalterable basic measure of nature is its absolute whole, 
which, in the case of nature as appearance, is infinity comprehended. But 
since this basic measure is a self-contradictory concept (on account of the 
impossibility of the absolute totality of an endless progression), that 
magnitude of a natural object on which the imagination fruitlessly 
expends its entire capacity for comprehension must lead the concept of 
nature to a supersensible substratum (which grounds both it and at the 
same time our faculty for thinking), which is great beyond any standard 
                                                
74 Cf. Crowther, 2010, p. 175 
75 The validity of the claim that no art can be sublime will be addressed in the final section this chapter. 
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of sense and hence allows not so much the object as rather the disposition 
of the mind in estimating it to be judged sublime. (5:256) 
The key to the sublime is what I take to be the affective relation between the imagination and 
sensibility. The fact that we can always imagine a greater measure Ñ from man, to tree, to 
mountain, to planet, to milky way and so on Ñ shows what Kant describes as a Ôpaling into 
insignificanceÕ of nature, in as much as it cannot supply a presentation to the senses which is 
adequate to the ideas reason possesses of these ever progressing measures or magnitudes (5:257). 
We cannot always apprehend, in other words, everything we can imagine.  
Why should this failure in our apprehension be pleasurable, as Kant insists it is? The pleasure 
obtained from judgments of the sublime has to do with the relationship between imagination and 
reason. Whereas judgments of beauty allowed for a free harmonious play between imagination and 
understanding, judgments of the sublime interrupt the freedom of the imagination due to the fact 
that it cannot phenomenally present the totality conceived by reason to the senses. As Crowther puts 
it, when we are presented with a vast phenomenon, Ôreason demands that we comprehend its 
phenomenal totalityÕ (2010, p. 175). This totality, however, Ôexceeds the power of imaginative 
representation, and in so doing, suggests the idea of infinite continuationÕ (ibid.). The satisfaction 
comes when we realise that, despite the failure of our imagination to present this phenomenal 
totality, we can still hold it as a rational idea. Consequently, the imagination Ôreaches its maximum 
and, in the effort to extend it, sinks back into itself, but is thereby transported into an emotionally 
moving satisfactionÕ (CJ, 5:252). Kant asserts that such a sinking of the imagination triggers 
satisfaction, because where imagination fails, reason can still succeed. In other words, where an 
idea cannot be (imaginatively) apprehended, it can still be (rationally) thought. The failure to attain 
an idea in intuition causes in us a feeling of respect, both for that which exceeds our faculty of 
sensibility, and for the rational vocation, which takes the reins of sensibility and guides us in actions 
according to laws. However, Kant does not justify why it is that this failure of the imagination 
should cause satisfaction and respect, rather than, say, depression and melancholia. KantÕs own 
95 
 
motivation for linking the insufficiency of the imagination with reason has to do with his need to 
connect mathematical and dynamical accounts of the sublime together, i.e. to show how they are 
two ways of judging objects, not judgments about distinct kind of objects. It is my contention that 
the same holds of the Kantian picture of nature generally speaking, namely that mathematical 
explanations of natural phenomena are insufficient without accompanying dynamic explanations, 
and vice versa.
76
 This can be shown further my looking at this second form of the sublime, the 
dynamical.  
In judgments of the dynamical sublime, nature is considered not essentially as magnitude, but as 
power. Kant calls power Ôa capacity that is superior to great obstaclesÕ (5:260). While magnitude 
may not play the essential role in judgments of the dynamical sublime, it is nonetheless involved, 
given KantÕs reference to Ôgreat obstacleÕ. The difference here is that, while in the mathematical 
sublime these obstacles are judged according to an apparent or aesthetic infinity, in the dynamical 
they are judged according to an apparent vital power. This power Kant calls dominion, when it is 
superior to the resistance of something else that possesses power. As such, the dynamical sublime is 
nature judged as having power, but not dominion, over us. This power, within the judgment, causes 
us to consider nature as an object of fear. Kant gives examples such as Ôbold, overhanging, as it 
were threatening cliffsÕ, thunder clouds, and volcanoes (5:261). These kinds of things reduce our 
capacity for resistance to Ôan insignificant trifleÕ, and hence make us fearful over our frailty in the 
face of the forces of nature. Not being in any physical danger, however, we are elevated by our 
awareness that while we cannot physically resist, we possess a resistance of Ôquite another kindÕ, 
which gives us Ôthe courage to measure ourselves against the apparent all-powerfulness of natureÕ 
(5:262).  This resistance for Kant is our capacity for judging ourselves as separate from nature, and 
as such superior to it in a certain sense. The judgment of the dynamical sublime then, holds nature 
                                                
76 This will be a major point for SchellingÕs nature-philosophy as I show in 3.2.3. 
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as an object of fear that arouses the specifically human power to call up its own vocation Ñ and 
here Kant surely means our moral vocation Ñ upon which nature has no dominion. 
Immediately after describing the dynamically sublime in nature, Kant clearly lays out what he sees 
as the difference between natural and rational powers. He writes in ¤29 that Ôthe disposition of the 
mind to the feeling of the sublime requires its receptivity to ideasÕ, which is precisely the 
Ôinadequacy of natureÕ (5:265). This may seem strange, given that it is through ideas that nature is 
first conceivable at all. Therefore, it may appear as though Kant considers ideas of nature to be Ñ if 
not substantively, at least transcendentally Ñ coexistent with experience of nature. However, as 
chapter one sought to show, and as I reiterate here, ideas of nature are only coextensive with the 
structure of experience. One approaches nature according to ideas, by acting as if those ideas were 
true of nature itself, but without being able to confirm this in any possible experience. In short, 
ideas of nature regulate one's experience of nature, but not nature itself. So, in the context of the 
sublime, nature is not receptive to ideas, because ideas do not make contact with nature itself. To 
reiterate my earlier claim from chapter one, an Kantian idea of nature is not about nature, it is about 
our thinking, and the unity of nature is in fact the unity of thought. Though this unity of thought 
makes experience of nature possible, it does not describe what nature is.  
I believe that there are grounds for claiming that Kant has an impoverished account of nature in his 
critical philosophy, to the extent that nature is not viewed as itself productive; rather the rules of 
experience are productive of appearances, and to that extent productive of nature. As I concluded in 
chapter one, KantÕs conception of nature results from his insistence on the opposition of subject and 
object, an opposition which Schelling will seek to disassemble in his nature-philosophy, which I 
cover in chapter three. But this is to jump ahead. There are several problems with KantÕs theory of 
the sublime Ñ that the failure of the imagination to apprehend totality necessarily results in 
satisfaction, and that nature appears to not be receptive to ideas despite these ideas guiding 
experience of nature itself. I interpret these problems as resulting the fact that Kant does not fully 
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consider the ways in which nature is self-productive. In the following section (2.2), I argue that 





2.2. Genius and the Problem of Nature 
Abstract 
In this section I advance two main claims. The first is that KantÕs theory of genius posits a relation 
between genius and nature for which Kant cannot fully account. Secondly, and as a consequence, 
Kant makes both genius and the art-work subservient to natural beauty and the judgment of taste. 
Even though KantÕs concern is more with the judgments art-works can stimulate, rather than the 
works themselves, Kant believes he is in a position to place the particular arts in a hierarchy. He 
does this according to the extent to which each art form manages to express of aesthetic ideas. In 
response to the first problem, the unresolved relation between genius and nature, I examine a 
defence of the divine inspiration argument, and claim that, despite its merits, it still falls short in 
several respects. In response to the second problem, I follow GadamerÕs critique of KantÕs theory of 
genius, in combination with Kant's remarks on poetry. I conclude that, even though KantÕs remarks 
on poetry are helpful in explaining the nature of art in general, KantÕs conception of nature itself 
remains problematic, in that it relies too heavily on the functions of our cognitive faculties. This 
conclusion prepares the way for part two of this thesis, on SchellingÕs identity-philosophy, which I 




2.2.1. Genius as a ÔGift of NatureÕ 
Many scholars have commented on the brevity and ambiguity of KantÕs remarks on genius in the 
third Critique.
77
 Compared with his analysis of judgments of taste, KantÕs discussion of fine art and 
genius seems rather spare, and at times little more than an afterthought.
78
 Within the context of the 
CJ as a whole, the sections on fine art and genius take up the least space. The most obvious reason 
for this is that KantÕs main focus in the CJ is securing reflective judgments according to a priori 
principles, firstly in matters of taste and secondly is matters purpose (the critique of teleological 
judgment). While genius is certainly accorded its role in KantÕs aesthetics, it is a role that is 
arguably subservient to the more general issue of judgments of beauty, and further, judgments of 
natural beauty. To explain the creative power of genius for Kant is therefore to explain how one can 
intentionally bring about pure judgments of taste. In order for art-works to come about, the 
potentially unbounded imaginative activity of the creative artist must be properly confined, to avoid 
artistic products becoming mere nonsense. In Kant's view, it is the faculty of taste that is 
responsible for this. The balance between genius and taste is what gives works of art their character 
as original exemplars, a term which I will explain in what follows. 
While the faculty of aesthetic judgment is bestowed upon every rational human subject, genius is 
granted only to a lucky few. From where does it derive? Genius for Kant is a talent, which he also 
calls a Ônatural giftÕ. The faculty of genius is Ôthe inborn predisposition of the mind through which 
nature gives the rule to artÕ (5:307). The genius is, in short, a Ôfavourite of natureÕ (5:318). From 
these descriptions, it would appear that genius and nature are connected in a way that ÒordinaryÓ 
human beings and nature are not. So how exactly does nature Ôgive the ruleÕ to art through genius? 
Analogous to natural beauties, beautiful art must be produced in such a way that it can be judged 
independently from any associated concept. This does not mean that fine art is produced in the 
                                                
77 Cf. Crowther (2010, p. 152), Proulx (2011 p. 29), Schaper (1992, p. 385). 
78 For the purposes of this section I refer to fine art and beautiful art interchangeably, as reflected in 
KantÕs original term schne kunst. 
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absence of any concept whatsoever. The key to understanding genius is the way in which it 
combines two distinct elements into its productions. On the one hand, artistic creations are 
intentional creations, for Ôevery art presupposes rules which first lay the foundation by means of 
which a product that is to be called artistic is first representation as possibleÕ (5:307). On the other 
hand, the concept of beautiful art does not allow the judgment concerning its beauty to be derived 
from it. In other words, the concept of beautiful art does not determine beautiful art-works. As Kant 
asserts, Ôthere is no science of the beautiful, only a critiqueÕ, nor is there Ôbeautiful science, only 
beautiful artÕ (5:305).  
So far, beautiful art follows a fairly close analogy with beautiful nature, at least in terms of aesthetic 
judgment. In both nature and art, one must be aware that the object being judged is beautiful Ñ that 
it stimulates a harmony in the cognitive faculties Ñ while at the same time lacking prescriptive 
rules by which the object can be judged in such a way. In artÕs case, this balance comes down to the 
extent to which the conceptual element of the work in question plays a role. This in turn concerns 
the role of intention in the creations of genius, an intention which, in KantÕs view, is directed 
primarily toward the expression of aesthetic ideas. I discuss these issues in detail below. 
Several points are worth dwelling upon before talking about the process of artistic creation. Firstly, 
Kant is concerned primarily with fine art, which in his view, is beautiful art; there is no place for the 
sublime in works of art.
79
 So little does Kant consider the sublime as part of the arts that he does not 
devote a single line to the issue. For him, the task of art is to represent the beauties of nature 
through original creations. As such, just like natural beauty, artistic beauty also admits of degrees. 
Where Kant distinguished between objects that could be judged as purely beautiful from those that 
were merely charming, i.e. appealed to the senses, he also makes a similar distinction in the case of 
art. In ¤43, Kant separates beautiful art Ñ which he calls liberal art here Ñ from mechanical or 
                                                





 The former is characterised primarily by play, which Kant describes as Ôan 
occupation that is agreeable in itselfÕ, the latter by labour, i.e. an activity which is attractive only in 
its result (5:304). Significantly, even beautiful or liberal art cannot be completely playful, but must 
also include Ôsomething compulsoryÕ, which Kant calls ÔmechanismÕ. Without this mechanical 
element, Ôthe spirit, which must be free in the art and which alone animates the work, would have 
no body at all and would entirely evaporateÕ (ibid.). Kant uses the example of poetry, which, 
although requiring Ôcorrectness and richness of diction, also requires Ôprosody and meterÕ. In other 
words, merely speaking as if one were reciting a poem does not mean that it is a poem one is 
reciting. The language itself, which in this case also means the rules and discipline in which such 
language occurs, are also needed for that which one recites to be a work of poetry. I will return to 
the significance of poetry later in this section. 
Pleasing arrangements of material do not amount to beautiful art. Though they may charm an 
audience, or pleasurably affect the senses, the remunerative arts are not sufficient for stimulating 
pure judgments of taste. Neither material, nor spirit, can produce beautiful art on its own. A work of 
beautiful art is beautiful to the extent that it expresses aesthetic ideas, which I will discuss further in 
the following section. To be sure, mechanical or remunerative art can have pleasure as its aim, just 
as beautiful art does, but in the case of the former, this pleasure takes the form of Ômere sensationsÕ; 
in the latter this pleasure occurs as Ôkinds of cognitionÕ (5:305). These cognitions are ones specific 
to the purpose of the work of art, in contrast to something merely agreeable, such as background 
music that helps facilitate conversation (5:306). In the latter case, the associated cognitions concern 
the conversation being had, and not the music being played, at least not exclusively (ibid.). 
Beautiful art is, therefore, Ôa kind of representation that is purposive in itself, and though without an 
end, nevertheless promotes the cultivation of the mental powers for sociable communicationÕ 
(ibid.). That which is communicated is the capacity for reflective judgment, shared universally 
                                                
80 The contrast here can be expressed in KantÕs terms Schnkunst and Brodkunst, the former meaning 
beautiful art, the latter literally translating as Òart for breadÓ. 
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amongst human beings. Clearly for Kant, it is one thing for people to present aesthetic ideas to 
themselves in response to nature. It is quite another for a person to devise their own aesthetic ideas, 
and make these communicable to an audience. 
All of this seems straightforward enough, and in isolation from the question of nature, nothing 
particularly problematic emerges from KantÕs discussion of fine art. Two things seem immediately 
important for KantÕs theory of genius: originality and communicability. Indeed, there is good cause 
to argue that each of these corresponds to the combination of spirit and mechanism discussed in the 
last paragraph. The spirit is wholly original, in that is animates the mind in ways not previously 
given. It is also wholly ideal, in that it cannot appear directly, but only through the material it 
animates. Communicability therefore becomes possible via this material, remembering of course 
that material does not just indicate the empirical items used to construct a work, but also the 
accompanying rules and traditions of artistic discipline. It is the balance between these two factors 
that makes the products of genius exemplary, as models of emulation for other people gifted with 
genius (5:318). In order to understand how the genius communicates through the art-work, I now 
turn to KantÕs remarks on aesthetic ideas. 
2.2.2. Genius as Expressive of Aesthetic Ideas 
As mentioned above, spirit is an essential element of genius. Works of art cannot be considered 
beautiful unless they are in some way animated by spirit. As spirit animates the mind of the 
perceiver into presenting aesthetic ideas via the imagination, so it animates the artistic genius 
specifically to create something that expresses aesthetic ideas. However, the spirit alone cannot 
achieve what is required to make an artistic product beautiful. The spirit of genius must be 
accompanied by a mechanism (a rule or concept). The necessity of some mechanism by which art-
works are produced will become important later. It is simply the case that, while concepts are surely 
involved in both the creation and appreciation of art-works, no concept can provide the determining 
ground for a work of art. That is why, in ¤45, Kant remarks that art must simultaneously look like 
103 
 
art, and appear to be a product of nature, even while the viewer is aware that the work is not a work 
of nature. Only art that appears to be Ôfree from all constraint by arbitrary rulesÕ can be called 
beautiful, and in this way, it shares in the beauty displayed in products of nature. Hence, Kant 
writes, Ônature was beautiful, if at the same time it looked like art; and art can only be called 
beautiful if we are aware that it is art and yet it looks to us like natureÕ (5:306). Kant holds two 
requirements for a work of fine art. Such a work can only come about by nature acting through the 
genius in some way, and further, this natural force must be the source of creativity.
81
 Only then can 
genius express aesthetic ideas. To fully understand Kant on aesthetic ideas, it is useful to briefly 
reiterate how Kant defines ideas in general in the CPR. 
Ideas order the cosmos.
82
 They do so according to rules that prohibit their appearing directly in 
empirical experience. Ideas of reason strive toward certainty and totality. By virtue of being ideas, 
and not appearances, they also go some way to capturing totality (insofar as it is thinkable).
83
 Kant 
insists in the CPR that no knowledge can be gained from thought alone. Within this context, KantÕs 
answer to the problem of presenting ideas to cognition is found in practical reason, at precisely the 
point that speculative or theoretical reason reaches its limit. Practical reason is able to concretely 
present ideas by constructing them in the form of moral actions.
84
 Being necessarily finite, however, 
such actions must necessarily fail to capture the object of their striving. To illuminate the problem, 
Kant introduces the antinomies of reason.
85
 The antinomies are designed to show the ways in which 
seemingly opposed propositions can be proven compatible if one views them each from different 
perspectives. In the fourth antinomy, Kant sets up equally convincing cases for both the existence 
                                                
81 Cf. Proulx, 2011, p. 9. 
82 Cf. CPR, B375. 
83 I have discussed this in detail in chapter one (1.3). 
84 One could also, with Kant, call this practical reason. 
85 CPR, B448-B488. 
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and the non-existence of a necessary being.
86
 By viewing the former from the perspective of 
absolute totality, and the latter from the perspective of perpetual experience, Kant believes he has 
shown the thesis and antithesis are not truly oppositional. The thesis (that there is an existent 
necessary being) is the perspective of pure reason. The antithesis (that there is no such existent 
being) is the perspective of the understanding. Despite the unavoidably dual perspective such 
antinomies establish, this does not mean there are two separate realities. In the introduction to the 
CJ Kant makes this clear: 
Understanding and reasonÉhave two different legislations on one and 
the same territory of experience, without either being detrimental to the 
other. For just as little as the concept of nature influences legislation 
through the concept of freedom does the latter disturb the legislation of 
nature. (5:175) 
This Ôterritory of experienceÕ is nature, insofar as it grounds all possible appearances according to a 
priori laws, while also exceeding any possible appearance. Understanding and reason do not act 
upon this territory in the same way. They each have their own domain, and each domain is 
legislative of experience in a particular manner (ibid.). This does not mean there are two natures 
however. Instead of ÔdomainÕ, one might use the term Ômode of operationÕ to describe the difference 
between understanding and reason. The understanding legislates through concepts of nature and is 
purely theoretical (since the rules of the understanding cannot themselves appear in experience). 
This is its mode of operation. Reason legislates through the concept of freedom and is purely 
practical, since freedom itself cannot be defined according to a determinative rule a priori. Kant 
attempts to balance these two domains in typically complex fashion. I quote him in full here to 
understand the context: 
There is thus an unlimited but also inaccessible field for our faculty of 
cognition as a whole, namely the field of the supersensible, in which we 
                                                
86 CPR, B480-88. 
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find no territory for ourselves, and thus cannot have on it a domain for 
theoretical cognition either for the concepts of the understanding or for 
those of reason, a field that we must certainly occupy with ideas for the 
sake of the theoretical as well as the practical use of reason, but for 
which, in relation to the laws from the concept of freedom we can 
provide nothing but a practical reality, through which, accordingly, our 
theoretical cognition is not in the least extended to the supersensible. 
(ibid.) 
At this point, of course, we are still strictly within the realm of ideas of reason, but the important 
point in the above passage is KantÕs mention of the supersensible. It is precisely this realm of the 
supersensible that the genius accesses or ÒchannelsÓ in artistic creation. There is another form of 
idea put forward in the third Critique: the aesthetic idea.  
In what follows I will elucidate the form and various features of the aesthetic idea, aesthetic 
attributes, and their corresponding aesthetic object. While ideas of reason present (albeit indirect) 
grounds for moral action, I argue aesthetic ideas are a form of presentation, which supplements the 
imagination with free associations beyond what is originally presented. In the case of artistic 
products, this means that the aesthetic idea expressed by a work pertains to a domain larger than 
that which it directly expresses. In other words, the idea expressed by a work is larger than the 
workÕs content. This could be interpreted as meaning that the work is a symbol. There is evidence 
for this in the CJ, which I discuss in the following section. First, it is important to grasp exactly how 
aesthetic ideas function for Kant before considering them in this wider artistic context. 
In section ¤49 On the Faculties of the Mind which Constitute Genius, Kant first mentions aesthetic 
ideas. This occurs between his remarks on art in general, and on the faculty of genius. Aesthetic 
ideas themselves are introduced via KantÕs remarks on spirit (Geist). Kant defines the spirit as an 




ThatÉby which this principle [of spirit] animates the soul, the material 
which it uses for this purpose, is that which purposively sets the mental 
powers into motion, i.e., into a play that is self-maintaining and even 
strengthens the powers to that end. (ibid.)
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While ideas of reason are concepts to which no intuitions are adequate, aesthetic ideas are, 
conversely, intuitions to which no concept is adequate (ibid.). Kant offers some strange sounding 
elaborations on this, for example that the artist attempts to make ideas Ôsensible beyond the limits of 
experienceÕ (ibid.). One may ask, how can something be sensibly presented in such as way as to go 
beyond the bounds of experience, which for Kant is always sensible? This is precisely the problem 
that Kant wishes to solve at this point in the CJ. Aesthetic ideas act as the ÔpendantÕ or counterpart 
of reason, because they attempt to present rational concepts to sensibility. However, because such a 
task is for all intents and purposes impossible, the aesthetic idea must operate according to a 
specific procedure, one which relies upon the functions of the imagination. Shortly after the remarks 
above, Kant defines aesthetic ideas in this way: 
 [T]he aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination associated 
with a given concept, which is combined with such a manifold of partial 
representations in the free use of the imagination that no expression 
designating a determinate concept can be found for it, which therefore 
allows the addition to a concept of much that is unnameable, the feeling 
of which animates the cognitive faculties and combines spirit with the 
mere letter of language. (ibid.) 
An aesthetic idea is a form presentation, which Ôoccasions much thinking though without it being 
possible for any determinate thought, i.e., concept, to be adequate to itÕ (ibid.). Hence, Kant 
concludes  Ôno language fully attains or can make [it] intelligibleÕ (ibid., my emphasis).  We have 
the capacity to apprehend aesthetic ideas in imagination, but not to know them, in the sense we can 
                                                
87 I use the Guyer & Matthews translation of the CJ, where ÔmindÕ is used for the original ÔGemtÕ. In 
¤49 Guyer renders ÔGemtÕ at times as ÔmindÕ, others as ÔsoulÕ. ÔGemtÕ can also mean disposition, 
nature or feeling. It is worth keeping in mind this larger meaning. 
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know empirical objects. In these respects, aesthetic ideas do not seem to be distinct from ideas of 
reason. Formally speaking they both have the same structure. The difference would appear to be 
that in the case of aesthetic ideas, the idea itself is communicated through the art-work, which is a 
material object. It is through this material that aesthetic ideas Ôset the faculty of intellectual ideas 
(reason) into motionÕ  (5:315), a process by which the initial concept (for example, the concept of a 
painting), is Ôaesthetically enlargedÕ in the imagination. Kant argues that it is by the Ôinstigation of a 
representationÕ that the imagination becomes creative, and supplements that initial representation 
with many additional ones, which then cannot be reduced to what was initially represented. For 
example, I could view a portrait, whose concept merely tells me that it is a painting of someoneÕs 
face. However, the aesthetic idea communicated to me through this portrait allows me to 
imaginatively supplement this with other representations that are not automatically involved in the 
concept ÒportraitÓ, for example, that the eyes are mourning an unarticulated loss, or contemplating a 
great love, that the person ÒportrayedÓ is virtuous, evil, troubled, etc.   
KantÕs notion of aesthetically enlarging a concept is key to understanding how he conceives of 
genius. Despite this supplementary action of the imagination, Kant also remarks that aesthetic ideas 
represent Ôa completeness beyond anything of which there is an example in natureÕ (5:314). How 
can a boundless activity also be complete? The only way is if one characterises the representations 
of the imagination referred to here as ideas, which Kant does. This requires some explanation. At 
first it appears that aesthetic ideas instigate a supplementary activity of the imagination, perhaps in a 
way analogous to how ideas of reason instigate or necessitate moral striving. However, Kant labels 
the imaginative activity itself as an idea, on the one hand because it Ôseek[s] to approximate a 
presentation of concepts of reasonÕ, and on the other, because this presentation yields something to 
which no concept is adequateÕ (ibid.).  
So how can this imaginative ideation, as one could call it, be both unbounded and complete? 
Precisely because on the one hand, imaginative creativity in the generation of aesthetic ideas is not 
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determined by the concept to which it approximates, because the concept itself is indeterminate Ñ 
for example the concept of eternity. On the other hand, the imagination Ôemulates the precedent of 
reason in attainting to a maximumÕ (ibid.). By thinking Ômore that one can in express in a concept 
determined by wordsÕ, we are struck by the fact that we can, at least by way of analogy, present to 
ourselves totalising concepts. More than this, it is only by way of the aesthetic imagination that our 
cognitions can approximate to concepts of reason (5:317). 
From these descriptions, Kant defines genius as the union of imagination and understanding. As 
opposed to imagination used for cognition, where it is subservient to the concept supplied by the 
understanding, imagination in the aesthetic context is free to provide Ôunsought extensive material 
of the understandingÕ beyond that which concords directly with the concept (ibid.). As such, Kant 
defines genius as a Ôhappy relationÕ of finding ideas for a given concept and hitting upon the 
expression for these, through which the Ôsubjective disposition of the mind that is thereby produced, 
as an accompaniment of the concept, can be communicated to othersÕ. It is precisely this ability of 
genius to navigate between idea and expression that Kant reiterates as spirit (5:318). What is 
yielded, it turns out, by the spirited activity of genius, is the ability to express what is Ôunnameable 
in the mental stateÕ and make it Ôuniversally communicableÕ (5:317). The artistic genius, is a certain 
sense, expresses what is otherwise inexpressible. However, the reasons the genius does this, turn out 
to be fairly conservative ones, as I show in the concluding section of this chapter. Furthermore, the 
question of how it is that genius manages to channel the otherwise unknowable freedom of nature 
into its productions remains unanswered. Much like the failure of the imagination in judgments of 
the sublime, which Kant takes as instigating an appeal to reason, so the productions of genius, 
which seem to present more than can be directly articulated, Kant takes as symbols, not of the force 
of nature, or our kinship with nature, but of human moral duty. In what follows, I tackle the 
question over how it is genius manages to produce works which express aesthetic ideas, to which 
Kant offers no real answer. Instead, he takes the inspiration of genius as given, and claims that 
judgments of taste must be deployed in order to form that inspiration into something communicable. 
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Subsequently, I discuss the argument that the creative power of genius symbolises divine creation, 
which has recently been defended.
88
 I claim that the divine creation argument does not manage to 
account the relationship between genius and nature, the latter of which, at least from KantÕs 
remarks, appears to be the source of the former. 
2.2.3. Genius, Taste, and the Symbolic 
Works of beautiful art are those which can bring about pure judgments of taste. Clearly such works 
are a rarefied thing, and in KantÕs view, are solely the products of genius. The power of genius for 
Kant is in devising original creations and making them communicable in such a way that they can 
be judged as if they were natural products. Unlike his successors, Kant did not want genius to stake 
to heavy a claim on the system of his aesthetics. Kant makes it clear through his remarks on art and 
genius that the judgment of taste always takes priority. In ¤50, Kant explicitly addresses the 
combination of genius and taste, and asks if it is more important Ôwhether genius or taste is 
displayedÕ (5:319). Kant equates this with asking whether the imagination or the power of judgment 
counts for more in works of art.  In the former case, Kant labels this form of art ÔinspiredÕ, but only 
in the second case can art be called beautiful. Taste is the discipline of genius, which helps to make 
the products of genius communicable. 
Still, it is not entirely clear how nature works through genius to give the rule to art. In his 
commentary on the CJ, Wicks is sensitive to this problem. On the one hand, Wicks points out that 
artistic products possess Ôthe same basic structure as beautiful natural objectsÕ (2006, p. 125). Wicks 
draws out an analogy in Kant between the laws of nature, according to which we first form 
judgments of beauty, and the Ôacademic rules and plansÕ which guide the creation of art-works. 
Without natural laws, Wicks states, Ôthere would indeed be not much more than sensory chaosÕ and 
similarly, for Kant, Ôgenius without academic form would also lead to incoherenceÕ (ibid.). 
                                                




On the other hand, precisely because these academic rules are created by human intention, we must 
recognise the work of art precisely as art, and not a merely natural product. How can this 
contradictory position be reconciled? For Wicks, this contradiction appears on the part of the viewer 
of the art-work. Works of art appear in some sense natural and in another sense not, but this is 
because the inner workings of the genius are obscured from the observer. Wicks characterises the 
artistic genius as someone able to produce something that conceals its own method of producing. I 
agree with this, but would like to add that for Kant, this concealing of method is not a part of the 
artistÕs intentions.  Hence, Ôthe author of a product that he owes to his genius does not know himself 
how the ideas for it come to himÕ (5:308). If the methods of producing beautiful art are concealed to 
the audience, they must be concealed to the artist who produces them, otherwise there would in 
principle be potential rules for the creation of beautiful things, which would violate KantÕs theory of 
reflective judgment. 
Wicks offers a viable answer to how genius negotiates its intentional and natural creative powers, 
and this answer can get us some way to understanding how it is that judgments of beauty can be 
applied to art-works. But the dilemma of the connection between genius and nature still remains. 
Wicks himself realises this, claiming that when one judges a work of art, they must Ôfirst must 
apprehend [it] as a merely natural object, or Ôconstellation of formsÕ (i.e. without regard for its 
origin). Nevertheless one must also comprehend the workÕs purposive form, contemplating it as Ôa 
work with a design, and hence fail to appreciate its pure beautyÕ. KantÕs solution, according to 
Wicks, is that Ôart represents natural objects which become of moral interestÕ (2006, p. 119). 
Moreover, the stronger the artistic genius's moral awareness happens to be Ð the more the products 
of artistic genius have a moral content that has been given a beautiful appearance Ð the stronger the 
confirmation of nature's compatibility with morality will be, quite beyond the confirmation that 
snowflakes and tulips offerÕ (ibid., p. 124). 
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Is Wicks right to place so much emphasis on the relation between artistic beauty and morality? 
Fortunately, Kant dedicates a section of the CJ specifically to this. Kant entitles ¤59 On Beauty as a 
Symbol of Morality, wherein he details a brief theory of the symbol. Kant contrasts the symbolic 
with the schematic, as two methods of hypotyposis Ð presentation that grants reality to concepts. 
The schematic relates to the combination of concepts of the understanding with intuitions a priori. 
The symbolic deals with concepts of reason, to which, of course, Ôno sensible intuition can be 
adequateÕ (p. 225). In this case, Kant says, Ôan intuition is attributed with which the power of 
judgment proceeds in a way merely analogous to that which is observed in schematisationÕ. Kant 
clarifies this by explaining that it is merely Ôthe rule of the procedure, not the intuition itselfÕ, which 
is used. In the symbolic form of presentation, it is the Ôform of reflection, not the content, which 
corresponds to the concept (ibid.). 
It is in this way, namely, the symbolic, that beauty connects to the morally good. The place of 
aesthetic ideas in KantÕs theory of judgment becomes clearer in ¤59, and Kant mirrors much of the 
language he employs in his discussion of aesthetic ideas here. Kant describes symbolic 
presentations as Ôdesignation of the concepts by means of accompanying sensible signsÕ, which 
contain Ônothing at all belonging to the intuition of the objectÕ. Instead, these symbols act Ôin 
accordance with the laws of association of the imagination, and hence in a subjective regard, as a 
means of reproductionÕ (5:352). Kant uses examples such as a hand mill symbolically representing 
a despotic state, or a monarchical state being represented by a body with a soul. These analogies 
help to illuminate concepts that do not have direct instantiations in sensible intuition. This is how 
beauty represents morality. The Ôennoblement and elevation above the mere receptivity for pleasure 
from sensible impressionsÕ leads us to an intelligible space, which helps to unify the faculties of 
cognition and taste. In an extended passage, which I quote in full, Kant explains how it is that 
reflective judgments aid cognition in forming a common unity: 
In th[e] faculty [of the intelligible] the power of judgment does not see 
itself, as is otherwise the case in empirical judging, as subjected to a 
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heteronomy of the laws of experience; in regard to the objects of such a 
pure satisfaction it gives the law to itself, both on account of this inner 
possibility in the subject as well as on the account of the outer possibility 
of a nature that corresponds to it, as related to something in the subject 
itself and outside of it, which is neither nature nor freedom, but which is 
connected with the ground of the latter, namely the supersensible, in 
which the theoretical faculty is combined with the practical, in a mutual 
and unknown way, to form a unity. (5:353) 
By conceiving of beauty as analogous with morality, Kant achieves two things. First, he grounds 
the supersensible as something common to the subject and the natural world that the subject 
inhabits. Secondly, couching moral claims in terms of their aesthetic (pleasurable) correlates allows 
Kant to solidify one of the only connections that he deems philosophically relevant between the 
subject and nature. The faculty of taste is shown to make possible Ôthe transition from sensible 
charm to the habitual moral interestÕ by representing the imagination Ôeven in its freedom as 
purposively determinable form the understandingÕ (5:354). By representing natural objects as 
beautiful, and by emulating this representation in works of art, Kant aims to show a deep affinity 
between our cognitive faculties, our moral concerns, and the fundamental ground of nature; the 
supersensible. It can be argued, however, that this affinity is one which Kant must presume rather 
than conclusively prove, much like the common root of intuition and understanding that he 
mentions in the CPR. None of this, however, tells us anything either about how nature manifests 
itself to us, aesthetically or otherwise. Nor does it give us any insight into how the artistic genius 
channels the creative power of nature into its works. For Kant, the creative power of genius is 
expressed primarily in the form of aesthetic ideas, which Kant sees as counterpart to idea of reason 
as elucidated in the CPR. In the following, I construe aesthetic ideas as attempts by the imagination 





2.2.4. The Mysteries of Creation: A Response to the Divination Argument 
It is clear from what I have said so far that for Kant, works of art can be deemed as such only to the 
extent that they can bring about pure judgments of beauty. What remains to be shown is exactly 
how the capacity for genius is able to create products that can do this. In his commentary on the CJ, 
Wicks advances the claim that ÔThe beauty of the work of art can...only reside in the mystery of 
what the artist intendedÕ (2006, p. 121). I have dealt somewhat with this mysterious element of 
genius above. However, there still some important gaps in KantÕs theory of genius which, in a 
recent article, Wicks hopes to solve. Here, I focus on two related problems Wicks highlights. The 
first is that ÔKantÕs characterisation of pure beauty presumes to remain unaffected by historical, 
linguistic, political, religious, psychological, philosophical and cultural differences in its endeavour 
to establish universally recognisable conditions for judgments of beautyÕ (Wicks, 2015, p. 2). The 
second problem relates to the kind of creative power granted to genius, which Wicks sees as 
analogous to the creative power of God (ibid., p. 16). I will respond to both of these claims by 
arguing that KantÕs notion of genius is entwined with specifically human ends, which prevents him 
from ascending even to an analogous relation between God and genius. This is precisely why the 
creative power of genius remains on the side of nature, as a mysterious and unknown force. It is 
also why particular artistic products can at most serve as exemplars, rather than archetypes (CJ 
5:319). The worry about contextual conditions of artistic practise can also be answered by 
separating the activity of genius from the products it creates, as well as the schools and traditions 
that follow therefrom. The problem comes, I claim, when attempting to pair back together the 
creative power of genius with the product that is produced from it. I claim that the only solution is 
to grant the art-work itself an ideal status similar to that of the aesthetic ideal elucidated above. 
WicksÕ main motivation in his article is to reconcile KantÕs moral concerns with regard to natural 
beauty, and his aesthetic concerns regarding the genius. Wicks attempts to do this by construing 
genius as analogous to GodÕs divine creation. In this way, the troubling aspect of historical context 
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with regard to actual art-works can be avoided. The divination argument runs as follows. For the 
human being, aesthetic and moral judgments occupy distinct domains, which, while deeply 
connected, are nonetheless separate types of judgment As Wicks claims, Ôit is human finitude that 
separates the beautiful and the moral into distinct mental categoriesÕ (2015, p. 9). For God there is 
no such separation; as a primordial being, God requires no distinction between through and 
intuition. As a consequence of this, neither beauty nor morality occur as such, but are presumably 
contained within the same singular and absolute truth of GodÕs affirmation. It is therefore a 
specifically human problem Ð and presumably one at which the genius excels Ð Ôto reintegrate these 
feelings for the sake of emulating the divine condition more closelyÕ (pp. 9-10). It is this 
characterisation of the human problem, and of genius more specifically, with which I want to 
contend.  
The notion of beauty being tied up with specifically human ends can be observed in ¤17 of the CJ, a 
section called The Ideal of Beauty. Here we see can that Kant is already concerned with the 
difference between natural and artificial beauty that becomes so important in his theory of genius. 
Natural beauty claims priority over artificial beauty for a few key reasons. The first thing to note is 
that taste gives rise to archetypes. These archetypes are the ideals of beauty, and the utmost ideal is 
the human body. The human form is held up as an ideal, something to be striven for. At the same 
time the ideal is realised as imperfect (for it is an intellectualised ideal, i.e. one which involves an 
interest in the objective purposiveness). So Ôan ideal of beautiful flowers, of beautiful furnishings, 
of a beautiful view, cannot be conceivedÕ (5:233). But neither can an ideal of beauty adhering to 
determinate ends be conceived, because Ôthe ends are not adequately determined and fixed by their 
conceptÕ. They are subservient to some other purpose or purposes. So the only ideal of beauty can 
be the human being. The ideal of beauty then gives rise to the aesthetic normal idea. This has 
parallels with the ideas of reason, in so far as they are particular representations with ends that 
cannot become objects of intuition proper. Kant writes, Ôthe idea of reasonÉmakes the ends of 
humanity insofar as they cannot be sensibly represented into the principle for judging of its figure, 
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through which, as their effect in appearance, the former are revealedÕ (ibid.).
89
 Both these forms 
iterate the paradoxical sounding notion of Ôsomething that we strive to produce even if we are not in 
possession of itÕ. But a passage from Kant helps to reveal the nature of this idea: ÔThe highest 
aesthetic model to which we are granted access, the archetype of taste, is a mere idea, which 
everyone must produce in himself, and in accordance with which he must judge everything that is 
an object of taste.Õ (5:232). Here we can see an iteration of my claim that genius is tied up with 
exclusively human ends. Just as with ideas of reason, we cannot prescribe to ourselves objects of 
striving from any position external to our thought, we must set both the goal towards which we are 
working, and the nature of our work to get there, from within.  
It cannot simply be that the genius is endowed with the ability to generate beautiful forms, if the 
purpose of such forms is to bring about judgments of taste in the audience. If this were so, then the 
distinction between beautiful and mechanical art would dissolve. In addition to this purpose, genius 
must also possess a creative power independent of any specified end, and importantly, 
independently of mere sensation.
90
 ArtÕs beautiful representation of a thing would be reduced to an 
immaculate reproduction of a flower. Art must always be tied up with specifically human, i.e. Ònon-
naturalÓ ends. Wicks asks an understandable question on the basis of this conflation: Ôwhat is the 
aesthetic idea of which such a beautiful natural object [as a rose] is regarded as the expression?Õ 
(2015, p. 19). To call a natural object judged as beautiful an expression of an aesthetic idea is 
mistaken. In fact the process works in reverse. It is the human Geist that makes possible the 
presentation of aesthetic ideas, which are produced by the imagination for intuition. A natural 
beauty does not express an aesthetic idea; rather it is the ground upon which an aesthetic idea is 
                                                
89 The model of exemplary originality is a thoroughly human construct therefore. It does not make 
sense to speak of objects of nature as being exemplary or original. Creations of nature presumably are 
always original and always exemplary, in that they are perfectly what they are, even if the ultimate end 
of this perfection is unknown to us. The human being is the only candidate for the ideal of beauty, being 
both the determiner of their own ends and the subject of finite conditions.  
90 Cf. CJ, 5:306. 
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produced. Aesthetic ideas are employed for the purposes of judgments of taste and, ultimately, 
creations of genius. The pure judgment of taste brought about by a beauty of nature does not in fact 
generate any ideas whatsoever. Rather, the spirit animates the faculties to generate ideas. A natural 
beauty can be the subject of a pure judgment of taste precisely because it is disinterested. As such, 
the judgment of beauty is not attached to any idea, either of reason or an aesthetic idea. A judgment 
of beauty is neither guided by, nor in the business of expressing, any idea at all. If natural beauty 
expresses aesthetic ideas at all, then it is only because of the judgments instilled in us by the forms 
of nature, not a power inherent in nature itself. 
It is because of this that I disagree with WicksÕ characterisation of genius. He writes, Ôif the artistic 
genius is said to create another nature, then the genius emerges as an analogue to, or finite 
condensation of, the intelligence that our power of judgment postulates as the source of natural 
kinds as well as of the beauty they exhibit within those natural forms.Õ (ibid., p. 16). One can see the 
appeal of such a view. The notion that genius taps into the same creative powers employed by God 
in the creation of the natural world makes sense on the surface, and it also helps to explain the way 
in which genius Ð via its Ògift of natureÓ Ð can formulate aesthetic ideas which exhaust all possible 
explanation. However, the parallel between artistic and natural beauty upon which Wicks bases this 
analogy does not hold if one examines the difference between divine creation and natural creation. 
For Kant, God does not create nature per se; he rather creates, that is, makes possible, the laws of 
nature, by which nature creates itself. A belief in the supersensible substrate of nature and a belief 
in God are related, but they are not the same. This can be proven quite simply by following KantÕs 
notion that while we can know nature (in a certain form) directly, i.e. through its sensible 
manifestation to us as appearance, we cannot know of God in the same fashion.
91
 There is another 
                                                
91 In ¤90 of the CJ Kant recapitulates his arguments concerning the existence of God in the CPR. He 
claims that, Ôsince the concept of a being that is to be sought beyond nature corresponds to no intuition 
that is possible for itÉthere is absolutely no cognition of itÕ. Kant does admit that we can conceive of 
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reason why artistic creation is not analogous to divine creation. In the first Critique, Kant goes to 
great lengths to deny human beings the possibility of a divine intelligence, or intellectual intuition. 
In KantÕs view, such an intuition would grant us the ability to think things into existence. There 
would be no separation between our thought of an object and its empirical reality. The analogy 
between this kind of intelligence and the creative force of genius breaks down on several points. 
Firstly, that which the genius thinks (namely, the aesthetic idea) is not the same thing that is 
produced in the final art-work. The art-work, paradoxically, contains aesthetic ideas within a limited 
form, but this form is not identical with the idea itself. The form is precisely a work (opus) because 
it has to be produced, that is, brought into empirical reality, through empirical reality Ð its spatial 
and temporal dimensions included. One might be able to say that the insight of genius, whatever 
that might be, offers something analogous to divine creation, but again, the products of genius are 
not analogous to this creation. As Kant says, Ônature is a beautiful thing, art is a beautiful 
representation of a thingÕ (¤48, 5:311). 
This leads to the first of WicksÕ worries mentioned above. If the work of genius and the beauty 
instilled within it are said to be universal, then what are we to make of the fact that the products of 
genius are themselves historical and culturally conditioned? For example, Ôsomeone who speaks 
only English is in no position to judge the beauty of poetry written in another language either with 
respect to the poetryÕs formal structure or its degree of semantic resonance, despite how it may 
contain a universal contentÕ (Wicks, p. 25). This may seem like a trivial worry, But Wicks has good 
reasons for expressing it. Because WickÕs conceives of genius as analogous to the creative power of 
God, he conceives of the former Ôspeaking in a universal language to everyoneÕ. WickÕs problem 
with Kant is that he appears to assume that Ôadhering to universal content alone will preserve the 
universal validity of judgments of beautyÕ (ibid.). This worry can be answered with KantÕs remarks 
on succession in ¤32. Kant was of course of the passage of historical and cultural time, and its role 
                                                                                                                                                            
things according to analogy, but it is not possible to draw an inference for said analogy such that a proof 
could be constructed from it. (Cf. CJ, 5:564-5). 
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role in the manifestation of art-works. But including such considerations in his analysis of aesthetic 
judgments would be counter-purposive. The most he can do is adapt what he sees as the creative 
powers of genius for his own purposes, i.e. for bringing about judgments of taste, and advocating 
for morally engaged subjects with an appropriate amount of respect for both nature and reason. But 
Kant is also aware that the creative power of genius must be bestowed into actual concrete works, 
conditioned and finite objects which make up and partake in historical time. This is precisely why 
art-works can only ever be exemplary. It is not the content of said works that is universal, therefore, 
but the formal judgments of taste they bring about. Standards of beauty may indeed change, but for 
Kant, formal principles governing the operation of aesthetic judgment do not. 
A judgment of taste is singular judgment about the object, but the way in which I arrive at this 
judgment must be valid for all. This saves us from constantly falling into error about our own 
judgments (if we had no standard with which to compare them, how would we evaluate them?). It 
also saves taste from being a merely arbitrary case of personal preferences. However, this only 
concerns judgments made in the face of an already existing object. The object itself occurs in time 
and space, in a historical and cultural context. The process of genius itself is universal precisely 
because it follows the same a priori rules in all cases. The process of genius does not so much 
inhabit an individual as it does move through them. This happens by succession, which as Kant 
writes, is Ôthe correct expression for any influence that the products of an exemplary author can 
have on othersÕ (5:283). This influence has to do with nothing more than one creating Ôfrom the 
same sourcesÉas oneÕs predecessorÕ and to learn from oneÕs predecessor Ôonly the manner of 
conducting oneself in so doingÕ (ibid.). It is clear from this passage that, while the actual contents of 
art-works are culturally informed, the inspiration that lies beneath them is always of the same kind, 
or at least, functions in the same manner. In addition, this inspiration does not prescribe anything 
like a universal content, only a manner in which artistic genius is supposed to present itself, namely, 
the manner of producing aesthetic ideas. 
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The point of this is that, even if WickÕs analogy between artistic genius and the creative power of 
God does hold, nothing substantive can be inferred from this. On KantÕs terms, there is nothing to 
determine the way God creates the world; nor is there a way to determine how genius creates i.e. 
how the artist creates precisely the works they do. All Kant believes we can prove is the a priori 
principles which govern judgments of taste, by which the creative powers of genius are monitored. 
The divination argument does not ultimately reveal anything substantive about the creative process 
of genius. 
I began this section with a quote from Wicks, that Ôthe beauty of the work of art can[...]only reside 
in the mystery of what the artist intendedÕ. In a sense, this still holds. Whether the creative power of 
genius is held as analogous to GodÕs creation or not, neither of these creative processes can be 
objectively known by us. In the former case, art-works are brought about via the intention of the 
artist, but also via an unknown gift of nature, an origin that shares ground with the supersensible. 
Again, in both cases, we have little else to which we can appeal other than our moral interest. If the 
ideal of beauty is the human as such, as Kant states, then the ideal of art is the art-work as such, not 
any particular art-work, though each particular work surely refers to this impossible ideal. The art-
work as such, minimally defined, is merely the intentional creation and expression of aesthetic 
ideas, and construed in this sense, amounts to little more than an emulation of nature according to 
moral interest. This may be what Kant intended; for works of art to symbolise the creative power of 
nature to accord with our moral concerns. However, the fact that in his remarks on the sublime, 
Kant claims that nature is unreceptive to human ideation, at least in a constitutive sense, it seems 
difficult for this vital relation between nature and genius to hold. The art-work seems to be a symbol 
of the striving toward the supersensible, just as ethical actions represent the striving toward moral 
ideas of reason. To better understand the relation between this infinite striving and its finite 




2.2.5. Nature In the Work of Art 
As I have shown above, Kant draws attention to a mysterious element in the productive capacity of 
genius, namely that its source of creative power lies in its relation to nature. Moreover, the exact 
process of this natural inspiration for genius remains a mystery in KantÕs account. The argument of 
divine inspiration is not sufficient for answering this mystery for reasons I have laid out above. The 
question over how it is that the artist, and not the philosopher, can access or channel this 
supersensible substrate of nature into their creations remains to be answered.
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 It is on this question 
that I will focus for the remainder of this chapter. Answering this question in turn will address the 
larger issue of the place of artistic beauty in relation to natural beauty. 
I focus on GadamerÕs account of KantÕs aesthetics in his seminal work Truth and Method, to 
examine how it is that genius can create works of art, and what exactly these works are in KantÕs 
estimation. I follow GadamerÕs claim that Ôthe ideal of beauty prepares a place for the essence of 
artÕ (1989, p. 48). I examine how this ideal is transposed into artistic representation, particularly in 
the case of poetry, which Kant designates as the highest art form (CJ, 5:326). I conclude by 
readdressing the question of nature in light of KantÕs theory of genius and corresponding theory of 
fine art. While valuable, KantÕs theory of genius leaves the question of nature still partly 
unanswered, which prepares for my move to Schelling in the second part of this thesis. 
In discussing the arts, Kant is concerned only with beautiful art, i.e. art-works that can bring about 
pure judgments of taste. This requires originality, as discussed above, and the capacity to 
communicate this originality in an understandable way. The problem that immediately arises, and 
with which I will be concerned throughout the rest of the chapter, is that there seems to be an 
element of creative genius that remains beyond the grasp of philosophical principles, which I claim 
is the precisely the original element which makes a work of art beautiful. What makes the products 
                                                
92 This advantage that the artist seems to have over the philosopher is echoed by Schelling in his 
Philosophy of Art, which will be the focus of chapter four. 
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of genius works of art is that they are created according to an originally conceived principle, which 
is in part unknown to the artists themselves. More than how genius gives rise to its creations, KantÕs 
concern is with how said creations are communicated to an audience. How is it, then, that art-works 
come to be judged as beautiful by the perceiver?
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Kant is not concerned with the ontology of the art-work itself, nor with what rules the genius gives 
to themselves in the moment of creation, but only the way in which the form of the work brings 
about a judgment of taste as if it were a form of nature. The artistic genius possesses the exact same 
faculties as every other human subject. It is only by chance, it would seem, that in the genius these 
faculties work in such a way as to be able to present aesthetic ideas as if they originated in nature, to 
purposively bring about purposeless, disinterested aesthetic judgments. Fine art is beautiful art to 
the extent that it can provoke pure judgments of taste. But contained within KantÕs description is a 
potentially paradoxical situation. He claims that art must be intentionally produced, and further, 
produced with a concept in mind of what the art-work ought to be (i.e. its purpose). Yet in this 
producing something is brought into the work (via genius) that makes it appears as if it were a 
natural product, i.e. created without any intention at all, and without the associated concept. 
As I explained in part one of this chapter, beauty in nature is that which pleases without a concept. 
By contrast, beautiful works of art are those that bring about an aesthetic expansion on their 
concept. It is useful to remember that in the case of natural beauty, a judgment of taste is based on 
the form of the object, and so by the specific ways in which that form is limited. This is opposed to 
                                                
93 Schaeffer picks up on this potential problem, asking, Ôif the work remains essentially opaque to the 
genius who produced it, and even to the genius-disciples who are inspired by itÉby what miracle can it 
become transparent for ordinary receivers who can only be imitators?Õ (2000, p. 43). Schaeffer construes 
this as a problem of the grounding of rules, continuing that, Ôon the one hand, the genius is incapable of 
rationally grounding his rules himself, since they are grounded in his natureÉOn the other hand, the 
genius gives the rulesÉwhich ground the exemplarity of the work of genius, [and] can in a certain way 
be discovered by its receiversÕ (ibid., p. 40). However, as I will show, it is not so much the rules created 
by genius that creates artÕs exemplary status, but rather, the communication of aesthetic ideas.  
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the sublime, which represents a certain limitlessness for judgment. The issue of 
limitation/limitlessness is important in the case of works of art as well. 
So far, nothing particularly troubling has emerged. For art to be beautiful it must be capable of 
inducing the same kinds of pure aesthetic judgment as natural beauties, and this is only possible 
through genius, which is the gift of animating materials with spirit. So animated, these materials are 
capable of expressing aesthetic ideas. When one delves deeper into the relation between artistic and 
natural beauty, things become more complicated. In ¤45 Kant claims that when one encounters a 
work of art, they must Ôbe aware that it is art, and not natureÕ, yet the Ôpurposiveness in its form 
must still seem to be as free from all constraint by arbitrary rules as if it were a mere product of 
natureÕ (5:306). What is it that makes us aware something is art, and not nature? For Kant, it is the 
fact that the artist Ôalways has a determinate intention of producing somethingÕ. This intention is 
apparent to a viewer as a concept associated with the end of the work itself i.e. the concept of 
something being a painting, a poem, a sculpture, etc. One is aware of a human intention in a work 
of art. Despite this intention, a work of art must be regarded as nature. The talent of the artist, 
therefore, is the talent of intentionally and conceptually producing something that can be judged 
independently of its intention and its concept. 
Earlier I discussed KantÕs view of genius as being a natural gift, and an Ôinborn predisposition of the 
mind (5:307). Now it becomes clear how it is that nature Ôgives the rule to artÕ. The genius in effect 
emulates Ñ although in an original fashion Ñ the form of natural beauty: being an end without a 
purpose. In ¤48 of the CJ, Kant illuminates this through his description of the relation of genius to 
taste. In the case of natural beauty, only taste is required, but in the case of beautiful art, both taste 
and genius are required; taste as the capacity to judge works as beautiful, genius to account for their 
possibility. In the case of nature, one need not be concerned with the possibility of natural forms; 
such possibility does not factor into reflective judgments at all. However, a concept of artÕs 
possibility is necessary for judging it as beautiful, and this is explained by genius. Whereas the 
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beauty of nature is a beautiful thing, the beauty of art is a Ôbeautiful representation of a thingÕ 
(5:311).  
At first glance, the characterisation of art as a beautiful representation, rather than a beautiful thing 
would seem to put natural beauty at an advantage. Artistic beauty appears to be derivative of natural 
beauty. Natural beauties exercise a greater degree of freedom from determinate concepts; this is 
how they can be judged according to their form alone. On the other hand, since art always 
Ôpresupposes an end in the cause (and its causality), a concept must first be the ground of what the 
thing is supposed to beÕ (5:312). 
Kant states that Ôthe beautiful representation of an objectÉis really only the form of the 
presentation of a concept by means of which the latter is universally communicatedÕ (ibid.). It 
remains to be seen exactly what this form is, as it cannot be a mere emulation of nature. Something 
about the human intention that brings about the work of art must factor into products of genius. 
However, the originality that Kant bestows to genius is precisely that element which stems from the 
mysterious connection between genius and nature; the element which even the artistic genius cannot 
account for. With these things in mind I turn now to GadamerÕs account of genius in relation to 
artistic versus natural beauty. While I find GadamerÕs interpretation illuminating, I contend that he 
remains within the same problematic boundaries as Kant, in terms of what it is that art can tell us 
about nature. 
2.2.6. Gadamer on Natural and Artistic Beauty 
In his book Truth and Method, Gadamer asserts that KantÕs concept of the pure judgment of taste 
Ôis a methodological abstraction only obliquely related to the difference between nature and artÕ 
(1989, p. 51). This is true; Kant is concerned more with establishing the universal validity of 
reflective aesthetic judgment than he is with what these judgments specifically are about. Gadamer 
points out that, as a result, KantÕs critique of aesthetic judgment Ôdoes not seek to be a philosophy 
of artÕ (ibid.), and this is reflected by the brevity of KantÕs remarks on art itself. Of particular 
124 
 
importance, in GadamerÕs view, is KantÕs ideal of beauty, which Gadamer claims rests on the 
distinction between the Ônormative ideaÕ and the Ôrational ideaÕ of beauty (ibid., p. 47). In the first 
case, an idea is held which acts as the ÔgenusÕ out of which individual examples of beauty emerge. 
Gadamer gives the example of a beautiful animal. The normative idea of a beautiful cow is one in 
which the minimum conditions are provided by which an individual cow is to be judged. Gadamer 
does not elaborate on what kind of conditions these might be, or indeed how they are possible given 
that the judgment of beauty does not rest on any property of the object begin judged. He seems to 
be referring to KantÕs question in The Ideal of Beauty over the possibility of an Ôarchetype of tasteÕ, 
which, as a Ômere ideaÕ, can nonetheless act as guide for individual judgments of taste (CJ, 5:232). 
GadamerÕs point here is that the normative idea of beauty is Ônot a prototype of beauty but merely 
of correctnessÕ. A rational idea of beauty, on the other hand, seems to demand something 
corresponding to it, which gives it a valid employment. In other words, the rational idea of beauty 
requires an ideal, in which its concept is instantiated. For Gadamer, as for Kant, this ideal is the 
expression of the moral by the human being. In this case, Gadamer claims, the object represented 
(the human form) Ôcoincides with the artistic meaning that speaks to us in the representationÕ (1989, 
p. 48). This may be a little hard to grasp at first, but I take Gadamer to mean that, for Kant, only the 
human form can express an ideal of beauty because only the human being can actually be what it 
represents. For example, Gadamer writes, Ôa tree that is stunted because of unfavourable conditions 
of growth may seem wretched to us, but the tree does not feel wretched or express this 
wretchednessÕ (ibid.). A human being on the other hand, expresses wretchedness by being 
wretched, i.e. by being measured Ôby the human moral ideal itselfÕ (ibid., 49). This notion of the 
ideal of beauty opens up for Gadamer an ambiguity over the relation between natural and artistic 
beauty, which, it would seem, Gadamer is preoccupied with arranging hierarchically. 
Gadamer claims, on the basis of his discussion mentioned above, that the Ôfundamental problem that 
motivates KantÕs aesthetics is that the beautiful engages our interestsÕ (ibid., p. 50). The way in 
which our interests are engaged by either natural or artistic beauty leads Gadamer to the thought 
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that each form of beauty seems to have an advantage over the other. Gadamer claims that KantÕs 
doctrine of the ideal of beauty results in Ôan advantage of art over natural beauty: the advantage of 
being a more direct expression of the moralÕ (ibid.). However, Kant, in GadamerÕs view, proposes 
the opposite. Natural beauty can arouse moral interest without having to address it directly. This is 
because, when judging natural forms to be beautiful, we are led to the thought that nature has itself 
produced that beauty, and where this thought arouses interest, Gadamer says, Ôwe have a cultivation 
of the moral sensibilityÕ. Gadamer explains this situation in the following way: it is precisely 
because Ôin nature we find no ends in themselves and yet find beautyÕ, i.e. a Ôsuitedness to the end 
of our pleasureÕ that nature seems to Ôgive us a ÒhintÓ that we are in fact the ultimate end, the final 
goal of creationÕ (ibid., p. 51). 
What emerges from GadamerÕs discussion is an explanatory gap between art-works as some 
expression of nature, and nature itself. As I have discussed already, the works of genius are 
specifically tied up with human ends. As a result of this, Gadamer writes that the task of art Ôis no 
longer to represent the ideal of nature, but to enable man to encounter himself in nature and in the 
human, historical worldÕ (1989 p. 49). At first glance this makes sense. Just as judgments of taste 
are concerned with the faculties of the subject rather than properties of natural objects, art is 
concerned with how mankind relates to nature rather than with nature itself. As such, Gadamer 
continues, Ôit is perfectly appropriate that Kant does not inquire into the mode of existence of the 
object being aesthetically judged (and thus into the whole question of the relation between beauty of 
nature and that of art)Õ (ibid.). However, I claim that this is not a wholly satisfactory answer. The 
only thing left to do, in this case, is to examine how art brings about judgments of taste, and to what 
extent these judgments of artistic beauty are the same as those of natural beauty. 
Again, Gadamer highlights the problem of beauty engaging our interest. Nature appears akin to our 
interest in forming judgments of beauty without any specific purpose. This is why oneÕs interest in 
the beautiful concerns only the faculty of judgment, rather than whatever the judgment may be 
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about. Returning to the example of the stunted tree, while its stuntedness does not straightforwardly 
mean its wretchedness, (its purpose is not to be wretched), still the tree is nonetheless purposive in 
an indirect way, namely, in its being used for the purpose of an aesthetic judgment, one which 
ultimately concerns manÕs own wretchedness, man being the only thing which can in itself be 
wretched (ibid., p. 49). 
Because of this, Gadamer claims that natural beauty has an advantage over artistic beauty because 
the former Ôpossesses no significance of contentÕ, and as such Ômanifests the judgment of taste in its 
unintellectualized purityÕ (ibid., p. 50). It seems that for Gadamer, the lack of direct conceptual 
content in the case of natural beauty makes judgments of natural beauty easier, because one does 
not have to negotiate with what an item of nature may be Òtrying to sayÓ. In other words, Gadamer 
rests on the assumption that natural objects do not specify a meaningful content in their 
appearances, whereas art-works do. Art-works are always made Òfor a reasonÓ, in GadamerÕs view. 
A judgment of beauty regarding an art-work must therefore navigate the additional task of 
negotiating the meaning of the work as well as its potential beauty. At first glance, this would seem 
to reflect what Kant himself says. In ¤51 of the CJ Kant writes that beauty, either in nature or in art, 
is the expression of aesthetic ideas, the difference being that Ôin beautiful art this idea must be 
occasioned by a concept of the object, but in beautiful nature the mere reflection on a given 
intuition, without a concept of what the object ought to be, is sufficientÕ (5:320). However, 
Gadamer shifts this conception of the difference between natural and artistic beauty in a way that is 
slightly troubling. It has to do with the connection between nature and morality. 
Gadamer points out that one of the fundamental problems of KantÕs aesthetics is that Ôthe beautiful 
engages our interestsÕ (1989, p. 50). Gadamer claims that Ôas beautiful, nature finds a language that 
brings to us an intelligible idea of what mankind is to beÕ (ibid., p. 51). For Gadamer, art is a direct 
expression of that which in aesthetic judgments of nature is expressed analogously. Nature, in 
GadamerÕs view Ôcommunicates to us th[e] self-discovery [of the moral nature] of man in a reality 
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that does not intend to do soÕ (ibid.). In other words, nothing inherent in the appearances of nature 
affirms the existence of a moral universe, since this idea of morality must be legislated by reason. 
For art to affirm the moral status of mankind, it must, in some way, set out to achieve this goal. It 
cannot be mere happenstance that works of art speak to our moral concerns. However, the power of 
genius, which in GadamerÕs view is precisely the power to communicate humankindÕs moral 
interests, remains nonetheless a gift of nature in KantÕs argument, not a gift of morality. 
Genius is in a paradoxical position, in which it must produce morally pertinent representations, with 
an intention to do so, but via a creative gift that it cannot rationally ground. Gadamer also draws 
attention to this seeming paradox at the heart of genius. He claims that Ôthe irrationality of genius 
brings out an element of productive creation, shown both in creator and recipient, namely that there 
is no other way of laying hold of the meaning of a work of art that in the unique form of the work 
and in the mystery of its impression which can never be fully expressed by any languageÕ (1989, p. 
49).  
GadamerÕs point is that there seems to be something about the artistic mode of expression that is 
unlike any other form of expression, which is that art expresses a meaning directly, but in such a 
way that one cannot, upon receipt of that meaning, describe what it is. This is because that meaning 
is inseparable from the form in which it is expressed, the artistic form itself. This is how the art-
work seems to be able to express the universal in the particular, by being limited to the final, 
concrete form of the work itself. Exactly what it expresses via this form takes us beyond the mere 
work however, into the realm of ideas, which, as Kant says, Ôaesthetically enlarges the concept itself 
in an unbounded wayÕ. There is, in some sense, more expressed in the work than its mere content. 
This can be summed up with the following passage from Kant: 
One can call such representations of the imagination ideas: on the one 
hand because they at least strive toward something lying beyond the 
bounds of experience, and thus seek to approximate a presentation of 
concepts of reason (of intellectual ideas), which gives them the 
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appearances of an objective reality; on the other hand, and indeed 
principally, because no concept can be fully adequate to them, as inner 
intuition. (CJ, 5:314) 
When expressed via the art-work, these aesthetic ideas open up an Ôimmeasurable field of related 
representationsÕ (5:315) which the imagination is free to contemplate without the need to tie them 
down to any determinate concepts. This is what Gadamer means by an aesthetic expansion of the 
artistic concept. To get a better understanding of this Ôimmeasurable fieldÕ, I now turn to the way in 
which Kant approaches the individual forms of art, which reveal something about how he conceives 
of natural beauty with regard to them. 
2.2.7. Poetry as the Highest Art: KantÕs Aesthetic Hierarchy 
Kant rarely shows any interest in the actual materials of the art-work, which one must assume 
contribute at least in part to the conceptual determination of what the work is supposed to be. This 
is largely because Kant is concerned with the cognitive functions necessary for judgments, rather 
than what the judgments are about. A brief look at KantÕs ranking of the arts makes this clear. In 
¤51 and ¤53 of the CJ, Kant discusses the place of different art forms in relation to each other. 
These are designated according to KantÕs main criteria for beauty, whether of nature or of art, which 
is the expression of aesthetic ideas (5:320). Kant splits art into three main types, the art of speech, 
pictorial art, and art of the play of sensations. Kant performs this division to show how each 
separate form interacts with ideas on the one hand, and sensations on the other. He places music in 
the lowest position among the hierarchy of the arts. This is because, he claims, music Ôspeaks 
through mere sensations without concepts, and hence does not, like poetry, leave something behind 
for reflectionÕ (5:328). Kant does admit, however, that music, or the art of tone, as he calls it, can 
move the mind in deeper ways than other forms, albeit temporarily. It is this temporariness that 
Kant identifies as the feature which disqualifies music from being as pure an art form as poetry. 
Presumably this is because, outside of the duration of the performance, during which time the 
audience is caught up in Ôcharm and movement of the mindÕ (ibid.), there is nothing to observe 
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upon which reflective judgment can be based. The form of music exists exclusively in its actual 
occurrence, and this will not suffice for the contemplative judgments Kant is after. 
On the other end of the scale, Kant claims that Ôthe art of poetry (which owns its origin almost 
entirely to genius, and will be guided least by precept or example) claims the highest rank of allÕ 
(5:326). Poetry takes up what I characterise as a highly paradoxical position in the ranking of the 
arts, one that is akin to the paradox of genius I mentioned in relation to Gadamer. Poetry is, on the 
one hand, pure communicative power, i.e. language itself. Language is the form most associated 
with the communication of thoughts. In the case of poetry, language is not used to communicate, at 
least, not directly. Instead, poetry is direct expression used as play. This might sound like a 
superficial characterisation of poetry, but it bears strong relations to the aesthetic idea.  Poetry 
Ôexpands the mind by setting the imagination freeÕ (5:326). It presents Ôwithin the limits of a given 
conceptÉa fullness of thought to which no linguistic expression is fully adequateÕ. Via this fullness 
of thought, poetry Ôelevates itself aesthetically to the level of ideasÕ (ibid.). In these descriptions of 
KantÕs poetry there is a fairly direct instantiation of aesthetic ideas. Poetry achieves its effect by 
presenting itself as a Ômerely entertaining play with the imaginationÕ. Through this play, poetry 
allows the mind to Ôfeel its capacity to judge of nature, as appearance, freely, self-actively, and 
independently of determination by natureÕ (ibid.). These descriptions of Kant accord with his earlier 
remarks in ¤49, where he described the process of the imagination, in which the material lent to us 
by nature is turned into something which Ôsteps beyond natureÕ (5:314). The poet, through this 
process, Ôventures to make sensible rational ideasÕ, in a way which philosophy cannot. It is by 
presenting itself as a mere play that poetry seems able to do this.  
I challenge GadamerÕs conception of genius in KantÕs aesthetics, by claiming that poetry seems able 
to detach itself from all purposes, to use language in a way that removes all need to specify 
intention, or even a purpose internal to the poem itself. Poetry seems to be capable of removing the 
need to speak about anything in particular, to engage in a free play of imagination and 
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understanding. However, it should be remembered that this formal aspect of poetry through which 
its playful quality is achieved, is specific to the judgment of beauty made about the poem. It is not 
so much a factor of its creation but of its reception. It seems that Kant is still one step removed from 
talking about the artistic product itself. In the final section, I address the distance at which Kant 
situates himself from the art-work, and some potential problems that arise from this. 
2.2.8. Art at a Distance 
The fact that Kant was relatively unconcerned with actual art-works leads to the following question. 
If it is the merely formal properties of a poem that are judged to be beautiful Ñ mirroring 
judgments of natural beauty most directly Ñ then what does a poem need to be about in order for 
these formal properties to achieve the status of beauty? Indeed, does the content even matter for a 
poem to be beautiful? Of course, the content must have some role to play, but it is difficult to see 
what role this is for Kant. In ¤49, Kant states that the thing that makes art beautiful is its spirit, that 
which is able to animate content in such a way as to create aesthetic ideas. These ideas themselves 
are such because they cannot be directly instantiated in experience, and even in the case of poetry, 
in a single linguistic expression. So, in the cases of both spirit and aesthetic ideas, the actual content 
still remains a mystery.  
Poetry can express ideas of reason in an aesthetic fashion, namely reflectively, in something 
sensible Ñ which in this case must be language itself. The aesthetic presentation of the idea then 
achieves Ôa completeness that goes beyond anything of which there is an example in natureÕ. The 
imagination Ôemulates the precedent of reason in attainting to a maximumÕ (5:315). Where one 
cannot represent ideas of reason directly through concepts, one supplements this for an aesthetic 
expansion of the given concept of reason for which no expression is found (5:316). 
Curiously, at this point, after spending so much time asserting that the art of genius concerns the 
beautiful exclusively, Kant mentions the sublime again. He remarks that in the consciousness of 
virtue Ð construed as an idea of reason Ð the mind receives Ôa multitude of sublime and calming 
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feelingsÉwhich no expression that is adequate to a determine concepts fully capturesÕ. Kant 
follows this with a footnote in which he writes Ôperhaps nothing more sublime has ever been said, 
or any thought more sublimely expressed, than in the inscription over the temple of Isis (Mother 
Nature): ÒI am all that is, that was, and that will be, and my veil no mortal has removedÓÕ (ibid.).
94
 
The fact that Kant returns to the sublime at this point, and particular in reference to the concept of 
Mother Nature, is revealing.
95
 It perhaps says something about what it is that the genius accesses in 
order to produce beautiful works of art. If nature is that which no mortal can truly access Ñ at least 
not completely Ñ and nature is also that which gives the rule to art through genius, it stands to 
reason that genius is the capacity that delves deeper into nature than do any of the cognitive 
faculties. KantÕs mention of the sublime here shows that while the end product of genius has 
nothing to do with the sublime, perhaps the process by which genius creates does. Indeed, Kant 
states that the power of genius can even present ugly things as beautiful. It would not be such a 
stretch to claim that genius is able to present sublime things as beautiful. In fact, this is precisely 
what Schelling's philosophy of art will attempt to do. Genius can do this, of course, by forming the 
potentially infinite manifold of imaginative presentations into a particular completeness, the same 
                                                
94 In his earlier work The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of 
God (1763) Kant expresses similar sentiments about the sublime, though in this case as support for the 
Ôwisdom, providence and even power of a Being who is worthy of our worshipÕ (2:117). The following 
note attached to this passage is revealing in this regard: ÔWhen, among other things, I consider the 
microscopic observations of Dr. Hill . . . ; when I see numerous animal species in a single drop of water, 
predatory kinds equipped with instruments of destruction, intent upon the pursuit of their prey, but in 
their turn annihilated by the still more powerful tyrants of this aquatic world; when I contemplate the 
intrigues, the violence, the scenes of commotion in a single particle of matter, and when from thence I 
direct my gaze upwards to the immeasurable spaces of the heavens teeming with worlds as with specks 
of dustÐwhen I contemplate all this, no human language can express the feelings aroused by such a 
thought; and all subtle metaphysical analysis falls far short of the sublimity and dignity characteristic of 
such an intuition.Õ 
95 This citation of KantÕs is obviously a gloss on the Bible, and it is significant that in his earlier work, 
he says similar things about God. Cf. The Only Possible Argument, 2:151. 
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completeness that goes beyond nature, precisely because nature, in its completeness, can never be 
instantiated in experience.  
Works of art, and poetry to the highest degree, limit the immeasurable field of related 
representations that accompany an aesthetic presentation of the imagination. Poetry in particular, 
can communicate these representations in a way that is guided enough by taste as to be appreciable 
by an audience, but is original enough to surpass direct linguistic expressions. This applies not only 
to poetic renderings of pre-established natural beauties, but even renderings of those things that in 
nature are not represented as beautiful. Art is therefore both grounded in nature and operates in a 
way akin to the supersensible substrate of nature, but also steps beyond nature by inventing original 
ways to represent as beautiful even that which does not seem most suited to such a representation. 
There is nothing to stop these beautiful representations being of things which naturally would be 
judged as sublime, but the cost of KantÕs assertion that all works of fine art are beautiful is that the 
side of genius connected to the potentially sublime in nature is obscured from critique, or definition, 
even by those gifted with the genius to create such works.  
Poetry most effectively represents the operations of nature (in accord with the laws of the 
understanding) such that the content of poetry Ð being secondary to form by which it is judged Ð
does not become embroiled with sensible presentation. As mere play, that which poems speak about 
does not need to enter into the problem of possible experience, just as the idea, its aesthetic 
counterpart, and the supersensible itself never enter into this problem either. They are represented 
by a play which draws attention to the harmonious relation between the faculties, and a nature that 
appears as if it were a work of art. Works of art appear as if they were nature. There is evidence to 
suggest that Kant wanted the relation between art and nature to be mutual, such as his discussion of 
the technique of nature that I discussed in the first part of this chapter. But given the fact that art for 
Kant can only stimulate judgments of beauty, and not of the sublime, and given that the formal 
judging of works of art mirrors that which is first found in nature, it would seem that the work of art 
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is secondary to the effect of nature on our reflective judgment. Nature takes priority due to the fact 
that the freedom represented in the work of art is derivative of that freedom which we hold as being 
inherent in nature. Through art mankind strives toward the supersensible. If nature is to take priority 
Ð and indeed, Kant quickly leaves the question of art altogether to deal with the teleological 
judgment of nature in the second half of the CJ Ð then the concluding question remains, what 




Conclusion to Chapter Two: the Inaccessible Ground of Kantian 
Nature 
From the perspective KantÕs aesthetics, nature seems to speak to us. It is as if nature were 
attempting to make intelligible the status of mankind. Works of art seem to carry out this process 
directly for Kant, through the intention of the artist. The spirit is responsible for making this process 
original, which means two things; first, that the created work stands as an exemplar for further 
works by appearing to apply rules that it creates for itself; second, that the work thereby created 
communicates something (via the imagination) that cannot be summed up by any simple conceptual 
expression. Nevertheless, none of these elements of genius explain precisely its relation to nature, 
because this relation lies in the supersensible toward which aesthetic ideas strive, and which they 
depict through the supplementary representations of the imagination. Furthermore, in KantÕs view 
the organisation perceived in nature, which reaches its pinnacle in the human organism, Ôinfinitely 
surpasses all capacity for a similar presentation by artÕ. Art can symbolise nature, but it cannot be 
nature; it cannot be alive, nor can it self-organise.  
Gadamer highlights an important and potentially problematic ambiguity in the difference between 
artistic and natural beauty. However, his attempt to clarify this ambiguity relies solely on the 
specificity of artistic beauty, resulting from its intentional creation. I have moved beyond 
GadamerÕs account in order to consider how, if at all, the sublime factors into artistic creation. Yet, 
it appears as though this ambiguity remains so, given the fact that, after all, Kant himself relegates 
the creative power of artistic genius to a Ôgift of natureÕ. 
In this chapter, I have related the question of nature which informs my thesis to KantÕs theory of 
aesthetic judgment. It has emerged from this that Kant conceives of nature itself as lacking in 
receptivity to ideas. The most important thing that this reveals is something Kant articulates in his 
analysis of the sublime. There, he identifies an aspect of the human mental life that is altogether 
separate from nature. In ¤28 Kant claims that we possess a power to Ôregard those things about 
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which we are concerned as trivial, and hence to regard [natureÕs] powerÉas not the sort of 
dominion over ourselves and our authority to which we would have to bow if it came to our highest 
principles and their affirmation or abandonmentÕ (5:262). It seems fairly clear that Kant here is 
referring to something like the first stages of being a moral agent, which, in terms of what has been 
discussed above, implies establishing a separation between human reason and nature, one which 
allows the latter to be regulated by the former. In dismissing worldly, sensory or empirical 
concerns, we can, in KantÕs view, ascend toward a more ÔpureÕ version of humanity, in which moral 
duty is tantamount.
96
 In terms of the sublime, Kant reduces its function here to raising the 
imagination to presenting those cases in which the mind can Ômake palpable to itself the sublimity 
of its own vocation even over natureÕ (ibid.). In spite of great (physical) odds, the power of human 
reason can still always triumph, and it is hard to see an alternative to the view that, while Kant 
offers diverse analyses of the aspects of aesthetic and artistic life, they all essentially amount to the 
re-affirmation of his moral position.  
I have argued that genius is important for KantÕs definition of beautiful works of art, to the extent 
that the creative power of genius mirrors a creative power in nature. More significantly, the 
effective combination of genius and taste can make this creative power apparent in a way that could 
not otherwise be articulated. In short, genius can reveal to the faculty of taste a creative force in 
nature that cannot be accessed by any other human faculty. The price of this access for Kant, 
however, is precisely that it can only be mirrored, by an artistic process which is neither 
philosophically measurable or repeatable, but merely exemplary. Where reflective judgments treat 
nature as if it were created for the purposes of our aesthetic satisfaction, genius seems able to 
intentionally produce beautiful forms, but in such a way that art-works which exemplify those 
beautiful forms are judged as if they were not produced by any intention i.e. as if they were 
products of nature. However, the exact means by which genius achieves this, and the larger role 
                                                
96 As in 1.3.3., KantÕs subtle Platonism is again evident here. 
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such capacity for genius might play both in philosophical and social life, remain unclear in Kant. 
Shortly after advancing his theory of genius, Kant moves on the second part of the CJ, in which he 
constructs his critique of teleological judgment. As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, 
KantÕs nuanced view of purposiveness underlies most if not all of his subsequent arguments, but it 
is easy at this point to claim that such purposiveness is much more directed toward KantÕs moral 
concerns than artistic or aesthetic ones. 
What does this mean for subsequent philosophies of art? Gadamer points out that, Ôunlike Kant, 
[Fichte and Schelling] considered the standpoint of art (as the unconscious production of genius) all 
inclusive Ð embracing even nature, which is understood as a product of spiritÕ. (1989, p. 59). As I 
move from Kant to Schelling, I have in mind this concern for the standpoint of art. This is the 
subject of chapter four. In chapter three, I will discuss how Schelling also sought to talk about 
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Chapter Three: Disassembling the Boundaries of Metaphysics  
3.1. SchellingÕs Critique of Kantian Metaphysics in the Treatise 
Explicatory of the Idealism in the Science of Knowledge 
Abstract 
Along with his contemporary J.G. Fichte, Schelling formed a distinctive response to KantÕs critical 
metaphysics. Schelling soon dismissed FichteÕs effort, the Science of Knowledge (1794), as 
excessively ideal. Kant, however, was never quite so easy for Schelling to dismiss. On the surface, 
the Treatise Explicatory of the Idealism in the Science of Knowledge (1797) is an essay about 
Fichte, but it soon becomes clear that Schelling is actually interested in Kant Critique of Pure 
Reason. Schelling performs two tasks in the Treatise. First, he defends KantÕs critical system from 
its various misinterpretations. Second, he attempts to bring KantÕs philosophy to its proper 
conclusions by pointing out which elements were given too much weight, and importantly, which 
were not given enough. In doing so, SchellingÕs Treatise re-examines several key features of KantÕs 
critical philosophy; intuition, imagination, and their grounding force, the spirit. SchellingÕs support 
of intellectual intuition, as the unity of thought and being, directly opposes KantÕs, who denied 
humans the capacity for intellectual intuition. I will defend SchellingÕs criticisms of Kant, while 
also questioning the extent to which Schelling overcomes KantÕs critical limitations. I will conclude 
by summarising SchellingÕs position and pointing out where his criticisms of Kant are most relevant 
for studies of Kant.  
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3.1.1. The Origin of Knowledge 
In the rarely discussed Treatise Explicatory of the Idealism in the Science of Knowledge, Schelling 
aims to answer a particularly Kantian question. Schelling asks, ÔwhatÉisÉthe reality that inheres 
in our representations?Õ (1994, p. 69).
97
 In so doing, Schelling hopes to show, like Kant, that our 
representations of objects and the objects in themselves two renderings of the same thing, thus 
avoiding the problem of a Òtwo-worldsÓ metaphysics.
98
 However, Schelling has one important 
qualification, for which KantÕs critical philosophy does not allow. While Kant wanted to secure the 
principles by which intuition and understanding were synthesised for knowledge, Schelling wants to 
go one step further. The latter writes, Ôwhen asking ÒWhat is the origin of our knowledge?Ó we do 
not want to know how already existing representations and concepts might be dissolved into their 
components; rather the question was how we had originally formed these concepts and 
representationsÕ (ibid., p. 70). This is a subtle but important development of KantÕs critical project. 
For Schelling, it is not enough merely show the a priori conditions for knowledge; we must also 
inquire into how we came to obtain such conditions. One must meet the demand of reason, and 
complete the chain of conditions that Kant spoke of in the first Critique, not just theoretically but 
practically.
99 
Fichte had already attempted this in his Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre), 
but Schelling was dissatisfied with the formerÕs grounding of this principle in self-consciousness, or 
the absolute I. For Schelling, such a principle lies neither in consciousness itself, nor in an external 
ground; it lies rather in their identity, which Schelling names spirit. In what follows, I will look in 
detail at SchellingÕs early modifications of Kant in the Treatise, his reinterpretation of intuition and 
imagination, and their importance for intellectual intuition, the vehicle through which the Schelling 
believes spirit is brought to consciousness. SchellingÕs early essays were subsequently eclipsed by 
                                                
97 Hereafter Treatise. I say Ôrarely discussedÕ in reference to the English speaking philosophical world. 
The Treatise was translated into English in 1994. 
98 For more on the two worlds problem in Schelling, cf. Whistler, 2013, pp. 70-93. 
99 Cf. A481/B509. 
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his philosophy of nature and by his System of Transcendental Idealism in 1800. It is my contention, 
however, that the Treatise contains many important insights into the young philosopherÕs 
adaptations of Kant, adaptations which inform SchellingÕs subsequent work. 
3.1.2. KantÕs Incomplete Criticism 
Kant faced significant objections in the wake of his critical philosophy. It is arguable that these 
criticisms have as much to do with the competition that existed to surpass KantÕs grand 
philosophical system, as it did with actual problems in KantÕs philosophy.
100
 As I have already 
made clear, Schelling was not an outright critic of Kant. Such critics, in SchellingÕs view, sought 
only to erect intellectual edifices, which were lacking in true philosophical spirit.
101
 At the 
beginning of the Treatise, Schelling stresses the importance of saving Kant from the 
misunderstandings of his heirs. Schelling accuses KantÕs successors of reading the latter too 
superficially, and thereby not understanding his true intentions, arguing that, Ô[i]n addition to the 
literal language [of KantÕs philosophy] there also exists a language of spiritÉ[T]he former is 
merely the vehicle for the latterÕ (1994, p. 69).
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Schelling believes that he has uncovered the true intentions of KantÕs critical philosophy. By 
pointing these intentions out, Schelling can bring critical philosophy to its proper conclusions. 
Schelling therefore has two main goals in the Treatise. First, he aims to provide the authoritative 
account of KantÕs critical philosophy, whereby it is shown to be incomplete. Second, Schelling aims 
to use this account to defend his position on the necessity of intellectual intuition as the starting 
                                                
100 Cf. Treatise, (1994 pp. 8-14); Frank, 2004; pp. 23-38. 
101 Cf. Treatise, (1994 p. 24). 
102 Schelling perpetually struggled with the continuum between revelation and analytical reasoning. 
SchellingÕs discussion of spirit in the Treatise is indicative of this struggle. Cf. ÒMetaphysical 
EmpiricismÓ in Schelling and B. Matthews (trans.) The Grounding of Positive Philosophy: The Berlin 





 However, SchellingÕs understanding of intellectual intuition has already 
changed here from its first appearance in his 1795 essay Of the I as a Principle for Philosophy. 
Intellectual intuition in the Treatise is not the quasi-mystical, inarticulable insight it was in Of the 
I.
104
 It takes on a more subdued role wherein the initial unconditioned activity of the spirit is 
brought to consciousness. As such it remains purely subjective.
105
 I will discuss this in more detail 
later. For now, I examine the reinterpretations and corrections to KantÕs philosophy that Schelling 
presents. 
3.1.3. The Formation of Knowledge in the Treatise 
Schelling begins proceedings in the Treatise on a fairly Kantian footing, pointing out the necessary 
dualism involved, not just in knowledge but in the foundations of self-consciousness; 
[T]he very essence of the spirit involves an original conflict in self-
consciousness resulting in the creation of a real world outside the spirit 
through intuition (a creation ex nihilo). Consequently, no world exists 
unless there is a spirit to form knowledge of it and, conversely, no spirit 
exists without a world outside of it. (1994, p. 69) 
It is important for Schelling that the same spirit which initially separates the world and intuition is 
responsible for joining it back together.
106
 This is done via the imagination, for intuition. In Kant 
this synthesis is responsible for knowledge, but it has an additional function for Schelling. In the 
first pages of the Treatise, Schelling sets up an important difference for the sake of his method. 
While Kant is correct in asserting that our conditioned finite understanding is discursive and 
                                                
103 Kant is well known for denying intellectual intuition any inherent reality for human cognition. Cf. 
CPR, Bxl, n.; B69-72; B158-9. 
104 Cf. Vater & Wood, 2012, p. 19. 
105 Hence distinguishing it from both spirit and the absolute itself. 
106 It eventually becomes clear that for Schelling, spirit must not merely reunite with the world, but 
both must issue from identity. This is elaborated both in SchellingÕs philosophy of nature and identity-
philosophy, with which I deal in sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
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dualistic, the higher principles by which this knowledge is governed are necessarily not so. 
Therefore, it is not so much that Kant is wrong, merely incomplete. The vital element of a 
potentially complete philosophy Ñ intellectual intuition Ñ is missing from Kant. Schelling points 
out the insufficiency of merely Ôempirical inquiriesÕ, because of the frequency with which Ôtheir 
most interesting problems refer us back to higher principlesÕ (ibid.). These higher principles are 
precisely what lead Schelling to the question with which we began: ÔWhat, then, is ultimately the 
reality that inheres in our representations?Õ It is worth quoting SchellingÕs response in full here, as it 
outlines his complex attitude to the problem of grounding empirical experience. To begin answering 
the above question, two complementary but opposing conditions are necessary: 
a primordial tendency toward the real [zum Realen], on the one hand, and 
a capacity to elevate oneself above reality [das Wirkliche], because 
without the former such a question will entangle us all too easily in 
idealistic speculations, and because without the latter the senses, rendered 
full by the individual object, retain no receptivity whatsoever for the real. 
(ibid.) 
Schelling has here articulated the middle ground of Kantian critical philosophy. In doing so, the 
former lays out the essential presuppositions of his perspective. Human knowledge must be 
grounded upon a unity that precedes the synthesis of intuition and understanding, but this unity 
must also inhere in consciousness itself. In other words, human reality must be in one sense unified 
and identical, in another sense disparate and multifarious. How can these opposing views be 
reconciled? For Schelling, it cannot be on the basis of KantÕs solution, wherein things are divided 
into phenomena and noumena. This is because, as Schelling writes, Ôan indeterminate logical 
something after thought has discriminated between the object and its qualities, it is assumed that in 
reality, too, this object could indeed exist in and of itself [and] independent of its qualitiesÕ (ibid., p. 
70). The problem with this indeterminate logical something is that it escapes all contact with our 
thinking; it is conceived merely as an object lacking in any determinate qualities, which is 
equivalent to saying it is not anything at all. For Schelling, there is no logical remainder after 
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consciousness produces knowledge, because the product of that knowledge, and that from which it 
is produced are the same. This will be the argument with which I most contend. 
So far I have scratched the surface of SchellingÕs reading of Kant. From here, things become much 
more complex. Schelling writes in a way that makes it unclear at what point he is following KantÕs 
thinking, and at what point he begins to diverge from it. It is often uncertain when Schelling is 
using KantÕs reasoning to make an assertion, and when he is merely following it for the sake of 
argument, in order to implicate Kant in some error. To help clarify SchellingÕs position, I will 
examine several key elements of the critical system in turn, as Schelling explains them, with the aim 
of elucidating SchellingÕs position in as simple a manner as possible. 
3.1.4. Intuition and Imagination in the Treatise 
Two potential paths emerge from what Schelling has said so far. One of them is deductive, the other 
constructive.
107
 Schelling thinks that Kant has stopped at deduction, using empirical experience to 
deduce the categories of the understanding. In SchellingÕs view this is insufficient. Even if the 
categories are deduced from experience, which is a damaging accusation in itself, the categories 
themselves are not the most important thing. When we ask the question Òwhat is the origin of my 
representations?Ó, to answer, Òthe concepts of the understandingÓ does not address the larger issue, 
namely how these concepts came to be formed. Schelling is looking to articulate the actual and 
progressive history of self-consciousness from a higher principle, one which is itself known to 
philosophy. This requires some explanation. It is clear that the faculty of the understanding is not 
enough to furnish representations, as indeed Kant would agree. In addition, intuition and 
imagination are required. In a lengthy passage, Schelling explains the process of cognition from 
intuition to the understanding. I quote the passage in full with a subsequent elucidation: 
                                                
107 I use the term ÔconstructionÕ here only to point out a difference in philosophical enterprises and 
methodologies. I deal with SchellingÕs theory of construction in 3.3. 
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To know an object outside of myself, Kant notes, intuition alone does not 
suffice. Indeed it does not, for by creating this [object] through a 
synthesis of the imagination, it cannot simultaneously be intuited by the 
subject as an object, that is, as something that possesses reality and an 
autonomous existence independent of the subject. Only after the creative 
faculty has completed [its activity], does the faculty of understanding 
enter into the picture, according to Kant Ñ an ancillary that merely 
apprehends, comprehends [and] arrests what has been furnished by 
another faculty. Yet what can such a faculty accomplish? Ñ Once both 
intuition and reality have vanished, [it can] only imitate, only repeat, that 
original act of intuition wherein the object first existed: for that the 
imagination is needed. The real, however, subsists only in intuition. 
Hence the imagination, in its current employment, cannot repeat that 
mode of action according to its material aspect either. For otherwise 
intuition would originate anew and we would once again be where we 
were before. Hence the imagination only repeats the formal aspect of that 
mode of action. This, we know, consists of time and space. Thus the 
imagination delineates merely the contour of an object hovering in time 
and space. This contour Kant calls the schema, claiming that it alone 
mediates the concept with the intuition. However, here as so often, he 
exhibited too generous a treatment of something that possesses no 
intrinsic reality. In speculation one may distinguish between scheme and 
concept, yet in the nature (of our cognition) they are never separate. A 
concept without sensibilzation by the imagination is a word without 
sense, a sound without meaning. Only now that subject is able to oppose, 
relate, compare, and bind together the object and the contour, the real and 
the formal aspects, does there originate an intuition with consciousness 
and the firm, incontrovertible conviction in the latter that there exists 
something outside and independent of it. Thus, as Kant observes, the 
lucid point of an objective cognition is to be found only at the 
convergence of the intuition with the concept. (p. 73)
108
 
                                                
108 It is noted here, and again in section two of this chapter, that Schelling augments his use of the term 
speculation between 1797 and 1803. This is particularly evident in the second edition of the Ideas for a 
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Critics contemporary with him claimed that that Kant had totally separated the facilities of 
sensibility and understanding. In the above quotation, Schelling challenges this claim and reinforces 
what he believes KantÕs view to be; that for any objective cognition, these two faculties, sensibility 
and understanding, are absolutely united. This lends subtle credence to SchellingÕs (Kantian) view 
that while philosophy can, for the sake of analysis, separate out elements of cognition, in reality   Ñ 
which is to say, in knowledge Ñ there is no such separation. The main difference between Kant and 
SchellingÕs methods of philosophy, then, is that the former merely posits the possibility of 
sensibility and understanding deriving from a common root, and the latter seeks to prove the reality 
of this common root. To flesh out this assertion, I will examine each point of the above quoated 
passage in turn. Schelling begins in line with Kant, agreeing that intuition by itself cannot furnish 
knowledge of an object. He goes further in saying that, within intuition, there is not yet any 
distinction between the intuition itself, and that of which it is an intuition. In short, there is no 
separation between inner and outer in intuition. Instead, there is an opposition between positive and 
negative. Schelling utilises the terms apeiron and peras in order to characterise space and time in a 
particular way.
109
 For Schelling space represents the originally limitless and undetermined; time 
represents determination and limitation. According to this analogy, space is originally positive, time 
originally negative.
110
 The two are complementary: space obtains in an unlimited manner, and is 
thereby limited by time. Kant has already shown in the CPR that space and time are necessary 
                                                                                                                                                            
Philosophy of Nature released in 1803, which revises the original 1797 use of ÔspeculationÕ for 
ÔreflectionÕ. In light of this revision that Schelling makes, it may be more instructive to render the 
sentence from the above quotation thus: ÔIn reflection one may distinguish between scheme and concept, 
yet in the nature (of our cognition) they are never separateÕ.  
109 From the Greek, translating as Ôthe unlimitedÕ and Ôthe limitÕ, respectively.  
110 I say more about Schelling's attitudes to space and time in 3.2, which explores SchellingÕs more 
cohesive account offered in the Introduction to the Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature 
(1799). It is mentioned here merely that Schelling's conception of spirit in the context of the Treatise is 
meant to elaborate a corresponding process between consciousness positing itself and nature positing 
itself (see below). 
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conditions for intuition. It therefore follows that intuition is generally possible only through a 
minimum of two activities, which I here call spatial and temporal determination. The same holds 
true for the imagination, which also holds these opposites together. Hence the understanding only 
repeats the original oppositions carried out by intuition and imagination. The understandingÕs 
legislative authority, what Kant calls the schema, in fact does not have as much authority in 
SchellingÕs view. This is because, by the time of the schema, namely, that which synthesises the 
object with its representation, the object has already been synthesised. This might not seem so 
different from Kant himself. But once Schelling leaves KantÕs terminology and begins to introduce 
his own, we can see where Schelling distinguishes himself from Kant. 
3.1.5. The Matter of Geist 
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant calls the spirit Ôthe animating principle of the mindÕ 
(5:313). Schelling would certainly agree with this, but as with many matters in the Treatise, he 
wants to take this one step further. We start to get a sense of this when Schelling writes ÔI am firmly 
convinced that no one who is not entirely deprived of his good senses [Vernunft] has ever claimed 
anything about speculative matters for which we could not point to some foundation in human 
nature itselfÕ (1994, p 76). Here is the crux of the matter of spirit, and what first distinguishes 
Schelling from Fichte. Where Fichte reduced the ground of knowledge to the activity of the I 
opposed to the not-I, Schelling saw no such absolute distinction. For Schelling, the grounding 
principle of consciousness must have a corresponding principle in nature.
111
 In the absolute itself, 
the two principles are identical.
112
 
                                                
111 This is Schelling's speculative principle that nature cannot be conceived merely according to its 
products, but must also be construed as an original productivity. Again I explore this in 3.2. 
112 This is a pre-emptive statement on my part. It still remains at this point for Schelling to articulate 
the way in which principles are united in the absolute, which is done in the Presentations and Further 
Presentations essays covered in 3.3. 
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Once again we are exposed to SchellingÕs own dualistic view, which could be characterised as 
perspectivally dualistic. According to one perspective, which Kant would call transcendental 
idealism, the form of our knowledge obtains from within, and becomes knowledge only when it is 
supplied with some content, or matter, which is supplied from without. This is a familiar scenario. 
Kant secured the a priori forms of intuition as space and time. Coupled with the concepts of the 
understanding, all that remained was for these to be filled out with some material content. In 
SchellingÕs view Ð one could argue in KantÕs as well Ð this separation between form and matter is 
merely ÔhypotheticalÕ, and in fact the two are Ômost intimately united in our knowledge (ibid., p. 
76).  Schelling goes so far as to say that Ôthe faith in an external world lies grounded in the inability 
of the common understanding to discriminate between object and representation during the [act of] 
representationÕ (ibid.). This is what distinguishes the second perspective, which sees the external 
world, or nature, and internal consciousness held in opposition merely for the sake of philosophical 
reflection, while in actual fact, the two are united.
113
 This is the point at which Schelling sees KantÕs 
philosophy falling short. Kant explained the form of our conceptual faculty, without accounting for 
its origins. This will not do, because, as Schelling says, Ôeven if we understanding the origin of a 
world external to ourselves, we still do not understand how the representations of this world could 
have entered into our consciousnessÕ. Kant and Fichte both opted to turn inward, to the interior 
workings of consciousness itself to locate an answer. But this is only half the story for Schelling. 
Hence the problem of the philosopher is Ôto explain the absolute correspondence of the object and 
the representation, of being and cognitionÕ (ibid., p 77).  
So far, like Kant, Schelling has merely presupposed the identity of object and representation. But 
they have not been substantively united. Here is where the spirit (Geist) enters the picture. Schelling 
                                                
113 It is this real union between consciousness and nature that becomes stronger as SchellingÕs 
philosophy progresses. In his System of Philosophy in General from 1804 Schelling goes so far as to 




introduces the concept of spirit in the following way: ÔThe identity of representation and object, 
then, exists, only in the intuition-of-self [Selbstanschauung] of the spirit. HenceÉit ought to be 
possible to prove that the spirit, by having an intuition of whatever object, merely intuits itselfÕ 
(ibid., p. 78). It is immediately clear that when Schelling refers to spirit, he does not just mean an 
animating principle of the mind. Spirit for Schelling animates all things, both within consciousness 
and in nature. With this all-encompassing view of spirit, Schelling believes he has secured the 
identity of several vital oppositions, including finitude and infinity, form and essence, mind and 
nature. However, the case of spirit is not yet proved, and in order to demonstrate its validity 
Schelling returns to some fairly Kantian sentiments. In what follows, I analyse SchellingÕs account 
of spirit, via his conception of the primordial representation. Schelling attempts to ground self-
consciousness identity within a broader, more general identity which he names the absolute. I argue 
that Schelling encounters the problem over how to prove his assertions and thereby overcome 
KantÕs dualisms. SchellingÕs solution, construction, will be the subject of 3.3. 
3.1.6. Geist as Primordial Representation 
Central to SchellingÕs argument in the Treatise is that the same productive capacities which reside 
in our cognitive faculties, also reside in nature. Once again, Schelling begins in a fairly Kantian 
manner, warning against hasty speculation on the matter of the identity of object and representation; 
The questionÉarises how it should be possible for something external 
and strictly heterogeneous from the soul to cohere with our interiority in 
so immediate a manner, and how it could have merged so inextricably 
with our ÔIÕ that neither one could be separated from the other without 
simultaneously uprooting what is common to both: the consciousness of 
ourselves. Nothing is more crucial than to think this question through in a 
rigorous manner and to ensure that this rigor not be compromised by our 
desire to arrive at some answer (1994, p. 85). 
Key to the question of consciousness is the recognition that what the philosopher attempts to 
articulate in the cohesion of soul and world is something which Ôeffectively precedes all conceptsÕ
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(ibid.). KantÕs mistake, in SchellingÕs view, is that he attempted to explain conceptually what is in 
fact not conceptual at all. This is why it was left with the Ôlogical remainderÕof the noumenal that I 
mentioned earlier. Schelling once again attempts to bring KantÕs argument to its conclusions. He 
accepts KantÕs version of space and time as the ground of possibility for intuitions. However, 
Schelling makes an additional remark. Due to the reality of knowledge relying on its being 
determinate, Ôthe entire belief in a reality outside ourselves ultimately adheres to the [notion of] an 
original sensation as its principle and most fundamental causeÕ (ibid., p. 87). This is worth 
unpacking. Space and time determine the forms in which our knowledge occurs. The intuition 
contained therein is subsequently conceptualised, bringing about a determined object for cognition. 
However, the object, or rather, the matter of the object, exists prior to our cognition of it, and it 
would not make sense to say that it existed indeterminately; it is merely indeterminate for us. Kant 
calls this element of cognition the sensible manifold. It takes our cognitive activity to form this 
manifold into a determinate object. It follows that such an activity Ð the original sensation Ð is 
responsible for bringing about the object in the first place. Such an activity must be infinite and 
unconditioned, for otherwise it would be conditioned by a further activity, and so on ad infinitum.
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Such an assertion relies on SchellingÕs insistence that spirit is at the ground of all reality, and that 
consequently, consciousness is not something specific to human beings, but arises out of the same 
ground as does nature and all its products. This spirit is originally unbounded, infinite, and 
unformed. The spirit is originally immaterial. This same spirit materialises as it gives rise to when 
giving rise to a reality that is finite, bounded, and formed. As such, spirit, or the immaterial, 
becomes opposed to the material. It follows that Ôonly in the act of production does the spirit 
become aware of its finitudeÕ(ibid., p. 88). This is a key point for SchellingÕs wider philosophy. All 
matter is the result of the equilibrium between two forces, one unlimited, the other limited. Both 
                                                
114 Given this position, Schelling asserts that Ôall acts of the spirit thus aim at presenting the infinite 
within the finite. The goal of all these acts is self-consciousness, and their history is none other than the 
history of self-consciousnessÕ (1994, p. 87). 
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forces are united in the absolute, and both are united in intellectual intuition. However, nothing can 
happen, nothing produced until these forces are reconciled into a determinate form. Upon this, our 
entire existence depends; we are forever trying to replicate, and thereby seek out the eternal ground 
of this producing. As such, Ôthere exists within us a necessary striving to sustain the continuity of 
the representations, that is, an eternal producingÕ(ibid. p. 90). 
We as finite human beings never achieve our goal of finding the ground of our representations. As a 
consequence, our striving is eternal. Philosophy for Schelling is strictly within the domain of the 
eternal. But it must nonetheless account for how the eternal gives over into thing. In other words, 
production must have its origin, whereby it moves from formless eternity into determinate 
formations. Schelling names this the primordial representation. It is with this term that Schelling 
hopes to escape KantÕs problem of explaining the non-conceptual by way of the conceptual. It is 
also this primordial act which first separates the world of sensibility from the world of ideas. 
Schelling credits Kant with the thought that ideas obtain a status wherein they are neither concept, 
nor intuition, yet ground the possibility of both. Whereas for Kant these ideas, limited to the domain 
of reason, remained merely regulative, for Schelling, ideas are actual manifestations of the 
contradictory appearance of the absolute for cognition. Indeed, as will be shown in this chapter, the 
absolute in SchellingÕs view is an idea which realises itself Ñ makes itself real. The vehicle with 
which Schelling aims to account for this self-realising absolute is intellectual intuition. Intellectual 
intuition grounds self-consciousness, for in it consciousness has no object other than itself. Self-
consciousness must issue from intellectual intuition, in which consciousness and that of which is 
consciousness are held in a pre-existing unity.
115
 At this point in SchellingÕs thought, intellectual 
intuition is construed as that by which the absolute is brought to consciousness. It is the subjective 
side of the absolute itself.  
                                                
115 Similar to KantÕs self-affection, except that for Kant self-affection is limited to phenomena, and 
cannot give us insight into the things in themselves. Cf. CPR, B67. 
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To move from the subjective to the objective, Schelling moves from the primordial representation 
to the primordial construction. Schelling borrows the term construction from mathematics, as does 
Kant.
116
 Once again, however, Kant has missed something, according to Schelling. By using 
construction as a way to distinguish philosophy from mathematics, Kant has left the synthesis of 
cognition resting on a primordial dualism (ibid. p 107). Schelling argues that the Ôconstruction from 
oppositesÕthat Kant conducts via the categories of the understanding presupposes this dualism in 
the human spirit which has been Ôelaborated in [KantÕs] practical philosophy although merely 
presuppos[ed]Éin his theoretical philosophyÕ(ibid.). In positing this primordial dualism in KantÕs 
metaphysics, Schelling believes that he has brought Kant to an ultimate Ôduplicity of principlesÕ
which cannot be moved beyond without extending construction to philosophy as well. Where 
intellectual intuition obtains the reality of self-consciousness, the primordial construction is what 
brings about this self-consciousness. The primordial construction, in effect, constructs the self. So 
far, we have reached the level of the self constructing itself. But Schelling has still not accounted 
for how it is that the absolute itself splits from itself so that human consciousness can emerge from 
it. This chapter is headed toward SchellingÕs theory of construction. Before it can arrive there, 
however, the other side of SchellingÕs philosophy Ð the nature-philosophy Ð must be elaborated. I 
therefore draw some conclusions from the preceding in preparation for part two. 
Conclusion 
According to SchellingÕs Treatise, KantÕs critical philosophy is incomplete. However, the Treatise 
does not fully address how it might be possible to complete it. In KantÕs CPR, principles such as the 
unconditioned are not denied, but neither are they affirmed. KantÕs basic reason for this is that he 
believes in the finitude of human beings relative to their ground of possibility in general. To put it 
bluntly, human beings are not capable of knowing what they are in themselves, but only what they 
are as they appear to consciousness.  
                                                
116 Cf. CPR Bxi, B268, B300, A708/B736, A717/ B745, A722/B750, A734/B762. 
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Schelling asserts in the Treatise that the principle of the unconditioned must not only be affirmed, 
but proven. For this proof, intellectual intuition is necessary, the very thing which Kant continually 
denies for human cognition. One can debate the relative status of intellectual intuition in Kant and 
Schelling, and say, for example, that SchellingÕs conception of intellectual intuition simply does not 
refer to the same thing as does KantÕs.
117
 However, at this point such a statement would be 
premature. It remains to be fully seen how SchellingÕs method can account for intellectual intuition 
with the larger context of his identity-philosophy. This is a method in germination, though never 
explicit in the Treatise. It will take SchellingÕs philosophy of nature, and finally, his direct 
explication of identity-philosophy in the Presentations Further Presentations essays to complete 
this larger picture. Firstly, then, I move to the philosophy of nature, which will attempt to show how 
the unconditioned is not merely a thought demanded by reason, but is in fact the principle of 
productivity in nature itself. 
                                                
117 Gram has written an article on precisely this issue, (1981, pp. 287-304). 
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3.2. From Unconditioned Nature to Absolute Identity: SchellingÕs 
Speculative Physics 
Abstract 
That Kant could call his metaphysical critique of reason complete, as he does both the prefaces to 
the CPR, is due to the limits he places upon philosophy.
118
 This results in a limitation of KantÕs idea 
of nature. Nature in Kant is that which appears under certain a priori laws, and the human subject, 
who prescribes these laws to sensible data, determines knowledge of nature. As such, nature is 
limited in KantÕs philosophy to that which can be represented as appearances. Even KantÕs positive 
metaphysics of nature in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786), is conditioned 
by this limitation. The unconditioned, and the question over whether the unconditioned is in any 
sense a part of nature, remain in need of answer. SchellingÕs nature-philosophy attempts such an 
answer, by insisting that the unconditioned is not just a part of nature, but the ground of nature. 
Such an answer requires that nature be understood, not as a product, but as an essential productivity. 
The difference between natureÕs products and natureÕs productivity, as well as their associated 
positions of reflection and speculation, will be elaborated here. SchellingÕs conception of 
speculative physics, which he introduces in 1799, provides the ground for his identity-philosophy, 
with which 3.2 concludes, and 3.3 begins. Despite SchellingÕs evident attacks on KantÕs account of 
nature, I will show how both still share some common aims, and assumptions, albeit in different 
iterations. 
                                                
118 CPR Axiii/Bxxiv. 
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3.2.1. From a Reflective to a Speculative Form of Philosophy 
Schelling persistently expresses dissatisfaction with the dualistic nature of KantÕs philosophy. In 
large part, this has to do with SchellingÕs shift in understanding regarding the concepts of reflection 
and speculation. This shift occurs in quite a subtle way in the SchellingÕs nature-philosophy, which 
I discuss below. In terms of nature-philosophy itself, SchellingÕs aim, through what he views as the 
proper speculative method, is to move beyond the idea of nature as product to the idea of nature as 
productivity. In SchellingÕs view, KantÕs speculative metaphysics is in fact only reflective, by 
which Schelling means, it relies upon an opposition between subject and object. To make this 
move, Schelling revises the meanings of ÔreflectionÕ and ÔspeculationÕ, adapting them for his own 
purposes. As it is clear that Schelling adapts these terms from KantÕs use of them, I will begin by 
briefly summarising what Kant means by them in order to illuminate the comparison. 
In the CPR, Kant defines reflection as Ôthat state of mind in which we first set ourselves to discover 
the subjective conditions under which we are able to arrive at conceptsÕ (B316). For Kant, reflection 
does not concern itself with objects, but rather with Ôthe relation of given representations to our 
different sources of knowledgeÕ (ibid.). Kant argues that there are two modes of reflection for the 
subject: logical and transcendental. Logical reflection is simply an act comparison between 
representations, without considering whether these representations belong to sensibility or to the 
understanding. Transcendental reflection, on the other hand, contains Ôthe ground of the possibility 
of the objective comparison of representations with each otherÕ (B319). The latter form of reflection 
is the one with which Kant is most concerned, as it is this transcendental reflection that determines 
a priori the Òtranscendental locationÓ of concepts, establishing whether a concept belongs either to 
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sensibility or the understanding.
119 
 In short, transcendental reflection according to Kant is the 
subjective determination of concepts, according to which cognitive faculty they belong.
120
 
By speculation, Kant means the theoretical knowledge that can be obtained through reason about 
the structure and unity of experience.
121
 In the CPR, The speculative employment of reason is 
concerned with securing the distinct functions of each of the faculties of cognition, and thereby 
placing firm limits upon what is knowable a priori. Kantian speculation deals with what is 
theoretically knowable a priori. Kantian reflection assigns what is knowable a priori to the 
appropriate cognitive faculties. 
For Schelling, KantÕs use of both reflection and speculation contain what can be seen as a hidden 
subjectivist assumption, namely that they rest upon the distinction between subject and object, or 
between internal consciousness and external nature.
122
 By striving for a systematic unity in the 
structure of cognition only, Schelling believes that Kant has introduced an insuperable separation 
between the human subject and the world. This is unsatisfactory for Schelling, because he believes 
that philosophy ought to be grounded upon a unified foundational principle, one that shows how 
consciousness and nature emerge from identity. According to SchellingÕs nature-philosophy, KantÕs 
transcendental idealist view of nature posits a scenario in which, ultimately, the totality of nature 
                                                
119 The passages I have quoted in this paragraph follow Kant in referring at some points to 
ÔrepresentationsÕ, at others to ÔconceptsÕ. Without wanting to simplify Kant, one could say that concepts 
are a type of representation. 
120 For clarity, I stick to KantÕs definition of reflection in the CPR. Although Kant accords a greater 
role to reflection in the third Critique, extending it to aesthetic and teleological judgments, the basic 
(formal) character of reflection remains the same. 
121 Cf. CPR Bxx-xxi; B383; A471/B499. 
122 Exactly how hidden this assumption is in Kant can of course be debated, but suffice to say here that 
Schelling hones in on the fact that Kant presupposes a subject that cannot be properly grounded, either 
in absolute self-consciousness or absolute nature (here meaning nature as productivity) 
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collapses into the totality of thought, because the totality of nature is held merely as an idea; an idea 
not itself produced by nature. 
So, how does Schelling understand the terms ÔreflectionÕ and ÔspeculationÕ? Matters become 
somewhat complicated here. The reason for this is found in SchellingÕs alterations to the Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature between the first edition of 1797 and the second edition of 1803. In the first 
edition, Schelling conducts a dialectical explanation of the polarity of nature: the dynamic relation 
between opposed forces. With this explanation, Schelling ultimately construes the dynamism of 
nature transcendentally. In other words, like Kant, the Schelling of the first edition of the Ideas 
construes nature according to the possibility of experience of nature.
123
 One implication of this, is 
that the concept of nature is now split into two: nature itself on the one hand, and experience of 
nature on the other. In the first edition of the Ideas, Schelling uses the term ÔspeculationÕ to refer to 
this separation. In the second edition, this has been moderated to ÔreflectionÕ. The following passage 
from the introduction to the Ideas will demonstrate this difference: 
How a world outside us, how a Nature and with it experience, is possible 
Ñ these are questions for which we have philosophy to thank; or rather, 
with these questions philosophy came to beÉAs soon as man sets 
himself in opposition to the external worldÉthe first step to philosophy 
has been taken. With that separation, reflection first begins; he separates 
the object from the intuition, the concept from the image, finally (in that 
he becomes his own object) himself from himself. (1988, p. 10) 
Now, in this passage from the second edition, it is reflection that issues from the separation between 
human subject and nature, but in the first edition this was rendered ÔspeculationÕ. This is an 
important distinction, because it shows how Schelling came to reassess the status of both reflection 
and speculation in the second edition from 1803, in light of his identity-philosophy. According to 
this second edition rendering, KantÕs philosophy, in spite of dealing with a Ôspeculative 
                                                
123 Cf. SternÕs introduction to the Ideas (1988, p. xvi). 
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employment of reasonÕ, ultimately remains stuck in the standpoint of reflection, namely, on the 
assumption of the insuperable division between mind and nature. So, in what does reflection consist 
for Schelling? According to the second edition of the Ideas, it consists in ÔdissectionÕ, not just of the 
Ôphenomenal worldÕ, but also the ÔintellectualÕ. Reflection makes the Ôseparation between man and 
the world permanent, because it treats the latter as a thing in itself, which neither intuition nor 
imagination, neither understanding nor reason, can reachÕ (ibid., p. 11). Reflection for Schelling is, 
then, something of a necessary misstep (the dissection of the unity of man and nature), which has to 
be corrected through speculation (the reunifying of man and nature into identity).
124
 Man must 
alienate himself from nature in order to become properly acquainted with it. 
So far, I have only covered the somewhat ambiguous attitude Schelling displays toward ÔreflectionÕ 
and ÔspeculationÕ, in the change between the first and second edition of the Ideas. I have shown 
simply that Schelling alters his view between 1797 and 1803 in light of his identity-philosophy. The 
identity-philosophy itself is of course still to be elucidated. Stern offers a simple explanation of the 
two editions in his introduction to the Ideas; Ôwhereas in the first edition of the Ideas SchellingÕs 
deduction of the polarity of nature has been purely dialectical Ñ as the transition of one moment 
                                                
124 The following passage from the Ideas can help to clarify this relation between ÔreflectionÕ and 
ÔspeculationÕ in Schelling: Ô[T]he human mind was early led to the idea of a self-organizing matter, and 
because organization is conceivable only in relation to a mind, to an original union of mind and matter 
in these things. It saw itself composed to seek the reason for these things, on the one hand, in Nature 
herself, and on the other, in a principle exalted above Nature; and hence it very soon fell into thinking of 
mind and Nature as one. Here for the first time there emerged from its sacred obscurity that ideal being 
in which the mind supposes concept and deed, design and execution, to be one. Here first a premonition 
came over and of his own nature, in which intuition and concept, form and object, ideal and real, are 
originally one and the same. Hence the peculiar aura which surrounds this problem, an aura which the 
philosophy of mere reflection, which sets out only to separate, can never develop, whereas the pure 
intuition, or rather, the creative imagination, long since discovered the symbolic language, which one 
has only to construe in order to discover that Nature speaks to us the more intelligibly the less with think 
of her in a merely reflective wayÕ (1988, p. 35). 
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into its opposite or other Ñ in the second edition this polarity is conceived as the unfolding into 
difference of an original unityÕ (p. xxi). According to this revised view, duality arises from Ôwithin 
the absolute itselfÕ (ibid.). This matter can be clarified by consulting the supplement to the 
introduction that Schelling wrote for the second edition.
125
 Here, Schelling discusses his nature-
philosophy wholly from the standpoint of identity. So, whereas Schelling had previously stated that 
philosophy begins with the separation of the human subject from the natural world, in the 
supplement Schelling claims that Ôthe first step to philosophy and the condition without which it 
cannot even be entered, is the insight that the absolute-ideal is also the absolute-real, and that 




In this section I have outlined KantÕs use of ÔreflectionÕ and ÔspeculationÕ, and have begun 
elucidating how Schelling adopts and modifies these terms. What exactly Schelling means by 
speculation still remains to be seen however, because, as is clear from the above, SchellingÕs 
thought undergoes some important changes during the years between the first and second editions 
of the Ideas. To grapple with to SchellingÕs speculative philosophy as he begins to formulate it, I 
turn now to another of SchellingÕs works of nature-philosophy, the First Outline of a System of the 
Philosophy of Nature, which Schelling published in 1799. By examining this text, I aim to avoid 
some of the ambiguities presented in the two editions of the Ideas, and elucidate a nature-
philosophy conducted under a specific set of terms which help to anticipate SchellingÕs identity-
philosophy, of which nature is only one component.  
                                                
125 The full title of this supplement is ÔExposition of the General Idea of Philosophy as such, and of the 
Philosophy of Nature in Particular, as a Necessary and Integral Part of itÕ, and can be found in the 1988 
translation of the Ideas, pp. 43-55. The full title gives some idea of SchellingÕs shift in focus between 
1797 and 1803. 
126  It is important not to conflate ÔidealÕ and ÔrealÕ with ÔmindÕ and ÔnatureÕ, because, as will become 
increasingly clear in SchellingÕs work after 1800, both ÔmindÕ and ÔnatureÕ are combinations of the ideal 
and the real. 
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3.2.2. SchellingÕs Speculative Physics 
It has become clear that Schelling wishes to approach nature, not merely as a world of experienced 
phenomena, but as a self-actualising reality. In the First Outline, and the separately issued 
Introduction to the Outline, Schelling introduces his method of speculative physics, which sets out 
to grapple with the productive capacity of nature.
127
 With this method, Schelling aimed to reconcile 
appearing nature Ð that which appears to knowledge as distinct and established natural products Ð 
from unconditioned nature, that is, nature as productive of the whole of itself, including our 
knowledge of it. At issue in SchellingÕs method of speculative physics is the way in which the ideal 
and the real are related. In the Introduction, Schelling claims that human intelligence perceives Ôthe 
most complete fusion of the ideal and the realÕ in products of nature (2004, p. 193). The human 
intelligence perceives the ideal because nature displays a level of self-actualising regularity that 
Schelling denies would be possible from mere material mechanism. It perceives the real because 
this regularity does really manifest in natural objects. Schelling calls this ÔcrystallizationÕ (p. 194). 
SchellingÕs point here is that we everywhere observe natural phenomena which display a level of 
organisation and complexity that seems Ôakin to the consciousÕ, for example the migration patterns 
of animal species. Schelling does not want to claim however, that such regularities are merely 
prescribed by the human intellect. Nature is not to be taken as a reflection of self-consciousness, nor 
simply as Ôthe medium [in which] self-consciousness can take placeÕ (ibid.). To take nature in this 
way is to account for it with the arguments of transcendental philosophy, wherein nature is 
explained for the sake of thought; the real is explained via the ideal. SchellingÕs nature-philosophy, 
                                                
127 The full title is Introduction to the Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, or, On the 
Concept of Speculative Physics and the Internal Organization of a System of this Science. This 
introduction was originally released separately from the First Outline, although both in 1799. The 




as a speculative physics, argues that nature should be thought as Ôindependent and realÕ and as such 
that Ôthe ideal must arise out of the real and admit of explanation from itÕ (ibid.). 
From the above one begins to get a sense of the place nature-philosophy takes up in SchellingÕs 
more general identity-philosophy Ð though he is yet to name the latter in these terms. Here, in the 
Introduction, Schelling simply says that if transcendental philosophy explains the real by the ideal, 
and nature-philosophy the ideal by the real, then Ôthen the two sciences are therefore but one 
science, differentiated only in the opposite orientation of their tasks. Moreover, as the two 
directions are not only equally possible, but equally necessary, the same necessity attaches to both 
in the system of knowledgeÕ (ibid.). 
It is true that KantÕs transcendental idealism can succeed in articulating the unity of the mind via 
speculative reason, but as Kant himself says, Ôall possible speculative knowledge of reason is 
limited to mere objects of experienceÕ (CPR, Bxxvi). For Schelling this accounts only for the formal 
structure of knowledge, or the ideal, but its necessary counterpart, the real, is left in a peculiar 
position. On the one hand, the real is that which can be structured into objects of knowledge by the 
cognitive faculties. The real is appearance. But the real is also that which cannot be so structured, 
namely things-in-themselves or the unconditioned. SchellingÕs next task is therefore to show in 
what way the unconditioned can be predicated of nature. 
3.2.3. The Unconditioned in Nature 
As early as 1795, Schelling recognises the need to solve the demand of reason for the 
unconditioned. In his essay Of the I as a Principle of Philosophy, Schelling claims that Ôtheoretical 
reason necessarily seeks what is not conditioned; having formed the idea of the unconditioned, and, 
as theoretical reason, being unable to realize the unconditioned, it therefore demands the act 
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through which it ought to be realizedÕ (1980, p. 167, original emphasis).
128
 In Of the I, this act is 
taken to be the unconditioned activity of the ego, or absolute I. While Schelling later revises his 
view of this unconditioned activity, what is retained in the nature-philosophy is the collapse of 
theoretical into practical reason.
129
 
As I showed in chapter one, the unconditioned for Kant issues from a demand of reason. Reason 
demands totality, and the unconditioned emerges as an idea of reason which fulfils this demand. As 
an idea, however, the unconditioned has no real substantive role to play in experience, and hence no 
role in knowledge. Kant insists that it is to be construed as Ôreal per seÕ, but Ônot known by usÕ 
(CPR B xx). The unconditioned can, nevertheless, be an object of striving, but only for practical, 
never for theoretical reason. For Kant, then, positing the reality of the unconditioned transcends the 
limits of our cognitive powers; since the unconditioned cannot be an object of experience, it can at 
most be a regulative idea. For Schelling too, the unconditioned does not appear in experience. 
However, this does not mean that nothing can be known about it. 
Schelling begins the First Outline with a section entitled ÔThe Unconditioned in NatureÕ. Here 
Schelling defines the unconditioned in the following way: 
                                                
128 MartiÕs translation of this passage renders it a little unclear, but it can be clarified with reference to 
a passage shortly before, in which Schelling directly addresses the Ôcritique of the cognitive facultyÕ Ð a 
thinly veiled reference to Kant. Here Schelling remarks that such a critique must necessarily seek both 
the formal and material principles of synthesis. Rather than deducing both from a common principle, 
Schelling claims that Kant has merely Ôexplain[ed] the progress of one synthesis by that of the otherÕ 
(1980, p. 166). KantÕs critique of cognition, according to Schelling, Ômust admit that theoretical reason 
necessarily seeks what is not conditioned, and that the very striving which produces a synthesis 
demands an absolute synthesis as goal of all philosophy. And, for this very reason, the critique must 
destroy what it only just erectedÕ (ibid.). It can be debated how fair SchellingÕs characterization of Kant 
is here, especially considering KantÕs recognition of the problematic nature of the unconditioned in the 
CPR. Cf. above 1.1.5. 
129 Cf. Peterson, 2004, pp. xiii-xviii. 
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The unconditioned cannot be sought in any individual ÒthingÓ nor in 
anything of which one can say that it ÒisÓ. For what ÒisÓ only partakes of 
being, and is only an individual form or kind of being. Conversely, one 
can never say of the unconditioned that it ÒisÓ. For it is being itself, and 
as such, it does not exhibit itself entirely in any finite product, and every 
individual is, as it were, a particular expression of it. (2004, p. 13) 
SchellingÕs aim here to show how the principle of the unconditioned as it pertains to transcendental 
philosophy, must also pertain to natural science. In the case of nature-philosophy, the unconditioned 
becomes the ground of productive activity in nature analogously to how it grounds human 
knowledge. However, in both cases, Schelling distinguishes his idea of the unconditioned from 
KantÕs by claiming that it is not merely a regulative idea guiding experience, but rather an activity. 
The unconditioned in nature Ôcannot be sought in any individual object; rather a principle of being, 
that itself ÒisÓ not, manifests in each natural objectÕ (ibid.). This requires some elucidation. In line 
with the distinction between reflection and speculation discussed above, Schelling is here making 
the distinction between that which appears, and the principle which makes possible that which 
appears. This is, in other words, the distinction between product and productivity. Schelling does 
not mask the fact that he carries over this distinction from transcendental philosophy. In both cases 
Ð the transcendental and the natural Ð everything that exists is Ôa construction of spiritÕ.
130
 So, if 
being itself is construed, not as a particular and therefore conditioned being, but rather as Ôthe 
constructing itselfÕ, then nature produces itself in the same way as the self produces itself, namely, 
through an unconditioned activity. 
This is where a shift of perspective becomes necessary. If nature were both an unconditioned 
productivity, and the sum of all that it produces, then it would be tempting to view the former as 
being exhausted by the latter. In this case, nature is simply everything that is, or the Ôsum total of 
existenceÕ (ibid., p. 14). However, this view of nature treats it as an object; something already 
determined. Whether nature is so determined by itself or by the human subject is irrelevant. The 
                                                
130 I discuss SchellingÕs concept of spirit in 3.1.5 and 3.1.6. 
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point is that approaching nature in this way neglects the productive power inherent in nature, which 
is inexhaustible; it is never used up in any of its products. Nature considered as object is nature 
considered as conditioned. If being itself is construed as absolute activity, then an individual being 
(of nature) must be understood as a determinate form or ÔlimitationÕ of that originary activity. There 
is therefore no Ôoriginary substratumÕ of being that might be described by the notion of substance, 
because this substance itself arises out of an activity which is never wholly exhausted in any 
product or sum of products (ibid.). 
According to the view prescribed by speculative physics, nature must be considered as the identity 
of productivity and product. To elaborate on this relationship, Schelling re-introduces the relation of 
subject and object, not as an opposition, but as two ways of conceiving the same thing. Nature 
considered as product, is nature as object. Nature considered as productivity, is nature as subject. It 
is the latter of these with which Schelling is concerned. Again, this is not to say that nature is not 
objective, or made in some sense of objects. It is simply to say that understand nature merely as 
objective is to miss the vital idea that nature constitutes itself as object. The question of speculative 
physics is not how we know natural phenomena, but how we know nature as productive of these 
phenomena. There is no division in SchellingÕs nature-philosophy between appearances and things-
in-themselves; there is only a division between productivity and product.  This is because Schelling 
is not concerned with experience of nature, which would then require a distinction between what 
one can and cannot experience. Rather SchellingÕs nature-philosophy, considered as speculative 
physics, attempts to construct an understanding of nature as pure productivity, and appearances of 
nature as products which simultaneously always give over into that original productivity. If the 
unconditioned must remain a regulative idea in KantÕs philosophy, then only its formal side may be 
determinable. The unconditioned is an idea which allows the subject to hold their knowledge as a 
unity. However, the reality of this unconditioned remains undetermined, and indeed indeterminable 
for Kant, hence his doctrine of things-in-themselves. It is not so much that Schelling seeks to 
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overturn KantÕs way of thinking completely in this regard. Rather Schelling wishes to extend it. In 
his introduction to the First Outline, Peterson explains this: 
If theoretical reason necessarily seeks the unconditioned (as Kant also 
held), then it must also admit that the endeavour which produces a 
synthesis in each act of knowing, a reunion of subject and object, 
ultimately demands the affirmation of such a unity as principle. That is, 
this endeavour is the symptom of a desire to achieve a state in which 
synthesis is no longer necessary. (2004, p. xvi) 
In KantÕs view, such a unity could only be held as a regulative idea of reason, a unity toward which 
the understanding strives. For Schelling, KantÕs error in this regard was to attempt to ascend from 
intuition, to understanding, to reason, and hence from conditioned experience to the unconditioned 
idea. Schelling instead asks how the opposite is possible, namely how a finite empirical exhibition 
of nature is possible from out of its unconditioned activity. In other words, how is the infinite 
exhibited in the finite? Now, since the truly infinite cannot be empirically exhibited, it can only 
manifest through Ôa finitude which is never completeÕ, which Schelling calls the Ôempirically 
infiniteÕ (ibid., p. 15). However, such an empirical infinity can only be exhibited successively, i.e. 
in a continuous series. For a continuous empirical series to be capable of presentation, it must 
already be occurring in time and space. But the originally infinite, i.e. the unconditioned activity of 
nature, is, in SchellingÕs view, the activity out of which time and space are themselves originally 
constituted. The empirically infinite cannot reach the truly infinite since the former relies upon a 
structure that is established by the latter. So, Schelling concludes that Ôthe genuine concept of an 
empirical infinite is the concept of an activity that is infinitely inhibitedÕ (ibid., p.16). 
If an activity is infinitely inhibited, how can it still be thought of as active? SchellingÕs answer to 
this relies on his claims that Ônature is its own legislatorÕ, and consequently that what happens in 
nature must be explained Ôfrom the active and motive principles which lie in itÕ; in other words, 
nature is sufficient for its own explanation. So, how can an infinite activity be infinitely inhibited, 
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and yet still active? Schelling here calls on KantÕs conception of repulsive and attractive forces. 
Schelling characterises the repulsive as that which is Ôoriginally infiniteÕ and streaming out in all 
directions from one central pointÕ (p. 17). Such a force would, on its own, not occupy space, since , 
for something to occupy space requires that it be limited in some way, i.e. limited to a position in 
space. Hence Schelling calls the attractive force Ôan energetic activity opposing (retarding)Õ the 
expansive force of repulsion, and giving it a Ôfinite velocityÕ (ibid.). The problem that then emerges 
is that if these forces coincide in the same point, then Ôtheir effects toward one another will 
reciprocally be cancelledÕ (ibid.) and the product of this coinciding will be = to 0. SchellingÕs 
solution to this is the claim that Ôno product in nature can be the product in which those opposed 
activities absolutely coincideÕ (ibid.). In other words, nature is never at rest. There is never any 
permanence in nature, only an apparent permanence in nature viewed as objects. The activity of 
nature as subject Ôcontinues irresistibly, andÉcontinually labours in opposition to all permanenceÕ 
(ibid.).  
Nature for Schelling acts in the dynamic flux between productivity and product, the latter of which 
is only a temporary instantiations of the former. KantÕs description of repulsive and attractive force 
explains the mechanism by which this flux is possible, but not why it is that it is precisely a flux, i.e. 
why these forces never resolve themselves. One can summarise by saying that Kant seeks to explain 
the permanent by way of alteration, in such a way that the former grounds the latter. Schelling seeks 
to explain the alterable by way of the permanent, insofar as the former is the unconditioned 
productive force of the latter, which is conditioned i.e. objective. 
According to Schelling, to treat nature reflectively means to oppose nature as object to oneself as 
subject. Instead, Schelling treats nature as a subject which is its own object Ñ the self-legislation of 
nature mentioned above. Hence, Schelling writes in the Ideas that Ôwhat we want is not that Nature 
should coincide with the laws of our mind by chance (as if through some third intermediary), but 
that she herself, necessarily and originally, should not only express, but even realize, the laws of our 
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mind, and that she is, and is called, Nature only insofar as she does soÕ (ibid. pp. 41-2). Compare 
this passage with the following from KantÕs CPR: 
The highest formal unity, which rests solely on concepts of reason, is the 
purposive unity of things. The speculative interest of reason makes it 
necessary to regard all order in the world as if it had originated in the 
purpose of a supreme reason. (A687/B715) 
The discovered absence of any such Ôteleological connectionÕ in a product of nature for Kant, does 
not affect Ôthe teleological law itselfÕ, because all that has been discovered is that a particular 
natural phenomenon can be accounted for by mechanical explanation. If, therefore the anatomist is 
Ôconvicted of error when he assigns to some member of an animal body an end which it can be 
clearly shown not to subserveÕ it still remains Ôquite impossible to prove in any given case that an 
arrangement of nature, be it what it may, subserves no end whatsoeverÕ (A688/B716). Quite simply, 
the fact that ideas such as purposiveness have only this regulative use in Kantian reason, is 
insufficient for Schelling. This is to relegate purposiveness to the ideal, and Schelling wishes to 
show how it is also real.  
3.2.4. From Unconditioned Nature to Absolute Identity 
As I have mentioned, Schelling comes to see his nature-philosophy as only one aspect of his 
broader identity-philosophy. However, he does so retrospectively. In the above, I have shown how 
Schelling seeks to demonstrate the unconditioned activity of nature, and so extend nature itself 
beyond KantÕs conception, which Schelling took to be overly mechanical. This comes with the 
caveat that Kant and Schelling approach nature from two different perspectives. Kant is concerned 
with nature considered as experience of nature. For Kant, explaining the possibility of synthetic a 
priori knowledge is to explain the possibility of the laws of nature. It is via these laws that we come 
to know nature objectively. In SchellingÕs nature-philosophy, the need to account for knowledge of 
nature evaporates, as he is concerned more with how nature itself is productive of our knowledge of 
it. Schelling treats nature as subjective.  
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One difficultly in approaching SchellingÕs treatment of nature as subjective is his modulation of the 
terms ÔreflectionÕ and ÔspeculationÕ. I have attempted to clarify this matter by discussing how both 
Kant and Schelling understand the terms ÔreflectionÕ and ÔspeculationÕ. I have elucidated this 
distinction by showing how Schelling differentiates his position from Kant. I have appealed to the 
idea that Schelling wishes for philosophy, nature-philosophy included, to issue from the 
unconditioned, rather than ascend towards it. In essence, I have shown how Schelling constructs his 
idea of nature as a self-constitutive unity. However, as I have also mentioned, one consequence of 
SchellingÕs development towards the identity-philosophy is that the nature-philosophy comes to be 
viewed only as one aspect of something larger. Nature is a unity that is in turn encompassed by a 
more general unity, namely, the absolute. To complete my account of SchellingÕs metaphysics, 
therefore, I move on to an account of the identity-philosophy proper, as well as the method that 
arises from it, philosophical construction. 
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3.3. SchellingÕs Construction of Absolute Identity 
Abstract 
This section once again addresses the question of how the absolute can be articulated. As 
SchellingÕs thought progressed, his once reverent endorsement of intellectual intuition was toned 
down, and construction began to play an increasingly important role. Nonetheless, it would be a 
mistake to say that construction replaces intellectual intuition. Instead, SchellingÕs theory of 
construction attempts to account not just for how the absolute can be intuited (i.e. how it can be 
thought) but how it can be posited. This distinction can be thought of via two statements that 
Schelling endorses. First, everything is absolute. Second, the absolute comes already formed. In this 
section I will explore the meaning of these two statements, and the way in which they combine in 
SchellingÕs theory of construction. Construction first appears in SchellingÕs System of 
Transcendental Idealism (1800), and is described there as an imitation of what he calls the Ôfirst 
cognitionÕ. However, significant advances on this initial concept are made as Schelling develops the 
concept of construction in two subsequent texts, the Further Presentations from the System of 
Philosophy (1802), and On Construction in Philosophy (1803). These texts are therefore my main 
focus. In order to show the significance of the identity-philosophy on SchellingÕs thought, I begin 
by comparing SchellingÕs early conception of intellectual intuition with its articulation in identity-
philosophy. I conclude by arguing that SchellingÕs theory of construction prepares the way for his 









3.3.1. The Method of Identity-philosophy 
In his Further Presentations of the System of Philosophy from 1802, Schelling attempts to defend 
his identity-philosophy by elucidating its methodology.  He writes, 
The essence of the absolute in and for itself says nothing to us; it fills us 
with images of an infinite enclosure, of an impenetrable stillness, and 
concealment, the way the oldest forms of philosophy pictured the state of 
the universe before He who is life stepped forth in his own shape in the 
act of his self-intuitive cognition. This eternal form, equal to the absolute 
itself, is the day in which we comprehend that night and the wonders 
hidden in it, the light in which we clearly discern the absolute, the eternal 
mediator, the all-seeing and all-disclosing eye of the world, the source of 
all wisdom and cognition. (2001b, p. 392) 
The problem that emerges from this is how to account for the fact that this enclosed and 
impenetrable absolute comes to manifest itself. It is this problem with which Schelling appears to 
struggle the most. In her book on early German Romantic and Schellingian theories of the absolute, 
Nassar points this out. She writes that towards the end of 1800, ÔSchelling came to realise that the 
absolute Ñ as absolute Ñ cannot be presented or mediated through any thingÕ (2013, p. 227). 
Nassar is here referring to the shift that occurs between SchellingÕs System of Transcendental 
Idealism (1800)
131
 and the identity-philosophy as articulated in the Presentation and Further 
Presentations of 1801 and 1802. In the STI, Schelling claims that it is the work of art that can best 
present the identity of subject and object, or of ideal and real. In short, the work of art is the utmost 
expression of the absolute. I dwell on this conclusion to the STI momentarily, in order to show the 
move to identity-philosophy that is necessitated by it. 
In the STI, intellectual intuition is the vehicle with which consciousness can present the Ôidentity of 
the conscious and the unconscious in the selfÕ (STI, 1978, p. 219). Consciousness, because it 
emerges from the absolute, undergoes the same polarising dynamic as nature, that is, consciousness 
                                                
131 Hereafter STI 
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splits into subject and object. However, the ultimate recognition of the identity from which subject 
and object are originally posited, comes with the consequence that puts this dynamic polarisation to 
rest, the end result being that Ôthe feeling accompanying this [intellectual] intuition will be that of 
an infinite tranquillityÕ (ibid., p. 221). In other words, intellectual intuition in the STI results in a 
reuniting of subject and object, conscious and unconscious into an Ôunexpected harmonyÕ, which 
the self comes to realise is nothing but the absolute which originally contains this harmony. In 
short, the self has come back to the place whence it begun. This presents a threat to the dynamism 
Schelling requires, lest his absolute be a mere static monism. Something must additionally be 
produced out of this harmony. This additional something, which holds the identity of subject and 
object in an object, is the work of art. The output of intellectual intuition is therefore aesthetic 
intuition. SchellingÕs philosophy of art is the subject of the next chapter. For now, I will only draw 
on a problem that Nassar identifies with SchellingÕs claim that the identity of the absolute is 
resolved in aesthetic intuition. 
The problem with the work of art presenting absolute identity is that, in so doing, absolute identity 
has been transported into an object. So, while the work of art is the product of a self-conscious 
being, and therefore of aesthetic intuition, it is not itself such a being. Nassar claims that, because of 
this, the work of art remains Ôdistinct from the self, such that aesthetic intuition is not intuition of 
the original identity Òin the selfÓ, but rather, Òin the work of artÓÕ (2014, pp. 226-7). If the intuition 
of the ultimate identity of the absolute has been transported into an objective product Ð a work of art 
Ð then to what extent can one be said to have knowledge of the absolute at all? SchellingÕs solution 
in the Presentation and Further Presentations is to reconstruct his view of intellectual intuition 
posited in the early Of the I essay, but with an additional requirement. As Schelling puts it in the 
Presentation, to arrive at the thought of the absolute, Ôone must abstract from what does the 
thinkingÕ (2001a, p. 349). This is a curious statement, but when considering the impasse at which 
Schelling arrived at the conclusion of the STI Ð that the presentation of the absolute could be 
attained in the work of art, which, as object, still retained the opposition between subject and object 
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Ð it becomes somewhat clearer what Schelling intends in the identity-philosophy. Schelling intends 
to show how the absolute can be presented in a way that frees it entirely from either subject or 
object. In other words, Schelling attempts to present the absolute in itself. 
While intellectual intuition certainly does not disappear from SchellingÕs identity-philosophy, it 
does, as already mentioned, undergo some changes. To grasp these changes I turn now to a brief 
overview of SchellingÕs conception of intellectual intuition from when it first appeared in the Of the 
I essay. 
3.3.2. The Plant in the Plant: SchellingÕs Conception of Intellectual Intuition 
In his 1795 essay, Of the I as the Principle of Philosophy, Schelling first mentions intellectual 
intuition.
132
 Still heavily under the influence of FichteÕs philosophy, SchellingÕs defence of 
intellectual intuition in Of the I is formulated exclusively in order to articulate the unconditioned 
ground of the I, or absolute-I.
133
 In a similar manner to KantÕs in the preface of the CPR, Schelling 
develops his position out of the need for an unconditioned principle for philosophy:  
                                                
132 Both Of the I and SchellingÕs first publication On the Possibly of a Form of All Philosophy, which I 
mention in the footnote below, are translated in Fritz MartiÕs volume The Unconditional in Human 
Knowledge: Four Early Essays (1794-1796) (1980). I take all references to both essays from that 
volume. 
133 SchellingÕs first publication, On the possibility of a form of all philosophy, appeared in 1794. While 
this essay also tackles the issue of an unconditioned ground for philosophy, adopted from both Kant and 
Fichte, it does not yet land on the claim that this ground can be determined through intellectual intuition. 
Instead On the possibility construes the unconditioned as an Ôultimate axiomÕ, which determines both 
the form and content of philosophy. Schelling claims that this ultimate axiom can only be Ôthe originally 
self-posited IÕ (1980, p. 45).  
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As soon as philosophy begins to be a science, it must at least assume an 




SchellingÕs goal in Of the I is to prove the reality of this assumption about an ultimate principle, and 
to demonstrate what that principle is. I will outline SchellingÕs argument for intellectual intuition in 
Of the I, and then present some objections to it, which show why it is untenable. Indeed, Schelling 
came to this same conclusion, and adapts his conception of intellectual intuition during the period of 
his identity-philosophy. 
In the preface to Of the I, Schelling remarks that Ôthe unity of consciousnessÕ requires a grounding 
in higher principles, principles which Schelling believes that Kant presupposed in the CPR. For 
example, Kant deduces the categories according to the table of logical functions of judgment, but he 
does not establish the latter according to any principle (ibid., p. 65). In SchellingÕs view, Kant 
presupposes this higher principle but does not address it. The reasons for this will become clear.  
Schelling goes on to claim that this higher principle can be nothing other than the unity of 
consciousness, understood as Ôthe synthesis of multiplicity into unity as suchÕ, and furthermore, this 
unity of consciousness can only be understood according to a Ôsuperior absolute unityÕ. In other 
words, the unity of consciousness cannot simply accompany oneÕs judgments, it must determine 
them from an absolute principle.
135
 This principle is the absolute I.   
Schelling opens the Of the I essay proper by reiterating the need for this principle: 
Either our knowledge has no reality at all and must be an eternal round of 
propositions, each dissolving into its opposite, a chaos in which no 
element can crystallize - or else there must be an ultimate point of reality 
                                                
134  Cf. Kant, CPR, Bxx. The difference of course is that Kant admitted the necessity of an 
unconditioned, but not knowledge of the unconditioned. For Schelling, as will become clear, such an 
unconditioned is not merely an element of knowledge but is that from which all knowledge emerges. 
135 KantÕs remark that the ÔI thinkÕ must accompany all representations of a subject appears in ¤16 of 
the Transcendental Deduction (B131). 
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on which everything depends, from which all firmness and all forms of 
our knowledge spring, a point which sunders the elements, and which 
circumscribes for each of them the circle of its continuous effect in the 
universe of knowledge. (1980, p. 71) 
This problem of an epistemological regress is not just present in SchellingÕs critique of Kant, but 
can also be found in the contemporary debate between coherentists and foundationalists. 
Foundationalist theories of non-doxastic sources of belief are justifiably open to skepticism as to the 
grounds upon which such sources can be justified. Coherentists face the objections that the internal 
coherence of a system does not guarantee the validity of its principles.
136
 Schelling certainly sounds 
like a foundationalist when he calls on the need for Ôknowledge which I do not reach by way of 
some other knowledge, but through which alone all other knowledge is knowledgeÕ (ibid.). 
However, matters are not so simple. The principle that Schelling seeks does not merely ground 
knowledge; it must be the Ôoriginal ground (Urgrund) of all realityÕ. Here one already begins to see 
anticipations of SchellingÕs theory of construction, as he follows this by claiming that the Ôassertion 
[of the ground of human knowledge] must be contained in its thought; it must create itself through 
its being thoughtÕ (ibid., p. 72). According to this definition, the Urgrund of reality does not just 
justify our knowledge claims about reality, but creates that reality. Furthermore, the determination 
of reality as such, or, the fact that we can refer to reality as really being, is coextensive with its 
creation. It is due to this characterisation that Schelling claims the only candidate for the Urgrund, 
for the unconditioned in human knowledge, is the absolute I. 
Now, The absolute I cannot be a concept because it would then be only a possible object, and 
Schelling is firm in denying the I is an object at all, since it is the very thing responsible for positing 
objects as opposed to itself. If the I were a concept then it would require Ôsomething higher in which 
                                                
136 Utilising SchellingÕs philosophy to contribute to the foundationalism/coherentism debate is surely a 
valuable exercise, though unfortunately one beyond the remit of this thesis. I mention it here only to 
advocate for SchellingÕs continued relevance in contemporary philosophy. For an overview of the 
foundationalism/coherentism debate, see Audi, 1988, pp. 407-442 
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it could find its unityÕ, and also, Ôsomething lower which would furnish its multiplicityÕ (ibid., p. 
85). The I must be self-positing. In other words, it must rely neither on a more fundamental unity 
for its possibility, nor on an empirical content to furnish its reality. Instead, both its fundamental 
unity and its reality must be contained with itself. Since the I cannot be a concept, because, if it 
were, this would make it a subject reliant upon an object against which to posit itself, Schelling 
concludes that the I can only be determined in an intuition. Since the I cannot be an object, because 
it is the source of the division of subject and object, this intuition cannot be a sensible intuition. The 
I can only be determined Ôin an intuition which grasps on object at all and is in no way a sensation, 
in short, and intellectual intuitionÕ (1980, p. 85)  
Schelling retains KantÕs distinction between sensible and intellectual in intuition from the CPR. So, 
Schelling writes the following, ÔWhere there is an object there is sensuous intuition, and vice versa. 
Where there is no object, that is, in the absolute I, there is no sense intuition, therefore either no 
intuition at all or else intellectual intuition. Therefore the I is determined for itself as mere I in 
intellectual intuitionÕ (p. 85, translatorÕs emphasis). What is curious about this argument is that we 
arrive at the claim that we have intellectual intuition via an inference. If we really had intellectual 
intuition, we should be able to tell so directly. There should not be anything to debate here, as it 
would be the most evident thing. But it does not seem to be so.
137
 Indeed, this is one of the 
weaknesses of SchellingÕs early conception of intellectual intuition. Schelling does acknowledge 
Ôthat Kant denied all intellectual intuitionÕ, but for the former this is only a result of the context in 
which KantÕs philosophy operates. Schelling claims that KantÕs critical philosophy Ôonly 
presupposes the absolute I at every step and which, on the basis of presupposed higher principles, 
determines only the empirically conditioned I and the not-I in its synthesis with that IÕ (ibid.). What 
is important in this conception of intellectual intuition, is that it determines the I as such, and not 
any individual or empirical I. This requires some clarification. Schelling writes, Ôsince the subject is 
                                                
137 A contemporary parallel here would be the alleged existence of qualia. 
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thinkable only in regard to an object, and the object only in regard to a subject, neither of them can 
contain the uncondition[ed] because both are conditioned reciprocallyÕ (ibid., p. 74). Now we are 
confronted with the problem of how to think this absolute that intellectual intuition is supposed to 
access. How can we think something that is not a thing, i.e. the absolute? This is the problem 
Schelling faces in Of the I, and he fails to definitely connect the absolute I to the individual I. 
Schelling claims that intellectual intuition is of a completely different kind to sensible intuition, but 
does not elucidate this difference. As a result, the absolute, taken as an absolute I, remains closed 
off from consciousness. The intellectual intuition which determines the absolute I as absolute, does 
not take place in consciousness at all, Ôsince consciousness presupposes an objectÕ. Intellectual 
intuition is possible Ôonly insofar as it has no objectÕ (ibid., p. 85) 
Before raising some objections to SchellingÕs argument, it is worth summarising what has been said 
so far. Schelling claims that intellectual intuition determines the I as the absolute ground of all 
reality. Intellectual intuition is therefore only possible if it is neither subjective nor objective.  
In his book on SchellingÕs nature-philosophy, Esposito rightly points out that there is a problem of 
connection between the absolute I and the actual or empirical I. He writes, ÔifÉunity is an essential 
component of a self, then the finite and absolute selves are really one self; and if so, how are these 
selves to be related?Õ (1977, p. 40). This is a question to which Schelling, at least within Of the I, 
does not have an answer. Indeed, Schelling claims that Ôthe absolute I never steps outside of itselfÕ 
(1980, p. 110). If this is the case, Esposito asks, then Ôof what use is the finite self to the absolute?Õ 
(1977, p. 40). And again, the answer would seem to be that the finite self is not really of any use to 
Schelling at this point. The ÒascentÓ that intellectual intuition seems to provide in Of the I, from the 
merely finite, through the infinite, into the sphere of Ôabsolute beingÕ, takes the human subject to a 
realm in which it no longer recognises itself as a subject at all.  
Reducing the absolute to the I, and intellectual intuition to the determination of the I as absolute, 
was ultimately overly restrictive on SchellingÕs part. As such, Schelling adjusts his conception of 
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intellectual intuition in his Presentation and Further Presentations.
138
 In these texts, identity is 
expressed via the opposition between universal and particular. Much the same as reflective 
judgment in KantÕs third Critique, in the Further Presentations Schelling argues that intellectual 
intuition is the ability to see the universal in the particular. This does not involve a process of 
abstraction or transcendental deduction; rather it is a direct and immediate experience of the identity 
between universal and particular. Schelling gives the example of a plant. When the anatomist 
dissects a plant to study it, he sees both the plant itself, as a particular of a certain species, as the 
concept ÒplantÓ etc. But he sees this via and within the individual plant body he happens to be 
dissecting. So, Ôto see the plant in the plant, the organ in the organism, in a word to see the concept 
or indifference within the difference is possible only through intellectual intuitionÕ (2001b, p. 377). 
Once again, a familiar problem emerges. Let us suppose that intellectual intuition can see the 
ultimate indifference that grounds difference. What is to be done with this insight, which, as already 
mentioned, has no object toward which it can direct itself? Indeed, to where is philosophy supposed 
to progress from this intellectual intuition? As Schelling's identity-philosophy is concerned not just 
with thinking but with postulating the unity of the absolute, it becomes clear that intellectual 
intuition does not suffice. Even in its revised form in the identity-philosophy, intellectual intuition 
suffers from the same problem as it does in the STI, wherein it must be converted into aesthetic 
intuition in order to be productive. Intellectual intuition must be productive of something. However, 
unlike the work of art, which is produced by the particular capacities of the artistic genius, 
intellectual intuition in the identity-philosophy must admit of a universality that moves beyond the 
opposition of the artistic subject (the genius) and the artistic object. It is SchellingÕs intention to 
show the way in which consciousness can and must be united with nature in the absolute, and how 
                                                
138 These essays appeared in the second and third issues of the Journal of Speculative Physics, which 
Schelling started 1800, arguably as a way of presenting his newly constructed system of identity-
philosophy, though Schelling insists in the Presentation that he was forced to release this system 
prematurely (2001a, p. 33). 
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philosophy can present this unity. The key word here is ÔpresentÕ. The identity-philosophy must 
present the absolute, not prove it or argue for its validity. To formulate proofs is to rest upon the 
separation between the proof itself and that which it proves. As Schelling repeatedly asserts, 
philosophy must as little suffer from burdens of explanation as mathematics.
139
 For example, in 
presenting a triangle, the mathematician does not need to provide extra explanation as to why the 
sum of the angles in a triangle is equal to two right angles. This truth is contained in the triangle 
itself. To present the identity of the absolute, Schelling requires something more than intellectual 
intuition. This is the method of construction, proposed first in the Further Presentations, and 
defended in the 1803 essay On Construction in Philosophy. It is to these texts that I now turn. 
3.3.3. Constructing the Absolute  
In his Further Presentations, Schelling takes as his starting point the actuality and necessity of 
intellectual intuition. Intellectual intuition must be Ôsimply and without restriction presupposedÕ
(2001b, p. 376). Intellectual intuition is the capacity to Ôsee the universal in the particular, the 
infinite in the finite, the two combined into a living unityÕ (ibid.). In the Construction essay, 
SchellingÕs task is to show not just how this living unity is ÒseenÓ, or recognised as such, but how it 
is enacted. For Schelling, only this step is missing Kant, because the latter did not allow for 
philosophical, but only mathematical construction. Kant can only conceive, but not construct, the 
absolute, and Schelling sees as a shortcoming of the critical philosophy. This can be taken as 
SchellingÕs ultimate aim, to move beyond the limits of criticism, and demonstrate the possibility of 
cognition of the absolute. His method for doing so begins with the way in which Schelling 
characterises the absolute itself, namely, as absolute cognition. What does it mean to cognise the 
absolute?  It means precisely the absolute itself; the cognition of the absolute and the absolute itself 
                                                
139 Schelling defends this idea in the Construction essay (2008, pp. 274-6) and in the Supplement 
(1988, p. 53) 
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are the same, because, as Schelling claims, the nature of the absolute is in itself is absolute 
cognition. 
To call the absolute a form of cognition is one thing. To ground a philosophy in this absolute 
cognition is quite another, and is fraught with its own difficulties. Schelling tackles these 
difficulties head on in a section of the Further Presentations entitled ÔOn Philosophical 
Construction, or the Way to Exhibit all Things in the AbsoluteÕ. This full title is important, because 
it points out the difference between intellectual intuition, and construction. The former merely 
recognises the absolute as absolute, the latter postulates this absolute. How is such a postulation of 
the absolute possible? As Schelling points out, it is hard to see Ôhow we can see so clearly into the 
absolute that we can ground a science in itÕ, as well as how such a science can be drawn from Ôthe 
simply identical and thoroughly simple essence of the absoluteÕ (ibid., p. 385). There are two 
obstacles to be overcome here. Firstly, if the absolute is essentially simple and identical, how is one 
supposed to distinguish between the absolute itself and what is demonstrated or produced out of it? 
Secondly, how can one even demonstrate the absolute at all, given that it is a single unconditioned 
unity, and that through which it is demonstrated is a conditioned multiplicity?  Schelling accepts 
this distinction between unity and multiplicity, but once again, this is only one perspective. If 
everyday cognition is bound by the condition of dualism, then the aim is not to dissolve the 
distinction, but to present its indifference. In order to do this Schelling adjusts the distinction with 
the following mission statement:  
What is proved, which we assume is ever the same, is the absolute unity 
of the finite and the infinite; for the present purpose I call it the universal. 
That in which it is proved is determinate unity, and is accordingly called 
the particular. To demonstrate the indifference between the universal and 
particular is to enact a philosophical construction; when this indifference 
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is shown to be itself an absolute indifference, the construction is an 
absolute one. (Further Presentations, 2001b, pp. 385-6)
140
 
This characterisation of construction contains within it some important caveats, Firstly, 
constructions are productive (Whistler, 2013, p. 118). More than this, constructions are 
performative. What does this mean exactly? Schelling adopts the geometrical conception of 
construction. The geometer Ôexhibits the reality of the figures he is using in his workÕ(ibid.). He 
does not produce something and then attempt to prove its validity afterwards. Rather, the production 
is the proof; the two are identical. Constructions are productive to the extent that they Ôenact the 
construction they describeÕ (ibid., p. 119). Whistler lays out the essential components of 
construction, and it is already obvious from his reading that construction is a difficult matter to 
tackle, first and foremost because it claims that its only burden of proof is its existence. How are we 
then to go about deciding on the validity of construction as a method at all? In what follows I will 
assess what answers Schelling offers to this question, first in relation to his move beyond Kant in 
the Construction essay, and later in the matter of universal and particular already mentioned.  
3.3.4. Beyond Kantian Construction 
In the Construction essay, Schelling acknowledges that Kant is Ôperhaps the first to grasp the 
universal concept of construction deeply and truly philosophically.Õ (p. 273) Schelling follows 
KantÕs description of construction as the identification of concept and intuition, for which a non-
empirical intuition must be provided.
141
 The key feature of construction for Schelling is that it 
enables a concept to be expressed Ôwithout compromising its universalityÕ (ibid.). This is exactly 
                                                
140 The German word ÔGleichgltigkeitÕ, rendered here as ÔindifferenceÕ, can also mean in older 
German Ôof the same value/validityÕ, or ÔequivalentÕ. SchellingÕs own use of the term develops out of 
his nature-philosophy, in particular the study of magnetism. In this case, ÔindifferenceÕ refers to the 
neutral point of a magnet that is dominated by neither pole. I interpret Schelling as employing this 
meaning of indifference, and read it as such throughout this chapter and chapter four. 
141 Kant phrases it in the following way in the CPR: Ôto construct a concept means to exhibit a priori 
the intuition which corresponds to the conceptÕ(A713/B741). 
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what the above passage from the Further Presentations aims to achieve, namely, a presentation 
which balances universal and particular. SchellingÕs problem with KantÕs discussion of construction 
is that he denies the possibility of construction for philosophy, because, according to Kantian 
transcendental idealism, to exhibit a priori an intuition corresponding to a concept is to achieve an 
intellectual intuition. For Schelling, philosophy is in and of the absolute itself, from which it 
emerges and to which it returns.
142
. Because of this, philosophy Ôdoes not have a point above 
itselfÉfrom which it can reflectÕ. It must unify Ôall points of reflection in itself, its own essence 
must always accompany itÕ (ibid., p. 273). So, where Kant denies construction because it would 
result in intellectual intuition that violates his transcendental idealism, Schelling advocates for the 
constructive method in philosophy because it allows for a continuity between concept and intuition 
which Schelling believes will allow him to present the absolute without compromising its identity. 
To formulate his method of construction, Schelling adopts the geometrical model that Kant 
describes.
143
 To reiterate, Kant argues in the CPR that, in order to construct a concept, one requires 
a non-empirical intuition, which is simultaneously singular and universal; singular because it is a 
representation of a particular, or, a particular representation; universal because that same 
representation is what constructs the concept. The concept is immediately produced in the intuition, 
rather than applied to it after the fact. Kant believed that such constructions could only exist in 
mathematics, geometry being the upmost example. SchellingÕs central motivation is to extend 
Kantian construction beyond mathematics and secure its place in philosophy. The reasons for Kant 
to deny construction to philosophy are the direct result of his critical system. To grant construction 
by means of the categories would be to grant intellectual intuition, in other words, an identity of 
                                                
142 Philosophy has been said to ÒreturnÓ twice in what I have said so far. Philosophy in the STI was to 
return to the Ôuniversal ocean of poetryÕ. In the Construction essay, it returns to the absolute. Though 
Schelling himself does not make the claim outright, it is intriguing to consider, particularly in light of 
SchellingÕs philosophy of art which I examine in the next chapter, the extent to which the absolute itself 
can be given the character of ÔpoeticÕ, not just in a productive, but in an artistic sense. 
143 Whistler offers a succinct overview of the history of geometrical construction. (2013 pp. 117-128). 
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concept and intuition. For Kant, both intellectual intuition and construction are problematic for 
philosophy because they eliminate the connection to empirical experience. Schelling argues, 
however, that by granting this kind of construction in mathematics, Kant had unwittingly shown the 
necessity of such intuition for philosophy. If Kant grants a non-empirical intuition to geometry by 
which to exhibit its concepts, Schelling claims, Ôhe cannot then establish an absolute difference 
between mathematics and philosophy through this non-empirical intuitionÕ(ibid., p. 274). In other 
words, Schelling believes that Kant has failed to show why construction should be prohibited in 
philosophy. This is because Kant conflated two types of mathematical intuition into one, in order to 
prohibit what would become an intellectual intuition in philosophy. 
So, what Kant took as one form of intuition Ñ intellectual Ñ Schelling here divides in two. The 
first, which presents the universal in the particular, belongs to geometry. The second, which 
presents the particular in the universal, belongs to arithmetic. Philosophy is neither of these, but 
rather the presentation of their indifference [Gleichgltigkeit] (ibid., p. 275).  
Kant could not grant this indifference of universal and particular to philosophy because he was 
limited by the methods of transcendental idealism. Schelling argues that philosophy must attain 
absolute form in order to forge the right path for itself. What does it mean to attain absolute form? 
Indeed, what does it even mean for philosophy to have a form? To this Schelling offers few 
answers. His closest analogy is Spinoza, who, Schelling claims, employed the geometrical method 
as a way of constructing philosophical proofs. In SchellingÕs estimation, SpinozaÕs error was to 
focus exclusively on this form and neglect the Ôpure ideal of philosophyÕ(ibid.). Kant responded to 
the same problem with his infamous declaration that ÔThoughts without intuitions are empty, 
intuitions without concepts are blindÕ (CPR, B75). However, the indivisibility of essence and form 
indicates more than the mere synthesis that Kant required. Additionally, this indivisibility must also 
ground philosophy itself. It must be both the discovery of, and the catalyst for, philosophical 
inquiry. So, to attain absolute form is to realise and Òmake realÓ the indivisibility of form and 
182 
 
essence. As such, Ôphilosophy must be not only a knowing, but always and necessarily at the same 
time a knowing of this knowing, not in endless procession, but an always present infinityÕ(p. 273). 
This last distinction is an important one. As we, and presumably Schelling, learned from Kant, we 
cannot experience our own experience, we cannot know our own knowing. Instead, we can only 
appear to ourselves in the same way that objects of external experience appear, as intuitions in 
space and time. Whatever it is that does the appearing is not itself contained within the 
appearance.
144
 Now, Schelling would likely agree with the first part of this statement: we cannot 
experience ourselves experiencing, because this would itself be another experience different from 
the first. However, SchellingÕs insistence on the indivisibility of form and essence is what allows 
him to avoid the Ôendless processionÕof knowledge knowing knowledge, and augment it into a 
Ôpresent infinityÕ. 
Construction, in KantÕs terms, is the identity of concept and intuition. This identity brings about, in 
SchellingÕs view, a Ônon-empirical intuitionÕ that must express itself, on the one hand, Ôas an 
intuition that is singular and concreteÕ, and on the other, Ôas a construction of a concept that is 
universally valid for all possible intuitions belonging under the same conceptÕ (ibid.). The 
archetypal construction is therefore a particular intuition which conveys something universal. As 
such, all constructions are archetypes, because they demonstrate the reality of their concept in one 
and the same conceptual (intellectual) intuition. Geometrical figures are a prime example of this. A 
triangle will not compromise its universality whether it appears in empirical or pure intuition. 
Importantly, it does not need to appear in empirical intuition in order for its properties to hold true. 
These very properties, to be instantiated in an empirical item, depend upon the construction of the 
concept ÔtriangleÕ. The triangle, in itself, is an archetype. The absolute archetypal construction is the 
one whereby the absolute posits itself as absolute, and where the absolute and the positing are 
                                                
144 This much is echoed in SchellingÕs nature-philosophy, wherein the unconditioned productivity of 






 This Schelling calls the absolute cognition, asserting in the Further Presentations, 
Ôthere is not absolute knowledge and outside of this an absolute, but the two are one. The essence of 
philosophy lies in this identityÕ (2001b, p. 391). One can already see the parallels that persist 
between philosophical construction and aesthetic construction. In the conclusion I will draw these 
out explicitly. 
Philosophical constructions do not make what they exhibit in a simple sense, nor do they deduce 
some separate fact from their exhibition. They rather see a certain mode of being in the exhibition 
itself, namely, of being universal and particular simultaneously. As Schelling puts it, Ôthe whole 
universe is in the absolute as plant, as animal, as human being, but since the whole is in every part it 
is therein not as plant, not as animal, not as human being or as the particular unity, but as absolute 
unityÕ (ibid.,). In short, philosophical construction ascends to and brings into it, the absolute itself. 
There are not distinct forms with distinct essences, there are merely presentations of the one 
absolute essence in the form of the plant, animal, human, etc. We now start to see the meaning, and 
the intimate relation between the two statements with which I began. Everything is absolute, i.e. a 
manifestation of the one absolute essence. The absolute comes already formed because it is being 
itself, namely, the absolute productivity which gives rise to forms out of itself. The essence of the 
absolute is that it forms itself.  
  
                                                
145 Nassar discusses the issue of archetypes in detail (2014, pp. 244-256). It will become increasingly 
important for my arguments once I turn to SchellingÕs philosophy of art. 
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Conclusion to Chapter Three  
Before concluding, it is worth briefly summarising the character of construction for Schelling.  
¥ Constructions are the identity of concept and intuition. 
¥ Proof of concept and proof of existence are therefore also identical. 
¥ Philosophical constructions express the universal through the particular. 
¥ They thereby produce ideas. 
¥ The ideas produced and the absolute from which they are produced are identical.  
I have deliberately excluded a further remark that Schelling makes in the Construction essay. 
Schelling argues that no philosophical construction can be merely particular, in the way that a 
construction of a triangle is particular to geometry, for example. Philosophy is supposed to be the 
science by which all other sciences are measured, by which their particular manifestations are 
reconciled with the absolute. Philosophy cannot therefore be bound by the same limitations as other 
sciences. What then does philosophy construct? Schelling argues that philosophy must Ôconstruct 
construction itself, as well as define definitionÕ(2008, p. 279). Now, if philosophy is to ground the 
very premises upon which it bases its arguments, there is a risk that it sinks back into the trenches of 
dogmatism from which Kant was so eager to rescue it. For where is the measure of correctness to 
lie? By what standards can the correctness of philosophyÕs assertions be assessed? 
Whistler expresses a similar worry when he asks, Ôwhat evidence does Schelling have 
thatÉconstruction [is] the most productive form of knowing? (2013, p. 129). WhistlerÕs answer 
refers to many of the things I have already elucidated, namely the various indifferences between 
universal and particular, concept and intuition, the constructing activity and its product, and its 
possibility and actuality. In Schelling's view, philosophical construction unites all of these 
oppositions, not by synthesising them, but by uncovering, or more accurately, postulating their 
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absolute identity. For Schelling, the method of construction is also proof of existence of that which 
it constructs. However, we are still left with the question as to how that proof of existence is to be 
guaranteed by a philosophy which now seems consumed solely by the task of constructing such 
proofs. How is a philosophy with no ground external to itself supposed to be regulated? One could 
say, the absolute regulates it, and philosophyÕs task is primarily to demonstrate the existence of 
such a ground. However, I repeat here what was shown in the previous part of this chapter on 
SchellingÕs nature-philosophy. That everything is originally absolute still does not explain how it is 
that the absolute comes to exhibit itself in particular things. Schelling is yet to provide conclusive 
justification for the identity of the absolute and the thought of the absolute, because this identity is 
itself an assumption upon which Schellingian speculation is based. A question arises to which 
Schelling is compelled to give an answer. Can the absolute be both a cognition and that which 
makes this cognition possible? In a manner of conclusion, I present a possible answer to this 
problem, from the STI. 
In the STI, Schelling talks about construction as a form of imitation. Construction basically 
recreates or reproduces the original series of acts whereby the unified absolute was split from itself 
by being posited as absolute. Construction reproduces the original unity of subject and object in the 
absolute. One could say, according to this view of construction, that it is the vehicle by which 
consciousness comes to consciousness. All mention of imitation disappears from the Further 
Presentations and Construction essay. This is perhaps because Schelling is eager in these two texts 
to assert his theory of construction in order to distinguish himself from Kant and Fichte. But the 
idea of imitation is useful, because it hints at a problem with which Schelling was to struggle 
intensely for the rest of his career. If the absolute is always absolute, as is everything that emerges 
from it, then there can never be a difference between the absolute itself and its articulation via a 
particular emergence. Or rather, the difference is merely one of perspective, between reflection or 
speculation. Yet, in the STI, precisely this difference is articulated by the concept of imitation. The 
imitation is qualitatively identical to that which it imitates, but it is not quantitatively identical. It is 
186 
 
a further, as in, additional, particular manifestation. There is the productive force of the absolute 
itself and then there is the imitative productive force of the imagination. As I began by saying, the 
utmost manifestation of this productive force is the art-work. I conclude my work on SchellingÕs 
metaphysics by reopening the abyss that it sought to close. And as I move from his metaphysics to 
his philosophy of art, I do so with the assertion that it is only via the work of art that the post-1800 
Schelling can hope to resolve the persistent divisions between the absolute and that which the 
absolute manifests. Schelling's philosophy of art will posit that the work of art is the ultimate 
symbol of the absolute. I will be ask, therefore, to what extent the symbol closes this gap in the 




Chapter Four: Art of the Absolute: SchellingÕs Philosophy of 
Art Lectures 
Chapter Outline 
In this chapter I examine SchellingÕs Philosophy of Art lectures, delivered between 1802 and 
1804.
146
 From these lectures I analyse three interrelated elements. Firstly, the articulation of 
SchellingÕs philosophy of identity via the work of art. Secondly, SchellingÕs theory of the absolute, 
and the struggles contained therein relating to expression of the absolute via the particular i.e. an 
artwork. Thirdly, SchellingÕs philosophy of language. I take these three issues as inseparable, to the 
extent that they all contribute to SchellingÕs lifelong struggle to fully account for the absolute and 
the how discrete things emerge from it. It is within these three elements that SchellingÕs struggle to 
overcome limitations imposed by KantÕs critical and aesthetic philosophy is most evident. I closely 
examine WhistlerÕs reading of the PoA, as he presents one of the most thorough analyses of 
SchellingÕs theory of the symbol. Contrary to Whistler, I claim that SchellingÕs theory of language 
does not so much demonstrate the indifference [Indifferenz] of ideal and real, as it does display the 
ultimate and endless insufficiency of linguistic utterances to capture that which grounds them. I am 
particularly concerned in this chapter with SchellingÕs thought that language is the original natural 
work of art, and I relate this to the conclusion to the System of Transcendental Idealism that I 
discussed in chapter three. If language is an objectification of the absolute, then its emergence as art 
cuts language off from this origin. In short, the absolute cannot be articulated. 
  
                                                
146 Hereafter PoA. 
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4.1. Construction of the Art-Work 
Abstract 
In the Philosophy of Art lectures, delivered between 1802 an 1804, Schelling expands upon his 
theory of the absolute via an analysis of the metaphysical and ontological status of art. For 
Schelling, art, like all things, derives from the absolute and is an articulation of the absolute. Unlike 
other things, however, the work of art is what Whistler has called the Òmaximal expressionÓ of the 
absolute, because it fully identifies the relation of indifference between ideal and real, infinite and 
finite, universal and particular, that obtains in the absolute itself. The PoA lectures contain 
SchellingÕs most rigorously formulated thoughts on art and its relation to philosophy. They also 
contain intense struggles to properly account for how the art-work Ð or indeed anything at all Ð can 
derive from a thoroughly indifferent, self-identical unity such as the absolute. Schelling maintains 
in the PoA that the universe creates itself in a similar manner to how the art-work is created, and 
that consequently, works of art derive directly and immediately from the absolute itself. His 
problem comes, I claim, when he has to account for the ways in which these works of art can 
ÒcontainÓ absoluteness while still remaining concrete phenomenal items. SchellingÕs purported 
solution is to designate language the utmost work of art Ð a natural work of art Ð in order to display 
the balance between ideal essence or content (language itself) and concrete form (linguistic 
utterance). In this chapter, I will contend with SchellingÕs theory of symbolic language, and 
WhistlerÕs analysis thereof. I will argue that despite making significant advances beyond KantÕs 
aesthetics,
147
 Schelling still does not manage to account for how the absolute can be articulated, 
brought into, or expressed through, the art-work. 
                                                
147 Most importantly from the Òmerely subjectiveÓ or ÒintersubjectiveÓ realm of judgment, to a firm 




Schelling does not deal with Kant at length anywhere in the PoA. KantÕs third Critique is mentioned 
only once in the whole text.
148
 Nevertheless, KantÕs presence is tacit throughout. The CJ imposed 
severe limitations, not only upon the capacities of aesthetics, but also upon the things which 
aesthetics describes. Consequently, art-works could be described only to the extent of their being 
vehicles for aesthetic judgments, to say nothing of their origin, content or ontological status. 
Schelling belonged a group of philosophers Ð among them Schiller, and members of the early 
German Romantic movement August and Friedrich Schlegel Ð who sought to disassemble these 
limitations. In SchellingÕs case, such dissembling could be achieved only via an entirely different 
conception of philosophy and its role. By the time of the PoA, this conception of philosophy was 
identity-philosophy, and its role was nothing less than the revelation and articulation of the absolute 
and all its possible manifestations. 
In the specific case of the PoA, Schelling aims to focus on the material formulation of art itself, and 
how this is fundamentally grounded in the absolute. For example, Kant argues in the CJ that beauty 
can only be understood as a kind of judgment, rather than a property of external objects. It is not 
that an object is beautiful in itself, but that I judge it to be beautiful in accordance with the harmony 
of my cognitive faculties. Schelling performs a stark reversal of this position, going so far as to 
claim in ¤21 of the PoA that beauty is a property of the absolute itself (1989, p. 31). Given the force 
with which Kant opposed this conception of beauty, that it inheres in things independently of our 
perceptions, it might appear surprising that Schelling makes such a drastic claim. To understand the 
nature of this claim, however, it is vital to address the philosophical backdrop upon which the claim 
is made. SchellingÕs claim is not the rationalist or empiricist one Kant sought to oppose. The claim 
that beauty is an element of the absolute derives from SchellingÕs identity philosophy, and has to do 
                                                
148 Cf. PoA 1989, p. 12. This could be a result of the PoA being lectures rather than something written 
solely for publication. 
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with the fact that human perceptions, as much as external nature, as much as beauty itself, derive 
from the same identical absolute. So, if beauty is the outcome of a judgment, this must be because 
the harmony felt between the cognitive faculties in the judgment is also manifested by the absolute 
itself. Schelling claims that, when viewed Ôfrom the perspective of totality or as they are in 
themselvesÕ, Ôall thingsÉare formed in absolute beautyÕ (ibid.). Absolute beauty means eternal 
beauty, the beauty of divine creation. In response to those who would want to claim that ugliness is 
also a feature of the absolute, Schelling claims that Ôperverted or ugly thingsÉjust as error or 
falsity, consist of mere privation and belong only to the temporal view of thingsÕ. The ugly is oneÕs 
lack of ability to see beauty as a reflection of GodÕs divine and eternal creation. More will be said 
about this in 4.2. 
If all things derive from absolute identity, one might question to what use identity-philosophy can 
be put.
149
 To avoid dismissing such a philosophy outright, it is important to get a grasp on exactly 
what Schelling means by the absolute, and how he seeks to account for the way in which distinct 
phenomena arise from it. It is only with this knowledge that we can, according to Schelling, explain 
the possibility and origins of the work of art. 
4.1.2. God, the Absolute, and the Universe 
Schelling begins the Philosophy of Art with the claim that, to Ôconstrue art means to determine its 
place in the universeÕ (1989, p. 24). Such a determination requires nothing less than the first 
principles of philosophy. The first principles for Schelling are those articulated in his identity-
philosophy, most explicitly in the Presentation and Further Presentations that I have discussed in 
the previous chapter. To recapitulate briefly, these principles are that intellectual intuition is a 
                                                
149 Whistler claims, for example, that the role of philosophy in SchellingÕs view is to observe the 
absolute construct itself, and chart its progress (2013, p. 247). This raises the question over what it is 
that is being observed in or through this identity (if identity is only ever itself, what observable things 
does it produce?) I will be defending the idea that a philosophy of art grounded in Schellingian identity-
philosophy does, or at least strives to do, more than Whistler seems to believe. 
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necessary instrument of philosophy, that philosophy is an absolute science (the science of the 
absolute) and that finally; philosophy constructs, rather than deduces or infers, its principles. What 
are the consequences of a philosophy of art conducted according to this philosophical system? The 
answer is twofold. Firstly, like all things, art must be shown to emerge from and express the 
absolute. Secondly, the philosophy of art must not treat art as a series of objects; rather it must 
construct Ôthe universe in the form of artÕ (ibid. p. 35). It is the second task with which Schelling is 
most concerned, and in order to complete it, he must first account for the possibility of art in the 
absolute.
150
 Schelling titles the sections of the PoA accordingly, as Construction of the Universal, 
and Construction of the Particular, to discuss the content and the form of art respectively. During 
this chapter, the validity of construction as method will therefore also be scrutinised. 
The PoA offers perhaps the most thorough description of the absolute of all SchellingÕs texts up to 
that point. Its exact specifications provide what Schelling believes to be the only possible 
foundations, both for art and for philosophy. So what are these specifications? They are constructed 
from SchellingÕs conception of God. This conception is muddied in the PoA by the fact that 
Schelling frequently appears to refer to God and the absolute interchangeably.
151
 It is not clear 
                                                
150 Terminological differences abound in Schelling, and he rarely is explicit about the exact differences 
between them. Schelling often uses the terms ÒGodÓ, ÒuniverseÓ and ÒabsoluteÓ interchangeably. I 
follow SchellingÕs usage, with some qualifications. I will address these qualifications directly in the text 
as they appear, but it is worth nothing here that the absolute is the term which Schelling distinguishes 
the most from the others. The absolute is a more complex term, as it can designate either God, the 
independence of God from all that is, or the eternal identity which precedes GodÕs positing of himself. 
Whistler summarises four terms that he claims Schelling uses interchangeably between 1801 and 1805. 
These are Ôthe absoluteÕ, ÔidentityÕ, ÔindifferenceÕ, and ÔGodÕ. Cf. Whistler, 2013, pp. 70-1. 
151 Cf. PoA ¤24: ÔThe true construction of art is a presentation of its forms as forms of things as those 
things are in themselves, or as they are within the absolute, for according to ¤21 the universe is formed 
within God as eternal beauty and as an absolute work of art. Similarly, all things as they are in 
themselves or within God are just as absolutely beautiful as they are absolutely true. Accordingly, the 
forms of art, since they are the forms of beautiful things, are also formed of things as they are within 
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whether God is identical with the absolute, a local feature of the absolute, or the active force by 
which the absolute which brings about the existing universe. SchellingÕs descriptions of these three 
elements both pave the way for his art philosophy, and create the abyss from which he struggles to 
emerge by the time of his unfinished Weltalter project.
152
 God is identical with the universe taken 
Ôin and for itselfÕ (1989, p. 26). This means that God himself, and his positing of the universe (via 
intellectual intuition) are one and the same.
153
 It also means, presumably, that there is a God prior to 
this positing, who is not identical with anything except himself. This God, which escapes any 
description, is the closest Schelling gets to a simple identification of God and the absolute. But by 
virtue of being the absolute, he is not God. Why? The absolute is Ôutterly eternalÕ, it is Ôneither 
conscious nor unconscious, neither free nor unfree, nor necessaryÕ (ibid.). If God were to take on 
this negative status, what would he be at all? A mere nothing, or rather, the absence of any property. 
But God is not the absence of all properties for Schelling. Rather, God is infinite affirmation (ibid. 
                                                                                                                                                            
God or in themselves. And since all construction is a presentation of things within the absolute, the 
construction of art in particular is the presentation of its forms as forms of things as they are within the 
absolute, and accordingly also a presentation of the universe itself as an absolute work of art as it is 
formed within God in eternal beauty.Õ 
152 Weltalter or Ages of the World refers to a collection of unfinished texts composed in between 1811-
1814/15. It also refers to a larger period in SchellingÕs thought generally, approximately covering the 
years 1809-1827 (cf. Vassnyi, 2011 p. 387). With the Weltalter, Schelling attempts to present a history 
of the absolute in three books: past, present and future. In all three drafts however, Schelling only 
manages to write the first book, the past. The original manuscripts of all three drafts have been lost. 
However, fragments of the second and third draft have been published and translated into English. The 
third draft was first translated by Frederick de Wolfe Bolman Jr. in 1942, and again by Jason Wirth in 
2000. The second draft appears with an essay by Slavoj Zizek entitled The Abyss of Freedom, from 
1997. The story of SchellingÕs attempt to complete and publish the Weltalter bears some striking 
similarities with KantÕs struggle to complete the Critique of Pure Reason, with the obvious difference 
that Kant did manage to publish his grand work. For more on this, see WirthÕs introduction to his 
translation of the Weltalter (2000, pp. vii-xxxii). 
153 Schelling mentions intellectual intuition only four times in the PoA, taking its validity as self-
evident on the basis of his earlier identity-philosophy. 
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p. 26-7). GodÕs creation is archetypal; by creating the forms of the universe, God simultaneously 
imparts into these forms their eternal essences. 
We now have, from SchellingÕs descriptions, at least four elements; the absolute, the universe, God, 
and eternity. The work of art, and the artist by whom the work is created, have complex relations 
with all these elements. In addition, they all united by a further element: mythology. Schelling 
defines mythology in ¤37: 
The entirety of the poetic renderings of the gods, by acquiring complete 
objectivity or independent poetic existence, is mythologyÉMythology is 
nothing other than the universe in its higher manifestation, in its absolute 
form, the true universe in itself, image and symbol of life and of 
wondrous chaos in the divine imagination, itself already poesy and yet in 
and for itself the content and element of poesy. (ibid., p. 45) 
According to Schelling, mythology is more fundamental than both poetry and philosophy. 
Mythology in fact unites poetry and philosophy together. Schelling characterises the mythological 
as the absolute continuity between concept and intuition, between language and utterance. It is this 
continuity that Schelling argues art manages to capture, or recapture, via an immediacy not present 
for philosophical reasoning. Philosophy is guided by rational argumentation, a linear and (arguably) 
temporal process. Art, or the art of art, as Schelling puts it,
154
 is guided by intuition, by an 
immediate revelation of its place in the absolute.
155
 One may wish to object to this characterisation 
of art, and ask why it is necessary, or how it is even possible, that all art reveal the absolute. As with 
SchellingÕs general philosophical method post-1800, this becomes a matter of perspective. One may 
elect to view art as a collection of objects, or practices. To approach art in this way is to approach 
art empirically, as phenomenal appearance. Schelling does not deny this ÒrealÓ side of art, he says 
only that he is Ôspeaking of a more sacred artÉa proclaimer of divine mysteries, the unveiler of 
                                                
154 Cf. PoA, ¤62 (1989. p. 84). 
155 For an early description of this difference between philosophy and poetry, see SchellingÕs Bruno, 
or, on the Natural and the Divine Principle of Things, (1984, pp. 132-3).  
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ideasÕ (ibid., p. 4) In what follows I will examine the ways in which Schelling accounts for the way 
in which this notion of art, which Schelling has claimed is immediately present in mythology, 
ÒentersÓ into the particular art-work.
156
 Elements central to KantÕs aesthetics are all present here, 
such elements as genius, intuition, beauty and sublimity, and a reverence for nature. The way in 
which these things interact, however, changes significantly in SchellingÕs hands. 
4.1.3. Constructing the ÔUniverse in the Form of ArtÕ 
Philosophy of art for Schelling constructs the universe in the form of art. What does this mean? To 
begin unpacking this claim requires a grasp of SchellingÕs concepts of universal and particular, as 
they occur in the PoA. In reference to mythology, Schelling defines the relation between universal 
and particular in the following way: 
Representation of the absolute with absolute indifference of the universal 
and particular within the universal = philosophy Ð idea. Representation of 
the absolute with absolute indifference of the universal and the particular 
in the particular = art. The universal content of this representation = 
mythology. In mythology we thus find the second synthesis already 
accomplished, that of the indifference of the universal and the particular 
with the particular. This proposition is thus the principle of construction 
of mythology as such. (1989, p. ¤37, p. 45) 
Two things should be noted here. First, mythology is the Ôuniversal contentÕ of art, but this does not 
mean that all art is mythological. Rather, mythology supplies the essential condition of art 
considered as an objectification of the absolute, namely, the presentation of the indifference of 
universal and particular in a particular. Consequently, the second thing to note is that the 
                                                
156 It is important to note that no art-work contemporary to Schelling is considered mythological by 
him, hence the distinction between mythology in general and the work of art in particular. The 
mythological for Schelling is not merely a separate Ð therefore inaccessible Ð historical epoch, but an 




mythological synthesis of universal and particular is enacted in the same way as a philosophical 
construction. Where philosophy enacts this construction pertaining only to the universal, i.e. 
independent of a concrete form, mythology constructs pertaining to a particular, i.e. a concrete item 
or series of items. On the surface this seems strange, as it implies that philosophy does not have a 
form.  However, we must remember that within this distinction between philosophy and mythology 
is implied a further distinction between that which pertains (philosophy/mythology) and that to 
which it pertains (the absolute). Philosophy pertains to the absolute via the universal (via reason, 
articulated conceptually). Mythology pertains to the absolute via the particular (via artistic forms). 
What ramifications do these distinctions have for philosophy, given that Schelling appears to have 
granted an immediate representation of the absolute via mythology, but not via philosophy? Some 
comparison with Kant is useful here. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant claims that concepts of 
the understanding do not appear in the phenomenal world. They are, in a sense, one step removed 
from phenomenal experience. Concepts of reason (ideas) are further removed, given that they 
derive from wholly from reason, which can never directly determine experience. According to Kant, 
ideas of reason cannot directly determine experience because they pertain to Ôthe totality of things, 
in their interconnection as constituting the universeÕ (CPR, B375). 
Schelling has a different metaphysical position, though it shares some common ground with Kant. 
Importantly for my argument, part of this common ground is the necessity for the absolute to be 
expressed via some representation or other. For Kant, it is expressed only in a regulative way, as a 
prescription by reason to the understanding, to grant the latter Ôdirection towards a certain unity of 
which it has itself no conceptÕ, in such a way as to Ôunite all the acts of the understanding, in respect 
of every object, into an absolute wholeÕ (CPR, B383) For Schelling, the absolute is expressed 
directly and immediately in the art-work, whose universal content is mythology. Common to both 
these views is that the absolute relies upon representation, whether in an idea or in an art-work. The 
notion of the necessity of representation for accessing the absolute will feature heavily later in this 
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chapter. Presently, I wish to focus on where SchellingÕs metaphysics differs from and challenges 
KantÕs, and how this informs what Schelling means by constructing the universe in the form of art. 
In the PoA, Schelling claims that reason is within the absolute, not just notionally, but fully: 
Ôcomplete revelation of God only occurs where in the reflected world itself the individual forms 
resolve into absolute identity, and this occurs only within reason. Reason is thus within the All 
itself and the full reflected image of GodÕ (1989, p. 27, original emphasis). Again, this remark is 
worth examining closely. SchellingÕs first assumption is that the world is the Ôreflected image of 
GodÕ. One might assume, therefore, that this precludes any element of human cognition, reason 
included, from accessing ÔGod himselfÕ. Indeed, this is the case, and this is where art begins to 
show its necessity as counterpart to philosophy. Philosophy is the Ôimmediate or direct 
representation of the divineÕ, but art is immediately or directly only the representation of 
indifference as suchÕ, i.e. the indifference between ideal and real (ibid.). As a consequence, 
philosophy deals exclusively with esoteric matters: ideas. It proceeds via rational argumentation, 
and this argumentation is said to represent the divine Ñ or in other words, the identity of the 
Ôaffirming and the affirmedÕ, i.e. God (ibid., p. 24). Art represents this identity as indifference of 
ideal and real, but does not represent this identity in itself. 
So far, philosophy seems to have the upper hand. However, advancing a few pages in the PoA, this 
dynamic between philosophy and art is revealed to be less than straightforward. It concerns the 
relation between universal and particular. In ¤27 Schelling writes, Ôparticular things, to the extent 
they are absolute in that particularity and thus to the extent they as particulars are simultaneously 
universes, are called ideasÕ (ibid. p. 34 original emphasis). As such Ôevery idea is = universe in the 
form of the particularÕ. Philosophy deals in ideas, i.e. particulars taken in the sense of the universal. 
Because an idea is = universe in the form of particular, however, the idea is Ônot real as this 
particular.Õ The ideas, as real, or, Ôviewed on the plane of the realÕ as Schelling puts its, are Ôthe 
gods, for their essence, their essential nature, = god. There are ideas only to the extent that they are 
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god in a particular form. Every idea, therefore, = god, but a particular godÕ (ibid., original 
emphasis). Both philosophy and art express the same God, the same absolute; philosophy in an 
ideal way, art in a real way. Schelling has presented the particular difference between philosophy 
and art, namely that, Ôwhat ideas are for philosophy, the gods are for art, and vice versaÕ (ibid. p. 
35). To construct the universe in the form of art, therefore, is to inform the particular art-work as 
such, into the universal idea, which is the absolute. In other words, philosophy of art articulates the 
absolute via the idea of art. Art itself, however, articulates the absolute via itself, i.e. via its real 
form. The real particular of the art-work therefore appears to express the absolute more directly, 
without need for the mediation of ideas into forms such as the linguistic arguments employed in 
philosophy. This is a central element of my criticism of SchellingÕs art-philosophy, which I will 
develop in 4.2. For now I turn to SchellingÕs description of the construction of artistic form. 
4.1.4. Construction of Artistic Form 
So far, I have shown how Schelling seeks to prove the absolute status of artistic content Ñ its 
essence. He must now account for the absolute status of artistic form. This account is directed 
toward one central question: 
How doesÉuniversal content make the transition into the particularity of 
form and actually become the true material of a particular work of art? 
(ibid. p. 83).  
Once again, this question results directly from the assertions of SchellingÕs identity-philosophy. The 
relations of universal and particular, and their correlates, form and essence, are of course not 
exclusive to art, and it is the job of identity-philosophy to show how these elements relate in a 
general sense, namely, in the sense of the absolute. This is achieved via the construction of ideas. 
Philosophical construction enacts a synthesis that both identifies universal and particular, and 
reveals their ultimate identity in the absolute. A construction of philosophy of art enacts this same 
synthesis in the form of art, in other words, with reference to an objective representation of this 
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synthesis Ñ with reference to a work. Philosophical construction must Ôconstruct construction 
itself, as well as define definitionÕ  (Construction, 2008, p. 279). It follows then that art-
philosophical construction, constructs the construction of works of art.
157
 This sounds rather 
confusing, but each use of the word construction plays a specific role. To simplify, identity-
philosophy constructs ideas, which articulate the grounding of things in the absolute. The 
philosophy of art constructs ideas which articulate they way in which the absolute can be viewed as 
art. In so doing, art-philosophy attempts to show not only how art is grounded in the absolute, but 
how it posits the absolute within itself. 
So much for art-philosophy in general. As for the form of art in particular, Schelling explains how 
form, like essence, derives from God. Here, the story becomes more complex. The direct and 
immediate content of all art is mythology - the Ôpoetic rendering of the GodsÕ (1989, ¤37 p.45). 
When it comes to artistic form, another factor must be taken into consideration. God, Ôdirectly and 
from within himselfÕ produces only Ôthe ideas of thingsÕ (ibid. pp., 83-4). God produces real things 
Ôonly indirectly or mediately in the reflected worldÕ. This much is fairly obvious. If God were to 
produce particular things directly, he would be conditioned by this producing. Instead, God 
produces the Ôessence of a particular and in relationship to a particular thingÕ (p. 84). So how 
exactly does God relate to particular things? SchellingÕs answer is that a particular relates to God, 
only to the extent that that particular is Ôone with its own universal, that is, through its idea or its 
eternal conceptÕ (ibid., p. 84). In this case, that idea is the idea of the absolute itself. 
At this point, one may object by asking how it is that a particular can be at one with its own 
universal. For example, the universal property of ÒapplehoodÓ can apply both to particular apple 1 
and particular apple 2, so that ÒapplehoodÓ = apple 1 and apple 2. It does not follow from this that 
                                                
157 This is certainly a dubious claim, as Schelling could be taken as meaning that philosophers in effect 
construct art itself. As Whistler rightly notes, however, Ôconstruction is not a method which the 
philosopher imposes on reality; it is a process that reality itself is already undergoing. Something 
constructs itself and the philosopher charts this processÕ (2013, p 124). 
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apple 1 = apple 2. However, the indifference of universal and particular in terms of art does not 
concern the predication of a universal to a particular in the way that ÒapplehoodÓ is predicated of 
particular apples. The relation is not predicative. It is symbolic. The nature of the symbolic is a 
significant theme in SchellingÕs PoA, and I will consider it at length in the following parts of this 
chapter. For the moment I conclude with a summary of what has been covered so far, and some 
outcomes thereof. 
4.1.5. Art In and For Itself 
The utility of describing philosophy of art as the construction of the universe in the form of art, is 
precisely its applicability to myriad other phenomena. The universe in and for itself = God. But the 
universe constructed in such and such a way = the thing therein constructed. The art-work expresses 
the indifference between these two poles. Philosophy expresses their identity.  
It is important for Schelling to stress that construction of art-works is not merely a synthesis Ð of 
subject and object, of essence and form, of universal and particular. Rather, the art-work expresses 
the pre-existing and eternal unity between these things from the absolute perspective. Art-works 
express the unity that precedes their creation via something created. Art represents, recalls, 
symbolises the unity that precedes all creation and into which all creation gives over. The absolute, 
one might therefore surmise, is nothing other than simple creative potentiation. The actual things 
that arise from it are particular potencies (Potenzen),
158
 which themselves are governed by their 
own laws of poesis. To put it another way, works of art are created according to laws that they also 
create. This is, from the point of view of identity philosophy, the organism as such. This ÒorganicÓ 
principle of creation directly opposes mechanical theories of nature that preceded Schelling, and, 
importantly, KantÕs conception of natural teleology.
159
 For Schelling, nature is an eternal dynamic 
                                                
158 For more on SchellingÕs doctrine of potences (Potenzlehre), cf. Tritten, (2012) 
159 cf. CJ, pp. 45; 72-3; 294-5; 297-301; 310  
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of forces, which interrelate in such as way as to bring about distinct natural phenomena. At the 
same time, said phenomena all arise from the one unconditioned principle of the absolute.  
At this point, I pose again my guiding question. How can the absolute be articulated? According to 
Schelling, philosophy articulates the absolute via ideas; art articulates the absolute via real 
particulars. To put it another way, the absolute articulates itself in ideas for philosophy, and 
articulates itself in particulars for art. For identity-philosophy this articulation is one of identity, for 
art-philosophy it is one of indifference.
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God = the universe in and for itself. The forces which govern creation are self-regulating because 
they derive from God; they are God himself. God, taken in this way, is equal to the ultimate free act 
of creation, ultimate because it is the one free act from which necessity arises. Art, replicates, draws 
into itself, and in turn expresses through itself, this same principle that equates freedom and 
necessity. The ground of possibility for all of this is the absolute. What still remains for Schelling, 
is to account for how the constructions of artistic form make their way into actual concrete forms Ñ 
art-works themselves. Once again, for the purposes of SchellingÕs identity-philosophy, essence and 
form are required in equal measure, so that a relation of indifference can obtain between them. For 
the purposes of art, further elements are required; beauty, the sublime, and genius. In what follows, 
I will discuss these each in turn, both in terms of how they relate to the absolute as such, and the 
absolute viewed in the form of art. First, I examine SchellingÕs descriptions of beauty as a feature of 
the absolute, and the sublime as a response to the absolute. I then move on to discuss genius as a 
                                                
160 Perhaps then, the thing art-works purportedly express is not so much the absolute itself, in so far as 
such a thing necessarily encompasses all that is, has been, and will be, but rather the principle by which 
all things are so encompassed. The principle, insofar as it is viewed according to the universe in the 
form of art, is poesis. Its concrete manifestation is poetry. Poetry, therefore, is the highest art not 
because it maximally expresses the absolute, but because it is the absolute, to the extent that the absolute 
is conceivable only as such a poeitic principle, (cf. Nassar, 2014, pp. 226-7). The matter of poetry is 
covered in the concluding part of this chapter (4.4).  
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form of intellectual intuition, and the problems this presents Schelling when defending art as an 




4.2. Universal harmony: on Beauty as a Feature of the Absolute 
Abstract 
In the PoA Schelling argues that beauty is a feature of the absolute. He adopts KantÕs definition of 
beauty as harmonious free relation, and attempts to vastly extend its scope. Where Kant limited 
beauty to a form of judgment, Schelling seeks to extend beauty not only to nature in itself, but to the 
universe, and to the absolute. Schelling argues that the same notion of beauty governs both the 
creation of art-works and the most basic character of the universe. I approach SchellingÕs 
conceptions of beauty though his discussion of sonority, as an example of SchellingÕs construction 
of the universe in the form of art. The ramifications of SchellingÕs theory of beauty include a need 
for a more extensive conception of genius than Kant is able to provide. SchellingÕs conceptions of 




Schelling makes a bold claim in the first part of the PoA: Ôthe universe is formed in God as an 
absolute work of art and in eternal beautyÕ (1989, p. 31). In this section of my chapter I will make 
sense of this claim, and investigate whether it is defensible. In this brief introduction, I present two 
passages from the PoA, which are helpful in recapitulating SchellingÕs position with respect to the 
absolute and beauty. The first passage deals with the manifestation of the absolute as the universe. 
The second deals specifically with the formation of the philosophy of art. My discussion of beauty 
in Schelling will use these passages as a foundation, from which I will develop subsequent 
discussions. I quote both passages in turn below: 
 [T]he universe is structured in two directions corresponding to the two 
unities within the absolute. Within the first, considered in and for itself, 
the absolute appears merely as the ground of existence, since on this side 
it forms its own eternal unity into difference. Within the second, the 
absolute appears as essence, as an absolute; for just as in the first unity 
essence is worked into form, so here in contrast form is worked into 
essence. In the first instance, form is thus dominant; in the second, 
essence. (1989, p. 201) 
In the philosophy of art, no principle other than that of the infinite can 
serve as our point of departure; hence, we must present the infinite as the 
unconditioned principle of art. Just as for philosophy in general, the 
absolute is the archetype of truth, so also for art is it the archetype of 
beauty. We must therefore show that truth and beauty are merely two 
different ways of viewing the one absolute. (ibid., p. 16)
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I will return to these passages repeatedly throughout this section. For the moment it is important to 
note that in the second passage, Schelling designates beauty as the Ôarchetype for the philosophy of 
artÕ. Beauty is, for Schelling, one way of Ôviewing the one absoluteÕ (ibid., my emphasis). This 
conception of beauty is fundamental to SchellingÕs arguments concerning products of nature, and 
                                                
161 Cf. PoA p. 292, nn. 16-17 
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products of art created by genius. It also has ramifications for SchellingÕs understanding of 
sublimity as the counterpart to beauty. All of these elements have important resonances with Kant, 
and part of my analysis in the section that follows this one will be to unpack exactly what these 
resonances are and assess their implications. For now I focus on the first quoted passage, and how it 
relates to SchellingÕs larger project of identity-philosophy. 
4.2.2. Forming the Absolute from Identity 
The relation between form and essence is fundamental to SchellingÕs philosophy, not just in terms 
of art, but also for his larger project of identity-philosophy. The absolute grounds two dimensions, 
form and essence. Essence is necessarily one, or what Schelling calls Ôabsolute identity within 
substanceÕ. Form, taken in the universal rather than particular sense, possesses only Ôrelative 
identityÕ (ibid., p. 118). An immediate question arises pertaining to these identities or ÔunitiesÕ as 
Schelling also calls them. How does the absolute first become spilt into essence and form, into 
absolute and relative unity? 
To begin with, the absolute is not differentiated into essence and form, as both are posited within 
the absolute as identical. Hence Ôform is also the essence, and the essence the formÕ (ibid.). For the 
Ôrelative identityÕ of form to truly emerge, the absolute must undergo a process of Ôsubject-
objectivationÕ, whereby the Ôsubjectivity and eternal unityÕ of the absolute pass into Ôobjectivity or 
multiplicityÕ. Considered as Ôone side of the absolute act of productionÕ, the result of this passing 
over from subjective unity (essence) to objective multiplicity (form) Schelling calls Ômatter or 
substance or eternal nature itselfÕ (ibid., pp. 118-19). In short, the absolute forms itself into nature 
by passing its essence over into varied concrete forms. 
This formation of the absolute into nature is not accidental. As, Schelling explains, Ôonly through 
subject-objectivation does [the absolute] manifest itself within objectivity and then as a recognised 
object guide itself back from this objectivity into its own self-recognitionÕ (ibid.). All the time, or 
rather, eternally, the absolutely subjective (ideal, or essence) and absolutely objective (real, or form) 
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are Ôessentially one and the sameÕ. To put it another way, the absolute appears to itself, and thereby 
recognises itself, by manifesting as nature.
162
 The absolute enacts a process of eternal self-
reconciliation, cycling from subjectivity, to objectivity, and back again. One may ask, why is it 
necessary for the absolute to reconcile itself if it is eternally and absolutely unified? This is similar 
to asking why multiple things exist rather than just one single thing. From one perspective, things 
are multifarious. For Schelling, this is the perspective of reflection, wherein there are multifarious 
things in so far as being itself is considered as a collection of products (here I am recalling 
SchellingÕs nature-philosophy). However, as I have maintained throughout my reading of Schelling, 
and as the phrase Ôsubject-objectivationÕ makes clear, Schelling does not wish to rest upon the 
opposition of subject and object that yields the latter merely as products. The speculative 
standpoint, which, I claim, remains tacit in the PoA, does not view determined products in 
opposition to a determining subject, or rather, it does not rest upon this opposition. Speculation 
views the absolute as the fundamental identity of productivity and product, as both subject and 
object. In consequence, all apparently distinct phenomena Ñ natural phenomena, organisms, 
including humans Ñ are differentiations of one fundamental unity. As Schelling puts it, Ôthe 
absolute is precisely that with regards to which no antithesis obtains between the idea and the 
concrete. In it, that which is the concrete or particular in things is itself the essence or universalÕ 
(ibid., p. 25). To understand this better, and to see how beauty can be attributed to the absolute, it is 
necessary to trace SchellingÕs path from the absolute, through its first cognition, to the organism. 
4.2.3. The Path to the Organism 
Schelling describes the organism as the indifference of form and essence (PoA, p. 27). This is 
related to the more general process by which Schelling supposes the absolute manifests itself. In the 
identity-philosophy this process is called the absolute cognition. In the PoA Schelling calls it GodÕs 
                                                
162 It must be remembered that Schelling frequently refers to the absolute as the primordial first 
cognition. Cf. above, 3.1.6. 
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Ôinfinite affirmationÕ. Through this affirmation, God Ôcomprehends himself as infinitely affirming, 
as infinitely affirmed, and as the indifference of bothÕ (p. 24). Schelling adds that God himself is 
Ônone of these in particularÕ, i.e. God is not reducible to any one state or stage of the process of his 
affirmation, but is the identity of all three. As such, God is both absolute unity and absolute totality, 
Ônot everything, but rather absolute allness itselfÕ (ibid.). Though SchellingÕs explicit reference to 
God to account for this absolute totality may seem problematic Ñ what if we were to remove God 
from the picture; can there be an atheistÕs account of the absolute? Ñ it is worth nothing that this 
tripartite structure of affirming, affirmed and indifference of the two, mirrors that of both 
SchellingÕs transcendental philosophy and nature-philosophy. In transcendental philosophy, the self 
forms an intellectual intuition of itself, first as active subject, then as object of its own knowledge, 
then finally as self; as Ôa knowing that simultaneously produces itselfÕ (STI, 1978, p. 27). In nature-
philosophy, nature is firstly productive, secondly productive of products, and thirdly the identity of 
productivity and product. This is worth noting in order to avoid accusing Schelling of supplanting 
some previous element of his philosophy with theology.
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The path from the absolute to the organism also travels through three stages or differentiation, or 
potences (Potenzen) as Schelling calls them.
164
 SchellingÕs use of the term potences arises from the 
fact that he conducts his philosophy of art according to the general principles of his identity-
philosophy. The important principle in this case is, as Schelling claims, that Ôthere is actually and 
                                                
163 As Whistler points out, Ôbefore mid-1802 and after 1806, God does not name reality; instead, God is 
a determinate entity within realityÉhowever between later 1802 and 1805 [the period during with the 
PoA lectures were delivered] God does become synonymous with realityÕ (2013, p. 71). 
164 The word potence does not have a common usage, and indeed Schelling uses the term in a specific 
way. Potence does not straightforwardly mean potency; it does not mean ÔpowerÕ or ÔpotentialÕ. Rather, 
potence suggests a unity of power and actuality, or rather, power actualised. For Schelling, because 
there is no absolute separation between thought and being, or in the terms of the PoA, between ideal and 
real, then power is always actualised power; potence is the identity of power and actualisation. As such I 




essentially only one essence, one absolute realityÕ (ibid., p. 14). As such, this essence, as absolute, 
Ôis indivisible such that it cannot change over into other essences by means of division of 
separationÕ (ibid.). If the absolute cannot be divided or separated, how does it give way to discrete 
entities? How does it emerge at all? It can only emerge, in SchellingÕs view, through potences, 
which he defines as the Ôindivisible wholeÉposited under various determinationsÕ. For example, 
the essence of nature, of art, and history, is the same essence. The absoluteness which inheres in 
each is one absolute in different potences, (the absolute in the potence of nature, the absolute in the 
potence of art, etc.).  
So, to determine the potences that ground the organism in the PoA, Schelling borrows from his 
nature-philosophy.
165
 He writes, 
The construction of matter is based on three potences, yet these are 
general categories such that just as matter individually, so also is nature 
as a whole based on them. By means of the first potence matter is 
anorganic and subordinated to the schema of the straight line; by means 
of the second it is organic, and by means of the third it is the expression 
of reason. The same potences, however, recur yet again in regards to the 
whole of matter. Matter as a whole is anorganic, organic and only in the 
third potence Ñ in the human organism Ñ the expression of reason. 
(PoA, p. 161) 
The point of this passage is to show how the three potences of matter Ñ anorganic, organic, 
organism, are all indeed matter. They are differentiated iterations of the same fundamental potence 
of matter itself. Via the first potence, matter is anorganic, or ÔcohesiveÕ (ibid.). I will refer again to 
this potence of cohesion in my subsequent discussion of sonority in SchellingÕs construction of 
music. This will act as a particular example of SchellingÕs more general idea that the character of art 
is in the absolute, namely, the absolute in the potence of art. Before moving to this example of 
sonority, it remains to describe SchellingÕs remarks on beauty generally. 
                                                
165 For a concise overview of differentiation in nature, cf. Esposito, 1977, pp. 88-97. 
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4.2.4. Universal and Particular Beauty 
In the introduction to the PoA, Schelling asks how it is possible that Ôindividual beautiful things can 
issue from absolute beautyÕ (p. 17). Just as the potences from which the forms of art emerge are 
modelled on those of the identity-philosophy, so too the question of universal versus individual 
beauty is answered by the relation of universal to individual generally speaking. Schelling claims 
that philosophy answers this question of universal and individual with Ôthe doctrine of the ideas or 
archetypesÕ (ibid.). Art answers with the doctrine of ideas, intuited not as ideas, but objectively. 
This reiterates SchellingÕs attitude toward the philosophy of art, that Ôart exactly corresponds to 
philosophy and is merely the latterÕs objective reflexÕ, and so, Ôit must also proceed through all the 
potences within the real as does philosophy in the ideal (ibid., p. 16). This is one of SchellingÕs 
clearest explications of the respective roles of philosophy and art. Fundamentally, philosophy deals 
with the ideal; art with the real.  
Of course, the relation between philosophy and art is not so simple. Philosophy has its own ideal 
and real side (transcendental philosophy and nature-philosophy respectively), and so too does art; 
the formative and verbal arts.
166
 Why is this important for considering beauty? Because Schelling 
describes beauty as the interpenetration or mutual informing of [the ideal and real]Õ (p. 29). The 
merely ideal, in general philosophy, is truth (Schelling also calls this knowledge), and the merely 
                                                
166 Schelling refers to an antithesis between Ôplastic or formative art on the one hand, and verbal art on 
the otherÕ (p. 18), which have antecedents in SchellingÕs nature-philosophy; namely that the interaction 
of the productive force with that which it produces is never at rest. In the case of the PoA, the antitheses 
between forms of art arises from the distinction between ideal and real as emanations of the absolute. As 
such, Schelling claims that Ôformative and verbal art = the real and ideal series of philosophy. The 
former is characterised by that unity in which the infinite it taken up into the finite, and the construction 
of this series corresponds to the philosophy of nature. The latter is characterised by the other unity, the 
one in which the finite is formed into the infinite, and the construction of this series corresponds to 
idealism in the general system of philosophy. I will call the first unity the real unity, the second the ideal 
unity; that which encompasses both I will call indifferenceÕ (ibid.). 
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real is action. Hence beauty is the mutual informing of truth and action into one another, in the form 
of art. I here review the earlier quoted passage for clarity: 
In the philosophy of art, no principle other than that of the infinite can 
serve as our point of departure; hence, we must present the infinite as the 
unconditioned principle of art. Just as for philosophy in general, the 
absolute is the archetype of truth, so also for art is it the archetype of 
beauty. We must therefore show that truth and beauty are merely two 
different ways of viewing the one absolute. (1989, p. 16) 
So, as well as there being beauty in things, there is also absolute beauty, of which the former is a 
reflected image. All appearing beauty derives from absolute beauty, which, as already mentioned, is 
GodÕs creation of the universe. Beautiful art is the indifference of absolute and reflected beauty 
(ideal and real beauty).  
To test SchellingÕs conception of beauty, specifically the notion that the universe itself is 
constructed as a work of art, I now turn to one example of SchellingÕs attempt to ground art and 
beauty in the absolute. This example is sonority. Sonority is the potence with which Schelling 
constructs music. 
4.2.5. The Indwelling Beauty of the Universe: Schelling on Sonority 
Schelling seeks to show the multifarious ways in which beauty manifests itself, and the absolute 
archetype of beauty which grounds all of these manifestations. As mentioned above, Schelling calls 
the first potence of the absolute the anorganic, and this potence corresponds to the primary 
formation of matter: matter as cohesive. This cohesion, and the relations that obtain between 
material forms gives rise to sonority. How can this be? How does the mere forming of matter give 
rise to sonority, indeed, how does it give rise to anything audible at all? If there is no sound in 
space, how can the cosmic bodies which occupy space produce sonority? Is this a purely 
metaphorical sonority that Schelling is talking about? One could certainly interpret it that way, but I 
210 
 
claim that understanding sonority as a metaphor in the PoA does not go far enough in getting to 
grips with SchellingÕs argument. I will make sense of sonority with two interpretative tools. 
Schelling delivered the PoA lectures as the height of wave-particle debate. In 1803, between the two 
occasions in which Schelling delivered the lectures, Thomas Young discovered the double-slit 
interference, which he believed confirmed his wave theory of light.
167
 YoungÕs theory, among 
others, was critical of NewtonÕs corpuscular theory of light, which held that light was emitted from 
luminous bodies in minute particles. In his Experiments and Calculations Relative to Physical 
Optics of 1804, Young draws the conclusion from his experiments that Ôthere must be some strong 
resemblance between the nature of sound and that of lightÕ (p. 12). The resemblance Young is 
referring to is that both sound and light can be seen to travel in waves. I use the concept of wave as 
a figure here, to help interpret SchellingÕs specific remarks on sonority. I do not wish to say that 
Schelling claims sonority is a wave, merely that the figure of the wave can help us understand some 
of the more abstract remarks Schelling makes about sonority being detached from corporeality. 
Secondly, and more explicit in SchellingÕs own text, is the Pythagorean notion of musica 
universalis, or the music of the spheres.
168
 Simply put, this theory posits that the distances between 
musical intervals are equivalent to the ratios of whole numbers. This in turn is related to the 
discovery attributed to Pythagoras, that the length of a musical string will change the frequency and 
hence the pitch of the note that resounds from it. These are said to be reflections of the harmony 
                                                
167 The modern double-slit experiment of which YoungÕs was a precursor, is used to show that light 
can behave as both wave and particle, and describes the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanical 
phenomena. I should make clear that I use the double slit inference as an interpretative tool. I do not 
wish to claim that Schelling was directly influenced by YoungÕs experiments, but rather that 
understanding sonority according to the figure of the wave can be helpful in making sense of SchellingÕs 
ideas. 
168 Schelling mentions this himself in the PoA. pp. 109; 116-17. 
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between celestial bodies and their movements.
169
 The second contextual basis is therefore the 
movements of the universe considered as music.
170
 I therefore approach SchellingÕs discussion of 
sonority considered as a wave, and that the splitting apart of the absolute into ideal and real, can be 
understood analogously to the splitting apart of the wave through the double slit experiment. 
Schelling mentions sonority in his construction of music, which he characterises in the introduction 
to the PoA as Ôthe primal rhythm of nature and of the universe itself, which by means of this art 
breaks through into the world of representationÕ. Here Schelling seeks to show that the real side of 
art, that in which the infinite is informed into the finite Ñ or to put it another way, unity is informed 




I showed above the process that the absolute undergoes when manifesting an ideal and real side. 
SchellingÕs resulting proposition is that works of art pertain to the indifference of the real and the 
ideal, from either the real or the ideal side. In other words, real, or formative art, expresses an 
indifference between ideal and real via the real Ñ via the particular. Verbal or ideal arts, which I 
will discuss in more detail in the following section, express the same indifference between ideal and 
real via the ideal Ñ the universal. 
                                                
169 The attribution of the music of the spheres to Pythagoras is a point of debate. Here I do not wish to 
engage in this debate, or establish the merits of Pythagorean theory generally. I only wish to point out 
that Schelling was operating with this idea in mind during the PoA lectures. The other well-known 
defence of this idea appears in KeplerÕs Harmonice Mundi in 1619. 
170 Such is SchellingÕs interpretation of the Pythagorean theory: ÔPythagoras does not say that these 
movements [of the solar system] cause music, but rather that they are musicÕ (PoA, p. 116). 
171 Schelling also calls the real side of art the formative arts, in contrast to the idea, or verbal arts. I 
remind the reader that Schelling divides the arts into real and ideal in the same way that he divides the 
absolute into a real and ideal side. Formative art therefore means that art in which unity (ideal) is formed 
into multiplicity (real): quite literally the forming of an ideal into something real. As art, these 
formations of ideal into real form their own unity once again (that of the indifference between ideal and 
real) which Schelling names the symbol. This will be elucidated in what follows. 
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So, how does the informing of the ideal into the real manifest as sonority? To start, speaking as he 
is from the real side, Schelling adapts his use of ideal and real into infinite and finite. For Schelling, 
infinity is construed as unity, since the alternative with be merely an infinite sequence, i.e. empirical 
infinity.
172
 The real is then construed as multiplicity.
173
 So, to clarify, the ideal is a unity, and 
infinite; the real is multiplicity, and finite. SchellingÕs proposition is then formed as follows: Ôthe 
indifference of the informing of the infinite into the finite, taken purely as indifference, is sonorityÕ 
(ibid., p. 107). Again, this indifference manifests as sonority only when the absolute is determined 
in the potence of art. In nature, the same indifference manifests as magnetism.
174
 Magnetism is not 
in itself a form, however; it does not subsist independently of the matter that is animated by it. So, 
while magnetism is the implanting of the infinite into the finite as bound to a corporeal body, 
sonority is the same implanting Ôdetached from corporealityÕ (ibid., p. 108).  
How can sonority be detached from corporeality? If Schelling is to defend this claim then clearly 
sonority must be distinguished from sound. This is where I appeal to the two contextual bases 
mentioned above (SchellingÕs preoccupation with the music of the spheres and sonority considered 
as wave). These two bases are linked by the fact that both of them require a particular understanding 
of the universe, namely, one that moves beyond the universe as merely physical occurrences and 
relations. Instead, I read sonority according to what it is that makes such relations possible. Now, 
the resonance of bodies is directly related to their coherence; this can be observed in things such as 
the orbital resonance of planets with smaller bodies. In this case, resonance is attached to the 
                                                
172 This notion of empirical infinity will become important for my discussion of the sublime (4.3). 
173 As should hopefully be evident by this point, SchellingÕs philosophy generally speaking attempts to 
account for this relation; unity posited in multiplicity, or, the absolute being articulated. 
174 Cf. Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature: ÔMagnetism is the general act of animation, the implanting of 
unity into multiplicity, of the concept into difference. The same embodiment of the subjective into the 
object, which, viewed in the ideal as potency, is self-consciousness, appears here expressed in being, 
although even this being, considered in itself, is a again a relative unity of thinking and 
beingÉMagnetism is therefore the universal form of individual being-in-itselfÕ (1988, p. 128). 
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material movements of the bodies themselves. However, the relations between bodies in orbit, given 
that they can be translated into harmonic musical  intervals, shows for Schelling that there must be, 
underlying these harmonic intervals, a formal quality that displays the identities of these relations in 
each other. This formal quality is sonority, which Schelling considers as ÔcontinuityÉan 
uninterrupted flow of resonanceÕ (ibid.). This uninterrupted flow allows for sonority to be viewed as 
containing unity in multiplicity. To put it bluntly, sonority is the possibility of multiplicity 
contained in a unity. It is then neither the total absence or total presence of resonance, but the 
absolute form of resonance. Sonority is the essence of resonance, or Òresonance-nessÓ.   
Considering the above in terms of the notion of wave, one can refer to the experiment in which an 
alarm clock is placed in a bell jar, and a vacuum chamber is created inside. Now, the sound of the 
clock of course cannot be heard, because it has no medium through which to travel. However, this 
has only shown that the waves cannot travel, it has not erased the possibility, the potential for 
emitting sound. If one imagines waves, not as emerging or emitting from a source, but as particular 
manifestations of a larger unity, then sonority is precisely this larger unity; the formal, and so non-
corporeal separation and union of resonance into distinct resonances. Like the double-slit 
experiment, I understand sonority as a wave that separates itself into two Ð in SchellingÕs terms this 
would be the separation of coherence of bodies from their resonances. In splitting itself, however, 
sonority is also the rejoining of the separated waves back together into a singular wave. To put it in 
terms of the identity-philosophy, sonority is differentiation within unity. Hence, as Schelling says, 
Ôthe multiplicity that is combined in the coherence as such with the unity thus becomes a living 
multiplicity within sonority, a multiplicity that affirms itselfÕ (ibid., p. 116) If, in double slit 
experiment, the wave splits and comes back together, sonority is its point of splitting and rejoining. 
This leads to the second contextual basis, the notion of the music of the spheres. Schelling claims 
that the doctrine of the music of the spheres has been wrongly interpreted as asserting that Ôthe 
movements ofÉlarge bodies must cause resonanceÕ (ibid.). According to this causal view, 
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Schelling claims, Ôthese bodies rotate with different yet measured velocity and in increasingly 
expanded circles, [and consequently] this resonance generates a consonant harmony organised 
according to the tonal relationships of musicÕ. This view is mistaken, claims Schelling, because it 
interprets the whole thing empirically. Schelling argues that this notion of the music of the spheres 
Ôdoes not say that these movements cause music, but rather that they themselves are musicÕ (ibid.). 
I would add here that the movements are the form of music, so that the absence of a medium in 
which resonance can travel does not effect SchellingÕs interpretation. Music is the universe in the 
potence of sonority. Music is, or rather, symbolises, the universe considered as sonorous. The 
musician is that person who can perceive the harmonies of the universe without them being 
transmitted. 
Sonority is constant or total resonance. The conclusion to this construction of SchellingÕs is 
expressed ¤77 of the PoA: ÔThe art form in which the real unity purely as such becomes potence and 
symbol is musicÕ (ibid., p. 109, original emphasis). As such, Schelling asserts that music 
encompasses all other formative arts, which include painting, sculpture and finally, architecture. Put 
simply, all formative arts are in some sense musical, according to Schelling. Rhythm, the next 
element in SchellingÕs analysis, is that which allows music as a particular form to emerge as music, 
rather than mere sonority. Schelling defines rhythm as Ôthe periodic subdivision of homogeneityÕ, 
such that the Ôuniformity of the latter is combined with varietyÕ (ibid., p. 110). In other words, 
rhythm associates the unity of sonority with multiplicity and division of sounds. Schelling argues 
from this that rhythm is the Ômusic within musicÕ, since that which characterises music at the most 
basic level is Ôthe informing of unity into multiplicityÕ (p. 111). It should be noted that music is the 
art form which encompasses these elements Ð sonority and rhythm. Sonority and rhythm are of 
course not exclusive to musical art, however. Remember, sonority is cohesion of bodies and their 
relations. Those bodies can be anything Ñ planets, geological formations, atoms. All of these, 
Schelling insists, pertain to a sonorous relation when considered from the real side of the absolute. 
It should be reiterated here that a notion such as the sonorous relation between cosmic bodies 
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clearly does not refer to bodies as they are understood by the natural sciences. SchellingÕs theory of 
beauty, like his entire philosophy of art, emerges from the construction of the universe in the form 
of art. In the PoA, and through this example, one can see Schelling attempt to push his identity-
philosophy to its limit.  
So, when constructed in the form of art, or to put it more bluntly, when the universe is considered as 
a work of art, then the relations between its bodies, via sonority, are harmonious. However, the 
mere cohesion of bodies is not sufficient for music, and rhythm, as a division of sonorous unity, 
cannot come from harmonious relation, but from the relation of that harmonious relation to a 
heterogeneous element; as Schelling puts it Ôthe informing of unity into multiplicityÕ Consider 
sonority as breath. Imagine a breath that is totally and completely unified i.e. does not suffer 
interruption from loss of lung capacity or any external forces. Rhythm is what divides that breath 




Here the ÒoÓ is homogenous, uninterrupted breath. The dashes represent the division of this breath 
into multiple parts, such that any part could be separated and considered as its own rhythmic unit, 
for example: 
o-o 
Schelling claims that the other features of music, harmony and melody, are made possible from the 
result of these two forces, sonority and rhythm, being placed in a relation of indifference. To use the 
breath analogy, a piece of music never entirely closes the breath off, never entirely reduces to Ò-Ó, 
                                                
175 This is my rendering of sonority is my own, not SchellingÕs. I use it for illustrative purposes. 
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nor does it entirely expand to homogenous breath, to ÒoÓ.
176
 Even a piece of music that consisted of 
a single note played continuously could still be written out as follows: 
-o- 
 
For Schelling, the simple elements of homogeneity and variety Ñ sonority and rhythm Ñ give rise 
to all subsequent musical forms, including tone, harmony and melody. These various musical forms 
do something else as well however. They pertain to the absolute which gave rise to them via the 
cohesion of matter and the relations between material bodies. Thus Schelling believes that he has 
shown the way in which, not just music as product of human activity occurs, but also how the 
universe itself is musical in a certain sense. Schelling explains in the following passage: 
The cosmic bodies in nature are the first unities that emerge from eternal 
matter. They also encompass everything within themselves, even though 
they must contract into themselves and withdraw into narrower and more 
particular spheres in order to portray the highest organization within 
themselves in which the unity of nature attains perfect self-intuition. The 
type of reason inherent within them thus expresses itself in their general 
movements only for the first potence. Music, which from the one 
perspective is the most closed of all the arts, the one that comprehends 
the forms still within chaos and without differentiation, and that 
expresses only the pure form of these movements separated from 
corporeality, similarly takes up the absolute model or figure only as 
rhythm, harmony, and melody, that is, for the first potence, even though 
within these spheres it is the most boundless of all arts. (ibid., p. 118) 
Here is one interpretation of this passage. Cosmic bodies pertain to the first potence, i.e. anorganic 
matter. As such they display only certain characteristics corresponding to this potence Ñ cohesion, 
movement and relations to other bodies. However, those same cosmic bodies, as manifestations of 
the absolute, develop though the second and third potences Ñ organic matter and organisms 
                                                
176 One could object with, for example, John CageÕs Ò4:33Ó, which consists of a group of musicians not 
playing their instruments for the entire performance. See my counter-argument to this below. 
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respectively. These cosmic bodies, viewed from the perspective of the second and third potences, 
obtain the same relations of rhythm, harmony and melody, as do music. In fact, music becomes 
music via these elements. Music is an expression of the absolute pertaining to the first potence that 
expresses a universe in itself. That universe is the absolute taken in the form of music. From the 
first potence, then, the archetype of beauty is not just deployed in service of cosmic bodies but is 
claimed to inhere in those cosmic bodies by virtue of a simple line of reasoning. If music derives 
from the same absolute as does every other real form, and we can deem music beautiful due to its 
rhythmical, melodic and harmonic features, we must then also be able to deem the harmony of 
cosmic bodies as beautiful. If music, organisms, human beings and the judgments of beauty in 
which we partake all arise from the same potences as do cosmic bodies, then how can we say on the 
one hand that beauty is a feature of our judgment, but then deny that it is a feature of the cosmic 
bodies which, via the potences, make judgment itself possible? If beauty pertains to a free cognitive 
harmony, SchellingÕs claim is that is must also pertain to a free real harmony, namely the harmony 
between the potences of anorganic, organic and organism. 
Even John CageÕs Ô4:33Õ, a piece that consists only of four minutes and thirty three seconds of 
ÒsilenceÓ, can be called music according to SchellingÕs definition. How is this so? CageÕs piece 
substitutes sounds made by instruments for the ambient sounds of the space in which it is performed 
Ñ shuffling of seats, coughs, a door opening, etc. Treating these sounds homogeneously, they are 
merely noise. Outside of the context of the piece one would not think to pay them any attention. 
Indeed, Schelling would not wish to call noise music. However, he refers to a specific form of 
rhythm that he calls the Ôtact of rhythmÕ (p. 111), wherein rhythm is not merely a regularity of 
intervals (as could be achieved in counting), but rather is that which is sought Ôwherever something 
identical is to become different or variedÕ (ibid.). The homogenous sound of a gathered crowed, in 
the context of a musical piece, attains a kind regularity Ñ Ôrhythm is viewed as the transformation 
of an essentially meaningless succession into a meaningful oneÕ (ibid.). I have explored here 
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SchellingÕs construction of music out of its absolute form Ñ sonority Ñ and the primary 
manifestation of that form, rhythm. I will now draw some conclusions from this 
Conclusion 
Both the absolute and art have ideal and real sides. The task of identity-philosophy, which Schelling 
simply calls Ògeneral philosophyÓ in the PoA, is to prove the identity of real and ideal in the 
absolute. The task of philosophy of art is to prove the same identity of real and ideal in the form of 
art. Schelling therefore regards all art forms as not only various relations of indifference between 
real and ideal but also as symbols of the same features in the universe, both at the anorganic stage of 
cosmic bodies, and the organic stage of nature. For Schelling, all philosophy, philosophy of art 
included, begins, proceeds and amounts to the absolute. SchellingÕs claims about beauty are 
designed to justify his initial claim in the first section of the PoA that Ôthe universe is formed in God 
as an absolute work of art and in eternal beautyÕ (ibid., p. 31). I have aimed to show this via the 
example of sonority as the indwelling of harmonious relations which are symbolised through art-
works. Artistic beauty is the representation of the original indifference posited in the informing of 
ideal into real. In the case of music, this is the informing of unity into multiplicity. What remains to 
be discussed are SchellingÕs conception of the sublime and the negotiation of these two elements 
via genius into the work of art. These will be the topics of 4.3.  
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4.3. Absolute Formlessness: The Sublime and Genius 
Abstract 
Corresponding to SchellingÕs view of beauty as absolute harmony is his view of the sublime as 
formless chaos. The sublime could therefore be construed as an element of the absolute, just like 
beauty. However, Schelling argues differently. According to his view, the sublime emerges out of 
what Schelling calls Ôaffecting infinityÕ, similar to KantÕs notion of the absolutely great. Therefore 
the sublime is merely the perception of chaos, rather than an indication of actual chaos in the 
universe. This results from SchellingÕs reliance on SchillerÕs conception of the sublime, which is 
highly influenced by Kant. By contrasting SchellingÕs ideas of the sublime and genius, I show that 
SchellingÕs view of art as the organ and document of philosophy reveals a problematic tension 
between philosophy as ideal and art as real articulations of the absolute. I conclude therefore with a 




4.3.1. The Law of Beauty and the ÔArt of ArtÕ 
In the PoA, Schelling seeks to prove that beauty is not only a form of human judgment, but also a 
feature of the absolute. This means that beauty can be conceived in two senses, which I have 
elucidated above, namely absolute beauty and reflected beauty. The art-work, by virtue of being the 
indifference of ideal and real, is therefore the symbol or indifference of absolute and reflected 
beauty for Schelling. With respect to beauty, then, Schelling differentiates himself quite strongly 
from Kant. For the latter, beauty is expressed as a form of reflective judgment which draws 
attention to the harmony between oneÕs cognitive faculties. For Schelling, this subjective harmony 
corresponds to a harmony inherent in the absolute, Schelling derives this from the very formation of 
the matter of the universe. Matter is worked into harmony by the act of God, of which the art-work 
is a symbol. In the case of the sublime, SchellingÕs connection to Kant appears stronger than in the 
case of beauty, in large part due to SchellingÕs repeated references to Schiller, who in his essay On 
the Sublime from 1801, defends a largely Kantian notion of the sublime and its relation to reason.
177
 
In the PoA, the sublime is not emergent from the absolute, so much as it is the symbol employed by 
the subject in attempting to apprehend the absolute. In this way, the sublime in Schelling has a 
familiar structure to the one with which I characterised the Kantian sublime in chapter two, namely 
as reasonÕs attempt to present ideas to sensibility. To elucidate the position of the sublime in 
SchellingÕs philosophy of art, I begin first by briefly reiterating his description of beauty. 
Schelling claims that ÔBeauty is posited where the particular (real) is so commensurate with its 
concept that the latter itself, as infinite, enters into the finite and is intuited in concreto. The real in 
which it (the concept) appears thereby becomes truly similar and equal to its own idea, the idea in 
which precisely this universal and particular are in absolute identityÕ (PoA, 1989, p. 29). SchellingÕs 
                                                
177 In his introduction to a translation of two essays by Schiller, Naive and Sentimental Poetry and On 
the Sublime, Elias points out that the exact date of the publication of On the Sublime remains uncertain, 
with estimates ranging from 1793 to 1801. Elias argues for the later date in consideration of the 
development of SchillerÕs thought (cf. Elias, 1966, pp. 78-9). 
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conception of beauty in these terms is directly linked to his notion of the absolute as expressed in 
the gods of Greek mythology. In ¤33 of the PoA Schelling defines the law of portrayal of the gods 
as the Ôlaw of beautyÕ. This law of beauty is that Ôthe absolute cannot be beautiful at all except as 
intuited within limitation, that is, within the particularÕ. All these gods are Ôthe absolute 
itselfÉintuited actuallyÕ (ibid.). Schelling here gives the examples of Jupiter and Juno.
178
  
It is not so much that Greek mythology forms the basis of all art. Such a reduction would be quite 
absurd. Rather, this mythology exemplifies the formal framework of SchellingÕs identity-
philosophy, constructed as philosophy of art. So, when Schelling characterises mythology as the 
Ôuniversal and absolute material of artÕ (PoA, p. 17), I interpret this as an already materialised 
process of the absolute manifesting in mythology. Mythology, then, is taken as the presentation of 
the indifference of the ideal and real, or, to put it in terms of construction, mythology is the unity of 
concept and being. This is the law of beauty briefly described, in so far is it pertains to harmonious 
limitations of the absolute. I now discuss how this relates to the notion of the Ôart of artÕ. 
Schelling refers to the art of art in his discussion of genius.
179
 Just like the absolute, the universe, 
and all manifestations of phenomena contained therein, the genius has both an ideal and a real side. 
Schelling explains the real and ideal sides of genius like this: 
The real side of genius, or that unity that constitutes the informing of the 
infinite into the finite, can be called poesy, in the narrower sense; the 
ideal side, or that unity that constitutes the informing of the finite into the 
infinite, can be called the art within art.(ibid., p. 85, original emphasis) 
By poesy, or the real side, Schelling simply means Ôthe creation of something real, or invention in 
and for itselfÕ. Poesy here means poiesis. The ÔartÕ of art is that whereby this creation becomes 
                                                
178 These are the Roman names for the Greek gods Zeus and Hera. 
179  I refer to SchellingÕs concept of genius here merely in order to illuminate the relation between 
poesy and art, which will inform my discussion of the sublime. It is only after these discussions that I 
focus on genius in the PoA directly. 
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Ôsomething that exists and endures on its own powerÕ (ibid.).  What does it mean for a creation to 
endure? Schelling does not here mean the status of an art-work as mere product. Just as in his 
nature-philosophy Schelling was concerned with the unconditioned productivity of nature, so here 
he is concerned with the absolute poiesis of the absolute. This can be extrapolated from SchellingÕs 
more general assertion in ¤5 of the PoA that the absolute is utterly eternal (ibid., p. 24).  I clarify 
this by way of a brief comparison with natural productivity. In his nature-philosophy, Schelling 
claims that natural phenomena emerge from an opposition of forces that are constantly striving for 
rest i.e. indifference, but never reach it. Schelling uses the analogy of a whirlpool to explain this. A 
whirlpool is formed when the flow of a stream encounters resistance. The whirlpool is therefore 
maintained by the continual tension between forces. Natural products, in SchellingÕs view, are the 
things which form in this tension. As such, the opposing forces are never entirely commensurate 
with each other; if they were then they would each cancel the other out, and no whirlpool, nor 
product would emerge.
180
 This unequal opposition of forces is what makes nature dynamic. 
Schelling references a similar idea in ¤5 of the PoA, wherein he says that a particular thingÕs 
endurance is Ôa perpetual positing of its universal into its concrete manifestationÕ (ibid.). However, 
in the presentation of the absolute in the form of art, Schelling claims that there can be no such 
perpetual positing, as this implies a continuous succession of positing, and Ôby virtue of the 
limitation of the latter, [this concrete manifestation] is not everything here and now and at once 
what it could be according to its essence or its universalÕ (ibid.). In the absolute, since that particular 
concrete manifestation is Ôabsolutely equal to the universalÕ this means that Ôit is everything it can 
be, and is so in reality and, simultaneously, without any temporal mediation. It is thus void of time 
and is eternal in itselfÕ (ibid.).  
According to the above, one could interpret Schelling to be saying that art-works themselves are 
eternal, and have no relationship to time, which again would be an indefensible claim. Instead, I 
                                                
180 This example is taken from the First Outline for a System of the Philosophy of Nature (2004, p. 18). 
223 
 
take Schelling to be saying that the art-works are presentations of eternity. They are not eternal 
themselves but rather depict the eternal. In the context of SchellingÕs wish to place art as well as 
philosophy in the absolute, this depiction of eternity can be taken as raising the art-work to the 
eternal itself, in the same way that a philosophical construction is the identity of its exhibition, and 
the proof of what it exhibits. Expressed simply, I take SchellingÕs claim to be the following: artistic 
creations are productions from out of eternity, and as such, are themselves eternal. To understand 
this claim, it is necessary to repeat SchellingÕs more general view of the relation between universal 
and particular within the absolute. ¤26 of the PoA begins, ÔWithin the absolute all particular things 
are genuinely separated and genuinely one only to the extent that each is the universe unto itself, 
and each is the absolute wholeÕ (ibid., p. 34). These particulars within the absolute, or absolute 
particularities, Schelling calls ideas. This is of course dependent on SchellingÕs desire to show the 
Ôtruth of the ideasÕ; that they are not merely regulative as in Kant but constitutive and real.
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How do beauty and the sublime relate to this? The sublime corresponds to the real side, that of 
informing the infinite into the finite. This is poesy; the act of communicating or manifesting an 
artistic concept into a physical form. Beauty corresponds to the ideal side, that of informing the 
finite into the infinite. This is art; whereby this concrete form arrives once again at its own concept, 
by being the absolute manifestation of that concept. According to this reading, it appears that art can 
be both beautiful and sublime simultaneously, and Schelling does indeed claim something like this 
in the PoA.
182
 Relating this to my earlier discussion, I claim that the unity of concept and being 
exhibited in the philosophical construction has as its artistic analogue the unity of (ideal, universal) 
creative power and (real, particular) concrete presentation. If one carries this over to beauty and the 
                                                
181 Cf. Simpson, ÔForewordÕ to the PoA (1989, p. xi). 
182 I qualify this by pointing out that SchellingÕs references to the simultaneity of beauty and the 
sublime are made largely in reference to mythological figures. Again, I read this as a mode for the 
generation of beauty and the sublime rather than a claim that beauty and the sublime themselves emerge 
from the gods of Greek mythology. Cf. ¤33, p. 40. 
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sublime, then it follows that each art-work is the identity of beauty and the sublime. To make sense 
of this, and assess how viable SchellingÕs assertions are, I now turn to his account of the sublime. 
This is an account that I claim is largely influenced by Schiller, and so, indirectly, by Kant. In the 
following I connect SchellingÕs description of the sublime with his description of genius, keeping in 
mind both the explicit influence of Schiller and the implicit influence of Kant. 
4.3.2. Sublime Chaos: Schelling versus Schiller 
Here I examine SchellingÕs general claim in the PoA that the universe itself is conceivable in two 
distinct ways or directions. The more specific claim in the context of the universe in the form of art 
is that each direction corresponds to the sublime and to beauty respectively. Schelling articulates 
this double view of the universe with the following: On the one hand, there is Ôthe view of the 
universe as chaos, which, briefly stated, is the basic view of the sublime to the extent that within it 
everything is comprehended as unity in absolute identityÕ. On the other is the Ôview of the universe 
as the highest beauty and form, since the universe is chaos precisely by means of the absoluteness of 
form, or because all forms and accordingly also the absolute form are structured into every 
particular and into every formÕ. (ibid., p. 34).  
The fact that forms arise at all from this chaotic universe is the result of the unlimited being in some 
way limited. This much Schelling believes to have explained via the construction of matter in his 
nature-philosophy.
183
 However, what is at issue here is not the process by which the unlimited 
becomes limited. Rather, the issue is the way in which the absolute is considered. When considered 
as sublime, the absolute is viewed through oneÕs Ôencounter [with] the infinite being taken up into 
the finite as suchÕ; the encounter in which Ôwe distinguish the infinite within the finiteÕ (ibid., p. 
87). Immediately, one detects in SchellingÕs construction of the sublime that it is more directly 
connected to the powers of human cognition than it is to the nature of the absolute itself. Though 
not explicitly, Schelling echoes KantÕs distinction between the mathematical and dynamic sublime. 
                                                
183 Cf. Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, (1988, pp. 179-181). 
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SchellingÕs distinction is that between the physical and the ethical sublime. The physical sublime 
refers to the human subjectÕs Ôpower of apprehensionÕ being defeated in the face of vast concrete 
items such as ÔcolossalÉmountains or cliffsÕ, Ôthe wide ocean that is surrounded only be the vault 
of heavenÕ or the Ôimmensity of the earthÕ (ibid., p. 86). The ethical sublime refers to the human 
subjectÕs Ôvital powerÕ which Ôdwindles to nothingÕ in the face of the power of nature. Both Ôpower 
of apprehensionÕ and Ôvital powerÕ are taken from Schiller, who clearly borrows from Kant. 
Common to all three authors is the notion that the human subject can, through their reason, rise 
above the merely sensible in nature which imposes upon them in the sublime, to the realm of the 
infinite; the realm of ideas.
184
 Schelling attempts to distinguish himself from Kant and Schiller by 
claiming that the boundlessness of nature one perceives in colossal or immense masses is Ôonly the 
reflection of the true infinityÕ (ibid.). He writes that Ôthe intuition of the sublime enters only when 
the sensual, concrete intuition is found to be inadequate for the greatness of the concrete object, and 
then the truly infinity appears for which the merely concretely infinite is the symbolÕ. Hence the 
sublime is Ôa subjugation by the truly infinite of the finite that is merely affecting infinityÕ (ibid.).  
                                                
184 In Kant this view appears in ¤29 of the CJ; Ôthe disposition of the mind to the feeling of the sublime 
requires its receptivity to ideasÉa dominion that reason exercises over sensibility only in order to 
enlarge it in a way suitable for its own proper domain (the practical) and to allow it to look out upon the 
infinite, which for sensibility is an abyssÕ (5:265). 
Schiller expresses a similar view in On the Sublime; ÔÔWe gladly permit the imagination to meet its 
master in the realm of appearances because ultimately it is only a sensuous faculty that triumphs over 
other sensuous faculties; but nature in her entire boundlessness cannot impinge upon the absolute 
greatness within ourselvesÕ (1966, p. 196). 
Schelling himself borrows another passage from On the sublime, which in SchillerÕs text reads, 
Ôfearlessly and with a terrible delight [the subject] now approaches these ghastly visions of his 
imagination and deliberately deploys the whole force of this faculty, [reason,] in order to represent the 
sensuously infinite, so that even if it should fail in this attempt he will experience all the more vividly 
the superiority of his ideas over the highest of which sensuousness is capableÕ (ibid., pp. 203-4). 
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In referring sublime experiences to the truly infinite for which they are the symbol, Schelling 
attempts to move beyond the separation in Kant between theoretical and practical reason Ñ namely, 
that it is only via the latter that one can strive toward the infinite Ñ and SchillerÕs preoccupation 
with the moral significance of the sublime. While the moral significance of the sublime is present in 
Schelling, it is not his main concern. As he writes, ÔThe intuition of the sublime, in spite of its 
kinship with the element of the ideal and the ethical, is an aesthetic intuition, to use this world here 
finallyÕ (p. 86). As with beauty, SchellingÕs aim is to ground the sublime in the absolute. 
It is with this attempt to describe the sublime within the absolute that SchellingÕs account begins to 
run into problems, which spill over into his account of genius.  He claims that nature itself, however 
colossal or powerful it may appear to the human subject, is not in itself sublime, since Ôthe 
disposition or the principle by which the finite is reduced to a symbol of the infinite is actually 
found in the subjectÕ (ibid., p. 90). Once again borrowing from Schiller, Schelling attempts to 
describe the sublime itself, detached from any disposition of the subject. Here Schelling takes 
SchillerÕs notion of the Ôconfusion of [natureÕs] own appearancesÕ, which is of course a confusion 
relative to oneÕs lack of ability to sensibly apprehend the whole of nature. Schelling applies this to 
the absolute as Ôprimal chaosÕ, that in which Ôall resides as one and one as allÕ. Here, Schelling 
characterises the essence of the sublime in the same way that he characterises the essence of 
material objects. He writes, Ôthe being or substance of the sublime is always one and the 
sameÉonly the form changesÕ (ibid., p. 86). It has already been asserted that this form of the 
sublime can take two different routes, depending on the perspective from which is its viewed. 
Borrowing again from Schiller, Schelling writes, ÔChaos, is the fundamental intuition of the 
sublime, for our vision perceives as chaos even the great mass that transcends our sensuous vision, 
as well as the sum of all the blind forces too powerful for our mere physical strength. Only to that 
extent do these things become symbols of the infinite for us.Õ (ibid., original emphasis). 
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The sublime emerges as the attempt by sensibility to apprehend the formlessness of the absolute 
itself. Absolute formlessness is simultaneously absolute form because, while not being reducible to 
any particular form, i.e. not being formed itself, it is also the totality of all possible forms. If beauty 
emerges from the forming of the absolute into harmonious relations, of which the art-work is the 
objective presentation, then it would follow that the artistic genius needs at least some insight into 
the primal formlessness of the absolute out of which beauty is formed. This primal formlessness, 
which is also the ground of all possible forms, is the sublime. And yet, it is still not clear that 
Schelling has distinguished here between the sublime as subjective disposition and the sublime 
within the absolute. Once the subjective disposition that encounters the sublime is removed, the 
sublime itself is also removed, because within the absolute itself, beauty and the sublime are 
identified. The determination of something as beautiful or sublime is only relative (ibid., p. 91). 
Hence, Schelling claims that the difference between beauty and the sublime Ð in terms of the 
absolute from which they emerge as different Ð is a quantitative rather than qualitative difference, 
pertaining to the degree of limitation of the infinite by the finite, or the ideal by the real. Schelling 
claims that Ôthe more the element of limitation reconciles itself with the infiniteÉthe more purely 
beautiful it isÕ (ibid.). For example, one could look at the night sky and see just an array of stars, 
disordered and chaotic. However, the sublime feeling that I experience out of this encounter Ð as 
Schelling himself says Ð is not because the night sky really is this way, but is rather a reflection on 
the partial nature of my sensibility, and the dwindling of my physical powers in the face of such a 
vast expanse. However I can also hold the same sky as the symbol of an overriding order, which, 
though definitely beyond my powers of sensible apprehension, is not impossible for me to conceive 
through my reason. The absence of limitation or formlessness of the night sky is in fact just what I 
perceive, not the night sky itself. Schelling confirms this by saying that Ôin general there is no 
sphere in which something can be called beautiful that in a different situation might not also be 
sublimeÕ (ibid.). On this reading the sublime does not seem to be within the absolute at all, but 
merely a situation in which the absolute is viewed as if it were absolutely formless. However, 
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Schelling also claims that in art, the object itself is sublime (ibid., p. 90). This is revealing of what I 
see as a larger problem with SchellingÕs account of genius, to which I now turn. 
4.3.3 The ÒSublimeÓ Intuitions of Genius 
Both Kant and Schelling claim that everyone can access the sublime, and that this is indication of a 
good moral disposition.
185
 This concerns judgments of the sublime, or in SchellingÕs terms, 
practices of the sublime. To be able to create things which can induce these judgments or practices 
is rarer. For Kant, beauty and the sublime can be demonstrated only in the realm of judgment, of 
inner cognitive activity. Genius is that capacity in particular humans Ñ a gift of nature Ñ to 
instigate judgments of beauty through a work. For Kant, however, the artist endowed with genius is 
not in the business of creating works that are sublime.
186
 Schelling thinks differently. This is due to 
SchellingÕs claim that the universe can be viewed as either beautiful or sublime, and the related 
claim that all representations of the absolute are in themselves universes. As such, an art-work for 
Schelling can be either beautiful or sublime; indeed it can be both simultaneously. While this 
certainly follows from SchellingÕs conception of the identity of the absolute, itself inherited from 
his earlier notion of the unconditioned in nature, some problems start to emerge once the sublime is 
viewed in the context of genius. By extension, this specific problem connects to a more general one 
in the PoA, which has to do with the status of the artist relative to the status of the philosopher. 
Schelling writes of this relation between the artist and the philosopher: 
Since in the artist the same principle is objective that in the philosopher 
reflects itself subjectively, he [the artist] thus does not relate to that 
principle subjectively or consciouslyÑthough he, too, could become 
conscious of it through a higher reflex. He is not, however, conscious of 
it in the quality of being an artist. As such he is driven by that principle 
                                                
185 Cf. Kant, CJ ¤29 (5:265); Schelling, PoA, ¤65, (1989, p. 87). 
186 Kant writes in ¤48 of the CJ that genius is the Ôtalent for beautiful artÕ, and that the beauty of art Ôis 
a beautiful representation of a thingÕ (5:311). 
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and for just that reason does not himself possess it. When he does 
achieve the standpoint of the ideal reflex with regards to that principle, he 
thereby elevates himself as an artist to a higher potence, yet as an artist 
still always relates to it objectively. The subjective element within him 
passes over again to the objective element, just as in the philosopher the 
objective element is constantly taken up into the subjective one. For this 
reason philosophy, notwithstanding its inner identity with art, is 
nonetheless always and necessarily science, that is, ideal, whereas art is 
always and necessarily art, that is, real. (ibid., p. 6) 
This characterisation of the artist bears some resemblance to KantÕs in the ¤46 CJ, where he writes 
that Ôthe author of a product that he owes to his genius does not know himself how the ideas for it 
come to himÕ, since for Kant the rule of genius is ÔnatureÕ (5:308). Schelling in fact makes several 
remarks on genius that resonate with KantÕs. In the introduction to the PoA Schelling claims that 
Ôgenius is autonomous, yet it escapes only external determination by laws, not determination by its 
own laws, since it is only genius insofar as it actually constitutes the highest law-governed 
qualitiesÕ (1989 p. 6). This is comparable with KantÕs description of genius in the CJ as exemplary 
originality: Ôgenius is a talent for producing that for which no determinate rule can be given, not a 
predisposition of skill for that which can be learned in accordance with some rule, consequently 
originality must be its primary characteristic. [However,] since there can also be original nonsense, 
its products must at the same time be models, i.e., exemplary, hence, while not themselves the result 
of imitation, they must yet serve others in that way, i.e. as a standard or a rule of judgingÕ (5:308). 
Despite these similarities, Schelling wishes to move beyond KantÕs quasi-mystical view of genius 
as a gift of nature, and place it firmly within the absolute.
187
 For Schelling, genius is secured in the 
absolute as Ôthe eternal concept of the human being in GodÕ (PoA, 1989, p. 84). What distinguishes 
genius is not its mysterious origin, but its capacity to articulate Ð which here means present as real Ð 
the absolute in its pure form, i.e. identity. However, since it remains true in both Kant and Schelling 
                                                
187 Cf. CJ, ¤46 (5:308).  
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that not everybody can be a genius, it is unclear what Schelling manages to add here by claiming 
that the genius is the eternal concept of the human being in God. In addition, the above passage on 
the relation between artist and philosopher appears to claim that philosophy is responsible for 
articulating the idea of which art-works are merely the unconscious depiction. I now move to the 
conclusion, which dwells on this question. 
Conclusion 
Schelling attempts to disassemble the mystery of genius in the following passage:  
With few exceptions, one can learn very little about the essence of art 
from those who practice art in such an age, since as a rule they have no 
guide concerning the actual idea of art and of beauty. Precisely this 
dominant disagreement even among those who practice art is a 
compelling reason for seeking the true idea and principles of art itself by 
means of science. (1989, p. 11) 
Schelling seems to be contradicting himself somewhat, on the one hand presenting art as that which, 
like nature, seems to operate according to its own self-determining laws, but also as the thing which 
will always have a flawed concept of itself without the help of rigorous philosophy to decode the 
practices that the artists themselves cannot explain. It is unclear if Schelling means to say that art-
works themselves express flawed concepts, or whether he is making the softer claim that to engage 
in constructions of the nature of art is to necessarily do philosophy of art. 
This leaves open further questions. Can philosophy even talk about art in the way Schelling desires? 
Can philosophy construct a system of art, given that artistic creation (poesy) draws into its products 
an unconscious element of nature? Must philosophy become unconscious in order to reveal these 
grounds? In other words, must philosophy become art if it is to objectively present the absolute in 
which it is grounded? Such is SchellingÕs claim in the System of Transcendental Idealism (1978, p. 
232), but I do not believe this is his claim in the PoA. While Schelling offers an intriguing notion of 
the relation of beauty and the sublime, which I have read as variations on a continuum between 
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form and formlessness, it is not clear how he has distinguished his notion of genius from KantÕs.  
Both the sublime and genius in Schelling appear to be partial or unconscious reflexes of that which 
philosophy articulates completely and consciously. SchellingÕs wish to construct the universe in the 
form of art therefore seems to rest on limitations inherited from KantÕs aesthetics. The real and 
direct depiction of the absolute in art doesnÕt appear to actually be so without the aid of 
philosophical construction, which acts on behalf of the genius, blind to the origin and essence of 
their own creations. Perhaps the absolute cannot be articulated unless this articulation is 
subsequently constructed in and of the absolute, by philosophy. There is one topic I have mentioned 
but not fully elucidated in Schelling, that can potentially reconcile this discrepancy between the 
artistic unconscious and the philosophical conscious. This is SchellingÕs notion of the symbol. In 
the concluding part of this chapter, I examine Schelling on the symbol in the context of poetry. The 
resulting concept of symbolic language presents an opportunity to assess whether reconciliation 
between philosophy and the ocean of poetry from which it emerges is possible.  
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4.4. Poetry and the Absolute Symbol of Language 
Abstract 
In the final part of chapter four, I examine SchellingÕs notion of the symbol. I claim that it is with 
this notion that Schelling attempts to construct not just the identity of art and the absolute, but of art 
and philosophy. I begin with a reiteration of KantÕs view of poetry, which I claim provides a useful 
point from which to examine SchellingÕs dissatisfaction with KantÕs philospohy more generally. 
While cautious not to reduce SchellingÕs philosophy to merely a comment on Kant, I point out some 
important common ground between them on the issue of poetic versus philosophical language. I 
look to WhistlerÕs account of the symbol in Schelling as one way to interpret the relation of art and 
philosophy in the PoA. While I agree with much of WhistlerÕs reading, I identity some problems in 
its characterisation of indifference (Indifferenz). The overriding question will be this: once the 
absolute has moved from absolute identity to presentation of that identity, to what extent is it still 
absolute? SchellingÕs answer: to the extent that the absolute forms a symbol of itself. It is with this 
answer that I move to my own interpretation of SchellingÕs symbol, wherein I claim that the PoA 





As I have maintained throughout this chapter, a fundamental concern in SchellingÕs PoA is to 
properly account for the relation between art and philosophy. With his theory of the symbol, this 
concern comes most clearly to the fore. As such, the symbol in Schelling is never an exclusively 
artistic phenomenon.
188
 For Schelling, the symbolic is a mode of presentation (Darstellung), which 
he claims can unite philosophy and poetry. As I have already discussed, Schelling identifies art and 
philosophy in the sense that they are both manifestations of the absolute Ñ philosophy is primarily 
an ideal manifestation, art primarily a real one. Already, however, Schelling has separated the 
absolute into two sides, which, despite his insistence that they do indeed issue from the same 
absolute identity, are separate nonetheless. To become absolute once again, philosophy must find 
what is real to it; art must find what is ideal. In what follows I elucidate SchellingÕs attempt to 
show, through his theory of the symbol, that such a reunion is possible, as well as some 
consequences of this. 
Why is the (re)union of real and ideal important? To answer this question requires some comparison 
with Kant. In making this comparison, I should make clear that I neither view Schelling merely as a 
respondent to Kant, nor Kant as a problem that Schelling has to solve. I therefore agree with 
Whistler that one should not view SchellingÕs philosophy merely as ÔKantianism drawn to its most 
extreme conclusionsÕ (2013, p. 67) However, when it comes to the symbol, particularly considered 
as the mode of poetic presentation, it is clear that Schelling does indeed seek to move beyond 
KantÕs views in some sense. Schelling refers to KantÕs aesthetics as a ÔformalismÕ, which, while 
bearing a Ônew and higher viewÕ of art that its predecessors, still ends up presenting Ôartistically 
empty doctrines of artÕ (PoA, 1989, p. 8). This is one of the strongest condemnations of KantÕs 
aesthetics in the PoA, and it is, I claim, largely to do with KantÕs aesthetic ideas being dependent on 
ideas of reason, such that art itself is reduced to a dependency on Ôthe moral and the usefulÕ (ibid.). 
                                                
188 Cf. Whistler, 2013, pp. 142-3. 
234 
 
In order to establish how fair SchellingÕs assessment of Kant actually is, I revisit a passage from 
KantÕs CJ which I take as representative of the position Schelling attacks. In the passage, Kant 
defends the notion that poetry is the highest art. He writes, 
The art of poetry (which owes its origin almost entirely to genius, and 
will be guided least by precept or example) claims the highest rank of all 
[in the arts]. It expands the mind by setting the imagination free and 
presenting, within the limits of the given concept and among the 
unbounded manifold of forms possibly agreeing with it, the one that 
connects its presentation with a fullness of thought to which no linguistic 
expression is fully adequate, and thus elevates itself aesthetically to the 
level of ideas. (5:326) 
At first, this passage doesnÕt seem to warrant the kind of attack that Schelling wages on Kant. 
However, in the same paragraph, Kant continues that we can supply ourselves, through poetry, with 
a Ôschema of the supersensibleÕ (ibid.). 
There are two consequences of this passage, which I believe contribute to SchellingÕs ire at what he 
views as the emptiness of KantÕs aesthetics. Firstly, poetry in KantÕs view is a linguistic 
presentation of ideas which are themselves inexpressible. What is expressed poetically cannot be 
captured in a straightforward linguistic expression. In addition to this explicit statement of KantÕs 
there is an implicit one; that this irreducibility of poetic expression also applies to linguistic 
expressions in philosophy. This will prove important for my assessment of SchellingÕs theory of the 
symbol, as the PoA seems determined to explain what poetry is, not just how it is to be aesthetically 
judged. Secondly, the presentation of poetry acts as a schema of the supersensible, in the sense that 
through poetry one is able to judge of nature Ôfreely and self-activelyÕ, in accordance with Ôpoints of 
view that nature does not present by itself in experience either for sense or for the understandingÕ 
(ibid.). Now, it should be stated that Kant does offer a solution to the apparent contradiction of a 
linguistic expression (poetry) presenting an idea that no linguistic expression can capture. He too 
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calls this the symbolic, and also defines it as a mode of presentation. In ¤59 of the CJ Kant defines 
the symbolic mode of presentation in contrast to the schematic: 
All hypotyposis (presentation)Éas making something sensible, is of one 
of two kinds: either schematic where to a concept grasped by the 
understanding the corresponding intuition is given a priori; or symbolic, 
where to a concept which only reason can think, and to which no sensible 
intuition can be adequate, an intuition is attributed with which the power 
of judgment proceeds in a way merely analogous to that which is 
observed in schematization. (5:351). 
For Kant the symbolic relies upon analogy in order to connect sensible intuitions to ideas. However, 
for Schelling, this process of analogous schematisation, whereby something is taken as meaning 
something else, is not the symbolic but the allegorical. Schelling defines allegory as that mode of 
presentation in which Ôthe particularÉmeans or signifies the universal or is intuited as the 
universalÕ (PoA, 1989, p. 47). KantÕs example in the CJ of a handmill symbolising a despotic state 
can help to show what Schelling means by this. In KantÕs example, the sensible representation of a 
handmill Ð its various features and actions Ð are judged as if, i.e. analogously, to the features and 
actions of a despotic state. One thing is taken to mean another, although literally it does not. As 
Whistler puts it, in the Kantian symbol, Ômeaning and being remain separated, and in consequence 
the former is only won from the latter by means of an artificial process of analogous reasoningÕ 
(2013, p. 66). For Schelling, the symbolic must present itself as the identity of meaning and being. I 
will discuss this in detail in the following section. 
One could here contend that when Kant defines poetry as a schema of the supersensible, he does not 
mean that poetry is symbolic, and so the distinction between symbol and allegory is not necessary. 
However, given the above quoted passage from Kant on the nature of the symbolic, it is hard to read 
poetry as the schema of the supersensible in any other way. What results from KantÕs description of 
poetry is a division between poetic and non-poetic language. The former can act as a vehicle for 
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communicating aesthetic ideas, but the content of these ideas does not appear to be translatable into 
non-poetic language. In what follows, I will show why Schelling believes this to be problematic. 
4.4.2. SchellingÕs Construction of the Symbol 
Shortly before Schelling introduces his notion of symbolic language, he affirms the common goal of 
art and the philosophy of art. He writes, Ôour present task, which is to understand the transition of 
the aesthetic idea into the concrete work of art, is the same as the general task of philosophy as 
such, namely, to understand the manifestation of the ideas through particular thingsÕ (p. 98). This 
reiterates the idea I mentioned earlier that the symbol is not an exclusively artistic mode of 
presentation. It also highlights a quite particular problem with which I will conclude; namely, how 
philosophy and art can each emerge from the absolute while remaining absolute themselves. 
In ¤39 of the PoA, Schelling defines the symbol in the following way: ÔRepresentation of the 
absolute with absolute indifference of the universal and the particular within the particular is 
possible only symbolicallyÕ (p. 45). To reach the symbolic, Schelling moves through three levels. 
The important thing about these levels is that they are not qualitatively differentiated, but are rather 
a Ôsuccession of potencesÕ (ibid., p. 48). I will return to this point in a moment. The first and most 
basic of the three levels of representation is schematism. Schelling defines schematism as a 
representation in which Ôthe universal means the means the particular, or in which the particular is 
intuited through the universalÕ (ibid., p. 46). A simple example of this would be applying a concept 
to an object, where the concept is what makes the object mean what it is.  
The second level is the allegorical, where the Ôparticular means the universal, or in which the 
universal is intuited through the particularÕ. An example of allegory would be intuiting the acts of a 
virtuous man as meaning the concept virtue. The third level is the symbolic, where neither universal 
means particular nor vice versa, but rather the two are Ôabsolutely oneÕ (ibid.). In this case, the 
virtuous manÕs actions do not merely mean virtue, rather they are virtue itself, and virtue is the 
virtuous man. The symbolic is the Ôabsolute formÕ, because it is the only form in which the 
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universal and the particular unify into one. These three levels correspond to the level of indifference 
between ideal and real in the various iterations of the absolute. The allegorical represents finitude, 
the schematic infinity, and the symbol eternity. What differentiates infinity from eternity? Eternity 
is not simply endless magnitude or an endless amount of time, it is rather endless producing i.e. an 
endless process of finitude emerging from infinity, and returning to it. Concepts like magnitude and 
time are produced out of eternity; eternity is their condition. If eternity is the condition of all 
subsequent things, and in fact endures through all things, one starts to understand better how 
language symbolizes eternity. 
The status of the symbol is therefore no small matter for Schelling. Whistler points out that it is 
incumbent upon Schelling to show that Ôthere is symbolic language and that philosophy employs it 
to exhibit the absolute absolutelyÕ (Whistler, 2013, p. 168). The reason for this in the PoA, is that 
Schelling believes in the Ôabsolute status of philosophy and the absolute status of poetryÕ (ibid., p. 
166). So either the language of philosophy and poetry is an absolute language, or it symbolises an 
absolute expression which itself cannot be absolutely expressed. As Whistler writes, philosophy is a 
linguistic enterprise, a Ôdiscursive yet maximal Darstellung [presentation] of the absoluteÕ (ibid.). 
What does this mean? Can philosophy be discursive about the absolute and identical with it at the 
same time? WhistlerÕs account of the symbol in the PoA addresses these potential problems. Before 
moving on to SchellingÕs construction of symbolic language, and poetic language in particular, I 
take a moment here to dwell on WhistlerÕs summary of the problems and his response to them. 
Firstly, I return to the point above, that schematism, allegory and symbol are a succession of 
potences. In simple terms, this means that schematism, allegory and symbol are differences of 
degree rather than of kind. How is one to interpret this? Schelling himself takes it as given and does 
not offer an explicit defence. Whistler provides some clarity on the issue. Whistler claims that 
schematism, allegory and the symbolic are Ôdifferent intensities of absolute formÕ (2013, p. 145). As 
such, they each correspond to Ôthe three different types of self formation of realityÕ (ibid.). In the 
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case of schematism, the infinite is emphasised over the finite, or in other words, the ideal is 
emphasised over the real. In the case of allegory, the finite is emphasised over the infinite, or the 
real over the ideal. In the case of the symbol, neither real nor ideal take precedence. The symbol is 
therefore the indifference between ideal and real, and also therefore between schematism and 
allegory. 
A second potential problem emerges from the first, which is that Schelling also refers to the 
indifference of the symbol between schematism and allegory, as a synthesis of latter two. In other 
words, the symbol is the result of schematism and allegory being synthesised. However, synthesis, 
in SchellingÕs view, applies to a reflective mode of philosophy, namely one that rests on the 
dualism between subject and object. This is where my view differs from WhistlerÕs. Whistler claims 
that Ôreflection is a mode of thinking or being in which the indifference of the absolute is not 
produced to a very high degreeÕ, and further, that Ôreflection designates the less intense ways in 
which reality manifests itselfÕ (ibid., p. 148).  I do not follow this line of thinking, precisely for the 
reason that Schelling takes indifference to be itself subject to differentiation, and further, that 
speculation is merely reflection to a more intense degree. Whistler claims that the presence of 
ÔsynthesisÕ in the PoA is most likely a result of Schelling preparing the material for lectures, rather 
than a rigorously construed text (ibid., pp. 144-5). This may be so, and the fact that Schelling 
withheld the PoA from publication during his lifetime supports such an idea. However, given that 
the PoA itself sits on the edge of SchellingÕs period of relative silence before the publication of his 
Freiheitsschrift in 1809,
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 I claim that it is just as reasonable to interpret the presence of synthesis 
here as a realisation on SchellingÕs part that the absolute grounding of philosophy and art in the 
identity of the absolute came with its own specific difficulty, namely, how to first leave the absolute 
                                                
189 The full English title is Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom, but is 
commonly known as the Freedom Essay. 
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so that one can return to it.
190
 With this in mind, I now turn to SchellingÕs claims about symbolic 
language in the PoA to see what solutions it offers. 
4.4.3. The Poetry of Symbolic Language  
In order to understand SchellingÕs thoughts on the symbolic in language, I will briefly reiterate his 
general position regarding the absolute. Schelling claims that the universe itself, as the most basic 
manifestation of the absolute, is Ôstructured in two directions corresponding to the two unites within 
the absoluteÕ (PoA, 1989, p. 201). The first of these presents the absolute as the ground of existence, 
and corresponds to the real side. The second presents the absolute as essence, and hence as inhering 
in every particular. The first of these is Ôessence worked into formÕ, the second Ôform [É] worked 
into essenceÕ (ibid.).  However, just because the absolute is spilt into real and ideal sides, this does 
not mean that it is split apart. Both the absolutely real Ð symbolised by the plastic arts Ð and the 
absolute ideal Ð symbolised by the verbal arts Ð contain their opposite by virtue of being absolute. 
In ¤73 Schelling states this most explicitly: Ôthe ideal unity, as the resolution of the particular into 
the universal, of the concrete into the concept, becomes objective in speech or languageÕ. He goes 
on to argue for why this is the case. On the one hand, language is Ôthe direct expression of 
something ideal Ñ knowledge, thought, feeling, will, and so on Ñ through something realÕ and for 
that reason Schelling considers language itself as a work of art. On the other hand, Ôlanguage is also 
a work of nature, because it is the only material used for art that cannot be considered as being 
created by artÕ. Schelling concludes from this that language is a Ônatural work of artÕ (p. 99). 
The key to understanding SchellingÕs philosophy of language has to do with his conception of the 
absolute. In the section of the PoA where he talks about language, Schelling reiterates this 
conception by stating, Ôthe absolute is by nature an eternal act of producingÕ (ibid.). The absolute is 
to the extent that it produces. 
                                                
190 Cf. McGrath, 2015, p. 8. 
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In a very dense passage of the PoA Schelling describes the absoluteÕs eternal producing as an 
absolute cognitive act. This act, like everything, moves in an ideal and a real direction. The absolute 
is to be taken, therefore, as the identity of ideal and real. When the absolute moves over into form, 
i.e. when the infinite is informed into the finite, this real side of the act manifests as matter. Matter 
becomes a symbol for the absolute, as it takes the eternity of the absoluteÕs producing into itself. 
However, matter is not itself eternal. Unlike older theories of substance, Schelling thinks that the 
only eternal thing is the producing of matter, not matter itself. In other words, matter is matter to the 
extent that it is being produced. In the previous chapter (3.2.3) I pointed out how Schelling views 
nature (the real side of the absolute), as the identity of productivity and product. To shift 
terminology for a moment, this means that the ground of all matter is not an eternal substance, but 
the eternal production of substance. That which the act of production produces, as I mentioned 
before, moves in two directions simultaneously. In other words, matter is not the cause of ideas, and  
ideas are not the cause of matter. When the absolute moves to the real side, its product is matter. 
When it moves to the ideal side, its product is ideas, which do not have to transfer themselves into 
any form, but can remain ideal. However, given that this ideal is contained with the act, it is not the 
absolutely ideal, but rather appears as something Ôrelatively ideal that possesses the real outside of 
itself Ð standing over against itÕ (1989, p. 100) However, as relatively ideal, it strives for the real to 
give it form, and so cannot cross over into objectivity. The ideal side of the absolute affirmation 
remains subjective, and strives Ôyet again toward a covering, a body, through which it may become 
objective without detriment to its idealityÕ (ibid., p. 100). 
For Schelling, language represents the indifference point between the ideal striving for a body and 
that which embodies the ideal. Language is the densest symbol because is represents the maximal 
indifference of ideal and real, the informing of the idea (infinite) into the real (finite) concrete 
linguistic utterance. Language itself, just as the absolute itself, is neither wholly real nor wholly 
ideal. Rather, language is the ground of possibility for particular languages, i.e. languages that 
transmit the indifference Ð though synthesised Ð of ideal and real. It is not just that language is the 
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densest symbol. All symbols are ultimately linguistic. The differences between art forms are not 
qualitative, but quantitative. Because language achieves the indifference of ideal and real, it 
becomes a Ômore paradigmatic symbol than matter, and this forms the basis for SchellingÕs 
conjecture that poetry and linguistic symbols are generally superior to material symbolsÕ (Whistler, 
2013, p. 183). Language is the objectification of the absolute ideal, not merely into matter, which 
cannot itself speak, but into an objective form that does not thereby lose its ideality. To put it 
another way, the self-affirmation of God becomes the Ôspeaking word of God, the logos, which is 
simultaneously God himselfÕ (PoA, 1989 p. 100). It is this divine speaking in which one partakes 
with language.  
SchellingÕs connection here of human language with the word of God would appear to provide a 
natural conclusion to his theory of the symbol. GodÕs creation is itself symbolised, reaffirmed, by 
human language. As Schelling himself reaffirms, Ôone views the word or speaking of God as the 
outflow of the divine science, as the creating, multifarious, and yet congruous harmony of the 
divine act of creationÕ (ibid.). However, this is where the symbol in Schelling begins to show signs 
of a deeper realisation. Schelling continues, Ôjust as knowledge still grasps or renders itself 
symbolically in language, so also does divine knowledge apprehend itself symbolically in the world 
such that also the whole of that real world (whole inasmuch as it is itself the unity of the real and the 
ideal) is itself a primal act of speaking. Yet the real world is no longer the living word, the speech 
of God himself, but rather only the spokenÑor expendedÑwordÕ (ibid., pp. 100-1). At this point, 
one arrives in Schelling to the moment that I have anticipated throughout, namely, the relation 
between art and philosophy. I propose an interpretation of Schelling that acknowledges the 
difficulty he has with reconciling this relation. 
4.4.4. Looking into the Speculative Mirror 
To end, it is sometimes necessary to return to the beginning. In this case it is SchellingÕs own 
beginning in the PoA, where he states very clearly that art is the Ôrepetition of [identity-philosophy] 
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in its highest potenceÕ (ibid., p. 13). It is clear from what has been said so far that this highest 
potence is the symbolic. However, if art is identity-philosophy conducted symbolically, then it 
would seem that philosophy is not itself symbolic, and that art has the advantage over philosophy. 
This would seem to contradict SchellingÕs remarks on genius and the sublime, wherein he states that 
philosophy can reveals the true nature of things only partly understood by their creators. The claim 
that art is identity-philosophy in its highest potence appears to make art superior to philosophy. 
Even when Schelling directly asserts the superiority of philosophy, art can in some sense be seen to 
have something philosophy does not. For instance, Schelling writes, 
Philosophy is the basis of everything, encompasses everything, and 
extends its constructions to all potences and objects of knowledge. Only 
through it does one have access to the highest. By means of the doctrine 
of art an even smaller circle is formed within philosophy itself, one in 
which we view more immediately the eternal in a visible form, as it were. 
Hence, the doctrine of art, properly understood, is in complete agreement 
with philosophy. (ibid.) 
This passage quite assertively places the circle of art within the all-encompassing circle of 
philosophy. However, while the circle of art is smaller, it is also more potent, both in SchellingÕs 
sense of potence, and also in terms of its capabilities. Philosophy may encompass the absolute, it 
may extend to all potences, but art, and here, I would claim, poetry particularly, confronts 
philosophy with a visible eternity, with a fully formed absolute. Poetry realises and makes real what 
philosophy only identifies in the ideal. A little further back in SchellingÕs introduction one finds 
this: ÔThe philosophy of art is a necessary goal of the philosopher, who in art views the inner 
essence of his own discipline as if in a magic and symbolic mirrorÕ (ibid., p. 8). The union of 
philosophy and art, of the scientific spirit and the poetic, is always a reunion; a joining together of 
that which first has to be split, i.e. differentiated. In terms of the identity that is supposed to be 
captured or articulated by identity-philosophy, it remains unclear in the PoA to what extent art is 
identity-philosophy (at its highest potence) or merely a branch of identity philosophy. 
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Another problem still lingers. From one perspective language is the utmost symbol of the absolute, 
and so can present it objectively. This is poetry. From the other side, language is constantly trying 
to return to itself as this symbol. This is philosophy. Philosophy is forever trying to become poetry, 
namely to become objective. In the PoA, Schelling constructs indifference out of the absolute 
coming into form. However, indifference is not the same as that out of which it is constructed. 
Indifference allows for the symbol, the symbol in turn cycles back into the absolute as its highest 
potence. It is a circling back. But what has been brought with it? Content and form are one within 
the absolute. But as I have shown, content and form are also one, in the sense that they are 
indifferent, i.e. through the symbolic. However maximally the symbol presents the fundamental 
oneness of the absolute, it remains the case the that absolute must be objectified Ð expressed, 
externalised. The absolute cannot be one straightforwardly.   
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Conclusion to Chapter Four: Philosophy, Poetry 
Towards the end of the PoA Schelling offers some insight into his wish for a union of philosophy 
and poetry, in the form of the didactic poem, Ôin which not merely the forms and aids of 
presentation, but rather that which is to be portrayed is itself poeticÕ (1989, p. 226). Envisioning this 
poem Schelling writes the following: 
The didactic poem can only be a poem about the universe or the nature of 
things. It must portray the reflex of the universe in knowledge. The most 
perfect image of the universe must thus be achieved in science itself, 
which is called to be just such an image. It is certain that a science that 
achieves this identity with the universe will agree with the universe, not 
only from the perspective of content, but also from that of form; to the 
extent that the universe itself is the archetype of all poesy, and indeed is 
the poesy of the absolute itself, science in that identity with the universe, 
regarding both form and content, will in and for itself already be poesy 
and will resolve itself into poesy. The origin of the absolute didactic 
poem or of the speculative epic thus coincides with the perfection of 
science; just as science originally emerged from poesy, so also is its final 
and most beautiful destiny to flow back into this ocean. (p. 226) 
The end of this passage is reminiscent of the System of Transcendental Idealism, where Schelling 
makes the following statement: Ôphilosophy was born and nourished by poetry in the infancy of 
knowledge, and with it all those sciences it has guided to perfection; we may thus expect them, on 
completion, to flow back like so many individual streams into the universal ocean of poetry from 
which they took their sourceÕ (1978, p. 232). The parallels between the STI and the PoA continue. 
In the final part of the STI, Schelling points out the mutual dependency of philosophy and art: 
Take away objectivity from art, one might say, and it ceases to be what it 
is, and becomes philosophy; grant objectivity to philosophy, and it ceases 
to be philosophy and becomes art. Philosophy attains, indeed, to the 
highest, but it brings to this summit only, so to say, the fraction of a man. 
Art brings the whole man, as he is, to that point, namely to the knowledge 
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of the highest, and this is what underlies the eternal difference and the 
marvel of art. (1978 p. 233) 
I would argue that the same contention exists in the PoA, except with a new spirit of synthesis, here 
meaning not just the joining together of different elements, but also of showing their underlying 
affinity, and fundamental identity. So, Schelling ends the PoA with the following; 
The complete manifestation of philosophy emerges only within the 
totality of all potences. The principle of philosophy, as the identity of all 
these potences, thus necessarily has no potence itselfÉThe construction 
of philosophy does not direct itself to a construction of potences as such 
and thus as different potences, but rather within each potence only to the 
presentation of the absolute such that each in and for itself is the whole.  
However, he adds, 
The relationship between the individual parts in the closed and organic 
whole of philosophy resembles that between the various figures in a 
perfectly constructed poetic work, where every figure, by being a part of 
the whole, as a perfect reflex of that whole as actually absolute and 
independent in its own turn. (1989, p. 282) 
Philosophy and art cannot do without each other. So, a persistent dualism continues. The path to 
absolute identity is a double path, separating out and reuniting occasionally, to illuminate the 
common ground beneath, the absolute more evasive than ever when it is most near, in the sublime 
presence of poetic reality. If philosophy can take part of the human to the highest peak, then 
inevitably and perhaps instructively, art confronts us with something wholly real, to which Ð despite 
flights of speculation Ð we must ultimately always return.  
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Conclusion to the Thesis 
I began this thesis by asking Kant and Schelling deal with the unconditioned/absolute in their 
philosophy. To answer this question, I have offered both metaphysical and aesthetic readings of the 
meaning the unconditioned read through SchellingÕs response to KantÕs critical philosophy. A 
significant part of both KantÕs and SchellingÕs articulation of the unconditioned has to do with the 
role of nature. Part of the effort involved in addressing the role of nature have been directed toward 
building a method by which to move between and compare KantÕs and SchellingÕs distinct 
philosophical systems. I have read Kant largely through the lens of SchellingÕs response to Kant, in 
order to establish a dialogue on a specific set of issues common to both philosophers. As I began 
this thesis by saying, metaphysical, aesthetic, and artistic expressions of the unconditioned/absolute 
are all only partial representations of something which cannot be exhausted by any particular 
representation. Putting the results of the individual chapters together, I offer two fragments that 
describe transitions between Kant and Schelling, one concerning nature, and other concerning art. 
The top line describes Kant, the bottom line Schelling: 
 
Kant: nature as the idea of the sum total of appearances  
Schelling: nature as unconditioned productivity. 
 
Kant: art as the expression of aesthetic ideas 
Schelling: art as expression of the absolute. 
 
It has been my task during this thesis to explain and defend these transitions. In so doing, I have 
examined KantÕs critical philosophy and SchellingÕs identity-philosophy, both as self-sufficient 
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systems and relations between two historical periods. The common element of these systems, I have 
argued, is the prized place of poetry as the form of art that seems particularly suited to articulating 
something to which philosophy only approximates. I will spend a moment on this relation between 
philosophy and poetry, firstly for Kant, and secondly for Schelling. I reiterate here that the 
difference between KantÕs and SchellingÕs philosophies can be viewed as a difference in 
standpoints. The difference between critical philosophy and identity-philosophy comes down to 
where one chooses to begin in oneÕs investigations. 
Kant shows us how to prepare for striving toward the unconditioned, the actual carrying out of 
which is done by practical reason. Aesthetic judgment is a pleasurable way in which to reflect upon 
our rational and moral natures, on the duties to which we are bound, and on our capacities to live up 
to them. The organisation of nature, which we judge as if it were purposively arranged as such, 
becomes the ultimate symbol for our own moral nature, and gives us cause to see the world to 
which we are related, not just as an aggregate of mechanisms, but as sustained by the divine 
intelligence of God. Through the journey of KantÕs critical philosophy, one can indeed see how 
knowledge makes room for faith. Art, and poetry in particular can provide us with pleasurable ways 
in which to contemplate the same rational ideas by which we unify our experience of nature, and 
again, it does so for the sake of the same principled moral striving. In his aesthetic philosophy, Kant 
need not occupy himself with how it is that the artistic productions of genius come to express to us 
that which we see in nature. What is most important for Kant is how we can judge the products of 
genius as such. In KantÕs critical philosophy, the line is drawn by experience, and it is up to the 
methods of transcendental idealism to explain how it is that we arrived there. For this we require not 
just the power of deduction, but transcendental deduction; we do not simply seek to know how we 
came by this or that experience, but how we come to have any experience at all, and a priori 
knowledge of its objects. But here there is a subtle distinction on which I claim Schelling hinges. 
By inquiring into the possibility of experience, Kant intends to show the grounds on which 
experience rests at any given moment, and by extension, in all possible moments. The grounds of 
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experience are not temporally, but logically prior to experience itself. The unconditioned is yielded 
by the demand for a unity of Erkenntnisse; meaning not just modes of knowledge, but a system of 
knowledge. 
In this thesis, I have examined KantÕs critical philosophy as a preparation for a complete speculative 
science. The systematic completion of philosophy results from its scope being limited. Reason 
attains its unity by subjecting itself to the formation of boundaries, beyond which, it slips into 
baseless claims, into territory which cannot be held up to the trial of critical metaphysics itself. 
Reason beyond its bounds leads, mostly, to error. However, the regulative ideas of reason which 
give rise to the various forms of dialectic on the CPR, help to secure the boundaries reason must not 
surpass. According to the ideas, nature is held as a unity to the extent that there is a unity of a priori 
laws governing experience of nature. Beyond these laws of experience, one cannot venture, except 
to find their necessary validity for the powers of cognition. In the CJ, Kant adds to these powers a 
further one, the power of reflective judgment. This allows for Kant to articulate a formal process by 
which we are able to hold nature not just as a unity, but also as purposive for the sake of our 
cognition. The power of genius, in addition, seems able, by some unknown gift of nature, to retrieve 
something from the hidden territory of nature, that which lies beyond the grasp of judgments and 
ideas. What is more, the power of genius is able translate this unknowable something into a 
communicable form. A poem may transport us into pleasurable and inspiring realms, but, with 
critical capacities intact, the poem will not take us beyond the bounds of our reason. 
For Schelling, the unconditioned is a productive activity, both in the self and in nature. The 
unconditioned and the absolute are not exactly the same thing in SchellingÕs thought, though they 
are related. The unconditioned is the mode in which the absolute produces itself. Navigating this 
relationship between the unconditioned and the absolute reveals a dynamic in SchellingÕs 
philosophy which is difficult to deal with, and with which Schelling himself struggled. This 
struggle is precisely the one over how to articulate the absolute. In my analysis of SchellingÕs 
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metaphysics and his philosophy of art, a difficulty emerges. In order for philosophy to articulate the 
absolute it must separate itself from the absolute. Intellectual intuition, which can provide insight 
into the original unity from which philosophy and all other things spring, cannot reunite these 
things actually, but only ideally. Has Schelling come so far from Kant after all? Schelling can 
conceive of nature as the identity of productivity and product, but this identity is not simple 
sameness, it is not numerical identity but polar identity, one which relies upon the extremes of its 
poles being in continual tension. In my discussion of SchellingÕs philosophy of art I used the figure 
of the wave to explain the splitting and re-joining of sonority. This figure can also help to 
conceptualise how Schelling saw the dynamic formation of the absolute itself. The absolute is 
eternally differentiating and re-identifying itself, and the multiple oppositions which arise from 
philosophising Ð ideal-real, subject-object, mind-nature, infinite-finite Ð are merely various 
intersections of that wave. Relating to the above question over how far Schelling moves beyond 
Kant, we may ask of these various oppositions and the unity to which they belong, can this unity be 
shown, or must it remain, as Kant would have it, a regulative concept of human reason? 
While identity-philosophy can posit the absolute, it is always entangled in intersections and 
oppositions. I see SchellingÕs defence of the constructive method as an attempt to philosophise in a 
non-dualistic way. While the success of this defence is debatable, its implicit consequences are 
evident in SchellingÕs Philosophy of Art, where the constructive method is taken as given. 
Philosophy can construct the universe in the form of art because such a construction is both 
universal and particular, i.e. it is both a construction of the universe, and the universe viewed as a 
work of art. But philosophy itself, by SchellingÕs own admission, deals only with the universal. In 
other words, philosophy must always be philosophy of something. If SchellingÕs philosophy is a 
philosophy of the absolute, it is because philosophy is eternally seeking the absolute. It is worth 
emphasising that, in this respect, SchellingÕs view is not dissimilar from KantÕs.  
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I have made efforts in this thesis to draw comparisons between both ideas and specific texts that are 
rarely talked about in relation to one another. This is particularly the case with Schelling, who 
enjoys significantly less discussion in English speaking philosophy. However, there has been and 
continues to be work exploring the relationship between Kant and Schelling, as well as the German 
Idealist period more generally. Michelle KoschÕs book Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling and 
Kierkegaard offers useful insights into the development of SchellingÕs early philosophy, as well as 
some of the themes in Kant that I have covered. In addition, Lara OstaricÕs edited collection 
Interpreting Schelling: Critical Essays (2014) covers a wide spectrum of SchellingÕs philosophy, 
including several entries on SchellingÕs identity-philosophy. Although I have not been able to delve 
into these texts in my thesis, they provide evidence of burgeoning interest in SchellingÕs work and 
his connection to the history of German philosophy. 
In the introduction to this thesis, I said that Kant seeks the unconditioned, and Schelling begins 
there. However, by beginning, SchellingÕs philosophy pushes itself apart from the absolute of which 
it desires to speak. What of poetry? Was this not the universal ocean from which Schelling claimed 
philosophy has first arisen? Philosophy may indeed have arisen out of a poetic ocean, and in so 
doing, adapted to the land on which it found itself. But, in finding its legs, in peering out into the 
starry heavens from the highest peak, philosophy forgets how to swim. KantÕs noumenal fog 
threatens to keep philosophy off the sea. And yet, the poet still ventures there, returning on occasion 
with glorious treasures from the deep. They are no mere illusions either, nor puzzles which 
philosophy is tasked with solving. Poetry, and the arts more broadly, have their own modes of 
transportation through the eternity of all things. Philosophy may be forever seeking its own ground, 
finding respite in no place except the one that it builds for itself. But as that building crumbles and 
is built anew, old foundations emerge again, and previously forgotten conversations remind us that 





It is no coincidence that I chose poetry, and for short while in chapter four, music, to approach my 
readings of KantÕs aesthetics and SchellingÕs philosophy of art. During the research, composition, 
and writing of this thesis, I have reflected on my own practice, not just as a philosopher but as a 
poet and musician. I often appealed to these disciplines, in moments where my philosophical skills 
eluded me. When I was unsure if I had understood Kant, Schelling, or a secondary author; when I 
was unsure whether to call something a concept of an idea; when I didnÕt know if I agreed or 
disagreed with something in a text; when I became disoriented in the struggle to take possession 
over my own voice. This last struggle is one that a poet or a musician knows well, and it is one that 
is almost impossible to describe. It can only be evidenced in the work itself, in the doing and 
continuing to do. In the pursuit of my philosophical voice I was also exercising my artistic one. The 
relation was unidirectional. Music is not just a therapy, a temporary break from intellectual work. It 
is its own intellectual work. I saw philosophical ideas in harmonic triads, melodies, rhythms, and at 
the same time, lines of verse, half-remembered etymologies, images and diagrams. It would not 
have been possible to compose this thesis without those things, nor would those things have 
emerged as they did without the works of philosophy I have studied. 
Contained in this thesis are all the notes, pictures, strange dreams, and poetic fragments by which I 
was visited in writing it. This combination, both an act of chance and yet altogether necessary, has 
led me in many moments to consider the possibility of exchange Ð disciplinary, institutional, 
pedagogical. It is an exchange that neither takes philosophy as a pool of assorted problems, nor 
artistic forms as merely eccentric subject matter for academic study. It is an exchange which sees 
both of these things as practices, mutually informative and, at times, coextensive. ÒFreedom within 
formÓ is an expression usually applied to jazz music, but is applies to philosophy as well, and to a 
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